File #2850: "2020_Book_InternationalDevelopmentLaw.pdf"
Testo
1|Foreword (In Memoriam)|6
1|Preface|8
2|Schematic Overview of the Text|9
2|What the Text Is and What It Is Not|11
2|In-Depth Descriptions of the Text|13
2|Methodology|17
2|What Is International Development Law?|19
1|Acknowledgments|22
1|Contents|24
1|About the Author|30
1|Abbreviations|32
1|Chapter 1: Introduction: Setting the Stage|35
2|1.1 A Look Back|35
2|1.2 Significant Historical Trends|41
2|1.3 The Failures of the State|47
2|1.4 The Failure of Ideology|52
2|References|60
1|Part I: The Rule of Law|61
2|Chapter 2: The Rule of Law: Theoretical Principles|62
3|2.1 Theoretical Background|62
4|2.1.1 Max Weber and the Sociology of Law|63
5|2.1.1.1 Other Philosophical Approaches and Voices|66
4|2.1.2 Discourses on Development Theories|67
5|2.1.2.1 Neo-Classical Economic Theory|68
5|2.1.2.2 Challenges to Neo-Classical Thinking|69
6|Structuralist School|69
6|Marxists and Neo-Marxist Theory|70
6|Alternative Normative Challenge|71
5|2.1.2.3 The Washington Consensus|72
4|2.1.3 Another Perspective on Development Theory|75
5|2.1.3.1 Waves of Development Assistance|76
3|2.2 Modernization Theory Vs. Dependency Theory|76
4|2.2.1 Modernization Theory|76
5|2.2.1.1 Modernization Theory in Practice|78
5|2.2.1.2 Modernization Theory Questioned by Its Own Proponents|81
4|2.2.2 Dependency Theory: A Contrarian Voice|84
5|2.2.2.1 New International Economic Order (NIEO)|85
5|2.2.2.2 The Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Climate Change Accord|86
5|2.2.2.3 Common But Differentiated Responsibility|88
4|2.2.3 A Reconciliation of Opposites?|91
4|2.2.4 The Janus Law Principle|94
3|2.3 Conclusion|98
3|Appendix|100
3|References|101
2|Chapter 3: International Development Law: Substantive Principles|103
3|3.1 Establishing the Parameters of International Development Law|108
3|3.2 Parties Under International Development Law|109
4|3.2.1 The Rights and Privileges of Individual Actors|111
4|3.2.2 The Duties and Responsibilities of Sovereign Actors|114
5|3.2.2.1 Privileges|115
4|3.2.3 Multilateral Actors|116
5|3.2.3.1 The Rights of Sovereigns Vis-à-Vis Multiyear Lending Institutions|119
3|3.3 Fundamental Principles of International Development Law|126
4|3.3.1 Mutuality|126
4|3.3.2 Duty to Cooperate|127
4|3.3.3 Equitable Participation in Development|130
4|3.3.4 Accountability|131
4|3.3.5 Transparency|133
3|3.4 Substantive Principles of International Development Law: Establishing Legal Norms|136
4|3.4.1 Contextual Norms|137
4|3.4.2 Absolute Legal Norms|140
3|3.5 Taxonomy of International Development Law|141
4|3.5.1 Absolute Norms|142
4|3.5.2 Globalized Laws|145
4|3.5.3 Relative Norms|146
3|3.6 Institutional Framework for International Development Law: Enforcing Legal Norms|147
3|3.7 Conclusion|151
3|References|152
2|Chapter 4: Is There a Human Right to Development?|154
3|4.1 Historical Antecedents to the Right to Development|155
4|4.1.1 A New International Economic Order|160
4|4.1.2 Monterrey Consensus|170
4|4.1.3 The Judicialization of Human Rights|171
4|4.1.4 Human Rights in an International Development Law Context|175
3|4.2 The History of the Right to Development|177
4|4.2.1 Rights and Duties Under the UNDRD|182
4|4.2.2 Moving Past ``Third Generation´´ Human Rights: Lessons from Islam|187
