File #2627: "2019_Book_AxialShift.pdf"
Testo
1|Preface|6
1|Contents|10
1|List of Figures|12
1|List of Tables|16
1|Chapter 1: On the Problem of Scale|17
2|References|33
1|Chapter 2: Economic Cubism, Economic Surrealism, and Scale Relativity|35
2|2.1 Introduction|36
2|2.2 Scale Invariance|38
2|2.3 Cubism and Scale Invariance|44
2|2.4 Surrealism and Scale Invariance|54
2|2.5 Concluding Remarks|59
2|References|60
1|Chapter 3: Scale Invariance in Constitutional Political Economy (CPE)|63
2|3.1 Introduction|63
2|3.2 CPE’s Scale Invariance|64
2|3.3 CPE’s Dichotomies|69
3|3.3.1 The Analogy Between Markets and Politics|69
3|3.3.2 CPE and Complexity|71
3|3.3.3 CPE and Methodological Individualism|75
3|3.3.4 Modalities of Small-Scale Organization|76
4|3.3.4.1 Rationality|76
4|3.3.4.2 Risk Aversion and Privacy|77
4|3.3.4.3 The Contractarian Approach and the Origin of the State|78
4|3.3.4.4 Economies of Scale and Political Group Size|82
4|3.3.4.5 Power Relations and Welfare Economics|85
3|3.3.5 Modalities of Large-Scale Organization|88
4|3.3.5.1 Political Economy and the National Scale|88
4|3.3.5.2 The State as a Machine|88
4|3.3.5.3 Methodological Individualism|90
4|3.3.5.4 Homo Economicus|91
2|3.4 Examples of CPE’s Scale Invariance|92
2|3.5 Concluding Remarks|96
2|References|98
1|Chapter 4: The Tower of Babel Syndrome|102
2|4.1 Introduction|102
2|4.2 The Emergence of the Ecological Crisis|108
2|4.3 Locality in the Responses to the Ecological Crisis|111
3|4.3.1 The Historical Response|112
3|4.3.2 The Modern Response|113
3|4.3.3 Localism and the Earth Charter|118
4|4.3.3.1 The Preamble|120
4|4.3.3.2 The Principles|122
4|4.3.3.3 The Way Forward|123
4|4.3.3.4 How the Modern Response Marginalized Localism: The Fiction of ‘Indigenous Peoples’|124
3|4.3.4 How the Modern Response Marginalized Localism: The ‘Natural Rights’ Paradigm|128
3|4.3.5 The ‘Complexity Imperative’ Illusion|130
3|4.3.6 Summary|134
2|4.4 Concluding Remarks|135
2|References|137
1|Chapter 5: A Décollage of Kropotkin, Mumford, Boulding, Bookchin, and Schumacher|140
2|5.1 Introduction|140
2|5.2 Evolution, Organisms, and Hobbes|142
2|5.3 Morphology, Structure, and Scale|146
2|5.4 Civilization, Capitalism, and the Nation-State|153
2|5.5 The Resurrection of City Confederations|158
2|5.6 Concluding Remarks|162
2|References|163
1|Chapter 6: The Morphogenetic Foundations of Economic Change|165
2|6.1 Introduction|165
2|6.2 An Analogy with Organisms and Complexity|166
2|6.3 Economic Change as Morphogenesis|170
2|6.4 A ‘Histopathology’ of Economic Change|174
2|6.5 Democracy as Evolutionary Fitness|177
3|6.5.1 Issues with Defining the Concepts of Democracy and Size|177
3|6.5.2 Democracy and Output Proxies|179
3|6.5.3 Democracy as Evolutionary Fitness|185
3|6.5.4 Summary|190
2|6.6 A General Theory of Morphogenesis|191
3|6.6.1 Definitions|192
3|6.6.2 Propositions|196
2|6.7 Concluding Remarks|204
2|References|206
1|Chapter 7: The Principle of Subsidiarity|212
2|7.1 Introduction|212
2|7.2 A Brief Introduction to the Principle of Subsidiarity|213
3|7.2.1 Subsidiarity’s Economic and Ethical Foundations|222
3|7.2.2 Subprinciples of Subsidiarity|225
3|7.2.3 Subsidiarity as Self-Organization|226
3|7.2.4 Subsidiarity and the Prisoner’s Dilemma|228
2|7.3 A Rendition of Methodological Individualism and Collectivism|230
3|7.3.1 Methodological Individualism|230
3|7.3.2 Methodological Collectivism (Holism)|232
3|7.3.3 Attempts to Reconcile Individualism and Holism|233
2|7.4 Subsidiarity and Methodological Collectivism|234
2|7.5 Subsidiarity and Methodological Individualism|240
2|7.6 Concluding Remarks|244
2|References|245
1|Chapter 8: The Auxilium Model|252
2|8.1 Introduction|252
2|8.2 Two Competing Paradigms|258
2|8.3 The Calculus of Trust|261
2|8.4 An Application of the Auxilium Model: Roberts V Hopwood|270
2|8.5 Trust and Judicial Review: The Fiduciary Principle|273
2|8.6 Concluding Remarks|278
2|References|280
1|Chapter 9: An Economic Model of Political Fission and Fusion|284
2|9.1 Introduction|284
2|9.2 Sovereignty and the Analogy Between Markets and Politics|289
2|9.3 Sovereignty Between Societas and Universitas|292
2|9.4 Direct Attacks on the Nation-State|297
2|9.5 Implications: Towards a Polycentric Constitutional Order|301
2|9.6 An Economic Model of Political Fission and Fusion|303
3|9.6.1 Failure of Federal Orders|310
3|9.6.2 War As a Stabilizing Mechanism|312
3|9.6.3 The Calculus of Independence|313
3|9.6.4 Technology and Subsidiarity|316
2|9.7 Concluding Remarks|321
2|References|325
1|Chapter 10: Case Study: New England and New Zealand|330
2|10.1 Introduction|330
2|10.2 Insights from Buchanan’s Constitutional Economics|332
2|10.3 Subsidiarity in New England and New Zealand|340
3|10.3.1 The United Colonies of New England (1643–1684)|340
3|10.3.2 The United Tribes of New Zealand (1834) and the Treaty of Waitangi (1840)|342
2|10.4 Centralization in New England and New Zealand|346
3|10.4.1 The New England Dominion (1686–1689)|347
3|10.4.2 The New Zealand Provincial System (1852–1876)|349
2|10.5 The Economic Evidence Today|352
2|10.6 Concluding Remarks|357
2|References|358
1|Chapter 11: Case Study: The Territorial Evolution of Australia and the United States|365
2|11.1 Introduction|365
2|11.2 A Comparison Between the United States and Australia|369
2|11.3 The Rationale for New States|372
3|11.3.1 Development in the Large Australian States Is Inhomogeneous|374
3|11.3.2 Specialization in Australia’s Territorial Evolution in the 21st Century|375
2|11.4 Case Studies|376
3|11.4.1 The German State of Hamburg|378
3