3|4.3 An African Perspective on the Right to Development|189
4|4.3.1 A Peoples´ Right to Self-Determination|191
4|4.3.2 The Africanization of Human Rights|194
4|4.3.3 An African View of Human Rights|194
4|4.3.4 The Role of the State|196
4|4.3.5 Enforcing the Banjul Charter: The African Commission|199
4|4.3.6 African Court on Human and Peoples´ Rights|201
3|4.4 Prospects for the Right to Development|203
3|4.5 Conclusion|205
3|References|206
1|Part II: International Financial Architecture|210
2|Chapter 5: Sovereign Borrowing and Debt: Legal Implications|211
3|5.1 International Financial Architecture|213
3|5.2 The Sovereign Debt Crisis|216
3|5.3 The Mexican Debt Crisis: Phase I|219
4|5.3.1 Debt Rescheduling|220
4|5.3.2 New Money Lending|223
4|5.3.3 IMF Structural Adjustment|224
4|5.3.4 A Critique of IMF Structural Adjustment|228
4|5.3.5 Initial Results of the ``Containment´´ of the Financial Crisis|232
3|5.4 The Mexican Debt Crisis: Phase II|233
4|5.4.1 The Baker Plan|233
4|5.4.2 The Brady Initiative|234
4|5.4.3 Aftermath of the Brady Initiative|237
3|5.5 The Mexican Debt Crisis: Phase III|238
3|5.6 Asian Financial Crisis|245
3|5.7 Global Financial Contagion and Its Implications|250
4|5.7.1 The U.S. Financial Contagion as a Case Study|251
4|5.7.2 International Consequences of Global Market Contagion|252
4|5.7.3 The G-20 Response|253
3|5.8 Tactical Approaches to Resolving the Debt Crisis|254
4|5.8.1 Debt-for-Debt Exchanges|255
4|5.8.2 Debt-Equity Swaps|256
4|5.8.3 Securitization of Debt|258
4|5.8.4 Special Financing Techniques|258
3|5.9 Debt Relief as a Development Strategy|260
4|5.9.1 A Menu of Options for Middle-Income Countries|260
4|5.9.2 Additional Approaches to Debt Relief|262
4|5.9.3 Debt Relief for the Most Heavily Indebted Nations|263
4|5.9.4 Bilateral Debt Relief: The U.S. Example|264
4|5.9.5 Bilateral Debt Relief Through Paris Club Reschedulings|266
4|5.9.6 Multilateral Debt Relief|267
4|5.9.7 The HIPC Initiative|268
3|5.10 The Debt Crisis in Perspective|273
3|References|274
2|Chapter 6: Privatization as a Development Strategy|277
3|6.1 Nationalization V. Privatization|278
4|6.1.1 The African Lens|281
4|6.1.2 The Case of Venezuela|283
4|6.1.3 Nationalization and Ethnicity|286
3|6.2 Changing the Role of the State|294
4|6.2.1 A State-Led Approach|294
4|6.2.2 A Post-Washington Consensus View of Privatization|297
4|6.2.3 Privatization in Transitional Economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia|299
3|6.3 Privatization Strategies and Tactics|301
4|6.3.1 The Czech Voucher Program|301
4|6.3.2 Pension Plan Privatization in Chile|307
4|6.3.3 Non-Traditional Privatization Methods|310
5|6.3.3.1 Bond and Equity Financing of Private Sales|312
5|6.3.3.2 Initial Public Offering|313
4|6.3.4 Capital Market Development in the Privatization Process|315
3|6.4 The New Face of Nationalization Today|319
4|6.4.1 Potential ``Lessons Learned´´ from Past Global Financial Crises|320
4|6.4.2 Public Private Partnerships: A Way Forward?|322
5|6.4.2.1 Queen Alia International Airport: A Case Study|324
5|6.4.2.2 Bolivia: A Cautionary Tale|327
6|Bolivia´s Water Sector|327
6|Bolivia´s Electricity Sector|329
5|6.4.2.3 Privatization Strategies: Lessons Learned|331
3|6.5 Conclusion|333
3|References|335
2|Chapter 7: Emerging Capital Economies|338
3|7.1 An Overview|338
4|7.1.1 Official Development Assistance vs. Foreign Direct Investment|342
3|7.2 Structuring Capital Markets in Developing Countries|343
4|7.2.1 The Role of the Financial System in Emerging Capital Markets|343
4|7.2.2 Macro-Economic Impediments to Capital Market Formation|344
4|7.2.3 Steps Towards Capital Market Formation|345
4|7.2.4 Capital Market Development: Components and Sequencing|346
3|7.3 Foreign Investment in Emerging Capital Markets|350
4|7.3.1 Foreign Direct Investment|351
4|7.3.2 International Bond and Equity Markets|352
5|7.3.2.1 International Bond Market|352
5|7.3.2.2 International Equity Market|354
4|7.3.3 Foreign Portfolio Investment|357
4|7.3.4 Sovereign Wealth Funds|358
4|7.3.5 Socially Responsible Investing: A Diverse Partnership Among Government, Private and NGO Actors|363
5|7.3.5.1 Catalytic Investment|363
5|7.3.5.2 Socially Responsible and Impact Investing|364
6|Global Environmental Issues and Financing|365
6|Green Bonds|366
5|7.3.5.3 Social Impact Bonds: Definition and Structure|368
6|Recent SIB Launches: A Sample|369
6|Development Impact Bonds: Definition and Structure|370
6|Examples of Recent Launches of DIBs:|371
3|7.4 Legal and Regulatory Frameworks for Emerging Capital Economies|372
4|7.4.1 Prudential Regulation of Emerging Capital Markets|375
4|7.4.2 Legal Regulation of Emerging Capital Markets|378
3|7.5 Conclusion|380
3|References|381
2|Chapter 8: Corruption and Its Consequences|383
3|8.1 Failed and Failing States|384
4|8.1.1 A Brief Overview of the Consequences of Corruption|388
3|8.2 Transnational Organized Crime|390
4|8.2.1 The Definition and the Historical Background of TOCs|391
3|8.3 Global Terrorism|393
4|8.3.1 Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism: A Convergence|400
5|8.3.1.1 A Law Enforcement Approach to Prosecuting TOC Criminals and Their Counterparts|403
4|8.3.2 International Prohibitions Against Financing for Terrorism|405
4|8.3.3 Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Anti-terrorist Finance Laws|406
4|8.3.4 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria: A Case Study|408
3|8.4 Public Corruption|413
4|8.4.1 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime|414
4|8.4.2 United Nations Convention Against Corruption|417
5|8.4.2.1 Money Laundering|418
4|8.4.3 OECD Convention Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions|420
4|8.4.4 World Bank Voluntary Disclosure Program|421
5|8.4.4.1 The World Bank VDP Process|423
5|8.4.4.2 Comparison Between the World Bank VDP and the U.S. Debarment Regime|424
4|8.4.5 United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010: A Bilateral Approach to International Corruption|426
5|8.4.5.1 Bribery Cases Under the UK Bribery Act 2010: A Snapshot|428
5|8.4.5.2 A Comparison Between the UK Bribery Act and the FCPA|430
3|8.5 Corruption in the Private Sector|432
4|8.5.1 Money Laundering|436
4|8.5.2 Sanctions|439
4|8.5.3 FIFA: A Case Study|442
3|8.6 Conclusion|444
3|References|445
2|Chapter 9: Afterthought|447
3|Reference|448
1|Correction to: International Development Law: Rule of Law, Human Rights and Global Finance (Second Edition)|449
2|Correction to: R. Sarkar, International Development Law, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40071-2|449
1|Glossary of International Finance and Investment Terms|450
1|Index|460
1|Preface|8
2|Schematic Overview of the Text|9
2|What the Text Is and What It Is Not|11
2|In-Depth Descriptions of the Text|13
2|Methodology|17
2|What Is International Development Law?|19
1|Acknowledgments|22
1|Contents|24
1|About the Author|30
1|Abbreviations|32
1|Chapter 1: Introduction: Setting the Stage|35
2|1.1 A Look Back|35
2|1.2 Significant Historical Trends|41
2|1.3 The Failures of the State|47
2|1.4 The Failure of Ideology|52
2|References|60
1|Part I: The Rule of Law|61
2|Chapter 2: The Rule of Law: Theoretical Principles|62
3|2.1 Theoretical Background|62
4|2.1.1 Max Weber and the Sociology of Law|63
5|2.1.1.1 Other Philosophical Approaches and Voices|66
4|2.1.2 Discourses on Development Theories|67
5|2.1.2.1 Neo-Classical Economic Theory|68
5|2.1.2.2 Challenges to Neo-Classical Thinking|69
6|Structuralist School|69
6|Marxists and Neo-Marxist Theory|70
6|Alternative Normative Challenge|71
5|2.1.2.3 The Washington Consensus|72
4|2.1.3 Another Perspective on Development Theory|75
5|2.1.3.1 Waves of Development Assistance|76
3|2.2 Modernization Theory Vs. Dependency Theory|76
4|2.2.1 Modernization Theory|76
5|2.2.1.1 Modernization Theory in Practice|78
5|2.2.1.2 Modernization Theory Questioned by Its Own Proponents|81
4|2.2.2 Dependency Theory: A Contrarian Voice|84
5|2.2.2.1 New International Economic Order (NIEO)|85
5|2.2.2.2 The Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Climate Change Accord|86
5|2.2.2.3 Common But Differentiated Responsibility|88
4|2.2.3 A Reconciliation of Opposites?|91
4|2.2.4 The Janus Law Principle|94
3|2.3 Conclusion|98
3|Appendix|100
3|References|101
2|Chapter 3: International Development Law: Substantive Principles|103
3|3.1 Establishing the Parameters of International Development Law|108
3|3.2 Parties Under International Development Law|109
4|3.2.1 The Rights and Privileges of Individual Actors|111
4|3.2.2 The Duties and Responsibilities of Sovereign Actors|114
5|3.2.2.1 Privileges|115
4|3.2.3 Multilateral Actors|116
5|3.2.3.1 The Rights of Sovereigns Vis-à-Vis Multiyear Lending Institutions|119
3|3.3 Fundamental Principles of International Development Law|126
4|3.3.1 Mutuality|126
4|3.3.2 Duty to Cooperate|127
4|3.3.3 Equitable Participation in Development|130
4|3.3.4 Accountability|131
4|3.3.5 Transparency|133
3|3.4 Substantive Principles of International Development Law: Establishing Legal Norms|136
4|3.4.1 Contextual Norms|137
4|3.4.2 Absolute Legal Norms|140
3|3.5 Taxonomy of International Development Law|141
4|3.5.1 Absolute Norms|142
4|3.5.2 Globalized Laws|145
4|3.5.3 Relative Norms|146
3|3.6 Institutional Framework for International Development Law: Enforcing Legal Norms|147
3|3.7 Conclusion|151
3|References|152
2|Chapter 4: Is There a Human Right to Development?|154
3|4.1 Historical Antecedents to the Right to Development|155
4|4.1.1 A New International Economic Order|160
4|4.1.2 Monterrey Consensus|170
4|4.1.3 The Judicialization of Human Rights|171
4|4.1.4 Human Rights in an International Development Law Context|175
3|4.2 The History of the Right to Development|177
4|4.2.1 Rights and Duties Under the UNDRD|182
4|4.2.2 Moving Past ``Third Generation´´ Human Rights: Lessons from Islam|187
3|4.3 An African Perspective on the Right to Development|189
4|4.3.1 A Peoples´ Right to Self-Determination|191
4|4.3.2 The Africanization of Human Rights|194
4|4.3.3 An African View of Human Rights|194
4|4.3.4 The Role of the State|196
4|4.3.5 Enforcing the Banjul Charter: The African Commission|199
4|4.3.6 African Court on Human and Peoples´ Rights|201
3|4.4 Prospects for the Right to Development|203
3|4.5 Conclusion|205
3|References|206
1|Part II: International Financial Architecture|210
2|Chapter 5: Sovereign Borrowing and Debt: Legal Implications|211
3|5.1 International Financial Architecture|213
3|5.2 The Sovereign Debt Crisis|216
3|5.3 The Mexican Debt Crisis: Phase I|219
4|5.3.1 Debt Rescheduling|220
4|5.3.2 New Money Lending|223
4|5.3.3 IMF Structural Adjustment|224
4|5.3.4 A Critique of IMF Structural Adjustment|228
4|5.3.5 Initial Results of the ``Containment´´ of the Financial Crisis|232
3|5.4 The Mexican Debt Crisis: Phase II|233
4|5.4.1 The Baker Plan|233
4|5.4.2 The Brady Initiative|234
4|5.4.3 Aftermath of the Brady Initiative|237
3|5.5 The Mexican Debt Crisis: Phase III|238
3|5.6 Asian Financial Crisis|245
3|5.7 Global Financial Contagion and Its Implications|250
4|5.7.1 The U.S. Financial Contagion as a Case Study|251
4|5.7.2 International Consequences of Global Market Contagion|252
4|5.7.3 The G-20 Response|253
3|5.8 Tactical Approaches to Resolving the Debt Crisis|254
4|5.8.1 Debt-for-Debt Exchanges|255
4|5.8.2 Debt-Equity Swaps|256
4|5.8.3 Securitization of Debt|258
4|5.8.4 Special Financing Techniques|258
3|5.9 Debt Relief as a Development Strategy|260
4|5.9.1 A Menu of Options for Middle-Income Countries|260
4|5.9.2 Additional Approaches to Debt Relief|262
4|5.9.3 Debt Relief for the Most Heavily Indebted Nations|263
4|5.9.4 Bilateral Debt Relief: The U.S. Example|264
4|5.9.5 Bilateral Debt Relief Through Paris Club Reschedulings|266
4|5.9.6 Multilateral Debt Relief|267
4|5.9.7 The HIPC Initiative|268
3|5.10 The Debt Crisis in Perspective|273
3|References|274
2|Chapter 6: Privatization as a Development Strategy|277
3|6.1 Nationalization V. Privatization|278
4|6.1.1 The African Lens|281
4|6.1.2 The Case of Venezuela|283
4|6.1.3 Nationalization and Ethnicity|286
3|6.2 Changing the Role of the State|294
4|6.2.1 A State-Led Approach|294
4|6.2.2 A Post-Washington Consensus View of Privatization|297
4|6.2.3 Privatization in Transitional Economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia|299
3|6.3 Privatization Strategies and Tactics|301
4|6.3.1 The Czech Voucher Program|301
4|6.3.2 Pension Plan Privatization in Chile|307
4|6.3.3 Non-Traditional Privatization Methods|310
5|6.3.3.1 Bond and Equity Financing of Private Sales|312
5|6.3.3.2 Initial Public Offering|313
4|6.3.4 Capital Market Development in the Privatization Process|315
3|6.4 The New Face of Nationalization Today|319
4|6.4.1 Potential ``Lessons Learned´´ from Past Global Financial Crises|320
4|6.4.2 Public Private Partnerships: A Way Forward?|322
5|6.4.2.1 Queen Alia International Airport: A Case Study|324
5|6.4.2.2 Bolivia: A Cautionary Tale|327
6|Bolivia´s Water Sector|327
6|Bolivia´s Electricity Sector|329
5|6.4.2.3 Privatization Strategies: Lessons Learned|331
3|6.5 Conclusion|333
3|References|335
2|Chapter 7: Emerging Capital Economies|338
3|7.1 An Overview|338
4|7.1.1 Official Development Assistance vs. Foreign Direct Investment|342
3|7.2 Structuring Capital Markets in Developing Countries|343
4|7.2.1 The Role of the Financial System in Emerging Capital Markets|343
4|7.2.2 Macro-Economic Impediments to Capital Market Formation|344
4|7.2.3 Steps Towards Capital Market Formation|345
4|7.2.4 Capital Market Development: Components and Sequencing|346
3|7.3 Foreign Investment in Emerging Capital Markets|350
4|7.3.1 Foreign Direct Investment|351
4|7.3.2 International Bond and Equity Markets|352
5|7.3.2.1 International Bond Market|352
5|7.3.2.2 International Equity Market|354
4|7.3.3 Foreign Portfolio Investment|357
4|7.3.4 Sovereign Wealth Funds|358
4|7.3.5 Socially Responsible Investing: A Diverse Partnership Among Government, Private and NGO Actors|363
5|7.3.5.1 Catalytic Investment|363
5|7.3.5.2 Socially Responsible and Impact Investing|364
6|Global Environmental Issues and Financing|365
6|Green Bonds|366
5|7.3.5.3 Social Impact Bonds: Definition and Structure|368
6|Recent SIB Launches: A Sample|369
6|Development Impact Bonds: Definition and Structure|370
6|Examples of Recent Launches of DIBs:|371
3|7.4 Legal and Regulatory Frameworks for Emerging Capital Economies|372
4|7.4.1 Prudential Regulation of Emerging Capital Markets|375
4|7.4.2 Legal Regulation of Emerging Capital Markets|378
3|7.5 Conclusion|380
3|References|381
2|Chapter 8: Corruption and Its Consequences|383
3|8.1 Failed and Failing States|384
4|8.1.1 A Brief Overview of the Consequences of Corruption|388
3|8.2 Transnational Organized Crime|390
4|8.2.1 The Definition and the Historical Background of TOCs|391
3|8.3 Global Terrorism|393
4|8.3.1 Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism: A Convergence|400
5|8.3.1.1 A Law Enforcement Approach to Prosecuting TOC Criminals and Their Counterparts|403
4|8.3.2 International Prohibitions Against Financing for Terrorism|405
4|8.3.3 Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Anti-terrorist Finance Laws|406
4|8.3.4 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria: A Case Study|408
3|8.4 Public Corruption|413
4|8.4.1 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime|414
4|8.4.2 United Nations Convention Against Corruption|417
5|8.4.2.1 Money Laundering|418
4|8.4.3 OECD Convention Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions|420
4|8.4.4 World Bank Voluntary Disclosure Program|421
5|8.4.4.1 The World Bank VDP Process|423
5|8.4.4.2 Comparison Between the World Bank VDP and the U.S. Debarment Regime|424
4|8.4.5 United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010: A Bilateral Approach to International Corruption|426
5|8.4.5.1 Bribery Cases Under the UK Bribery Act 2010: A Snapshot|428
5|8.4.5.2 A Comparison Between the UK Bribery Act and the FCPA|430
3|8.5 Corruption in the Private Sector|432
4|8.5.1 Money Laundering|436
4|8.5.2 Sanctions|439
4|8.5.3 FIFA: A Case Study|442
3|8.6 Conclusion|444
3|References|445
2|Chapter 9: Afterthought|447
3|Reference|448
1|Correction to: International Development Law: Rule of Law, Human Rights and Global Finance (Second Edition)|449
2|Correction to: R. Sarkar, International Development Law, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40071-2|449
1|Glossary of International Finance and Investment Terms|450
1|Index|460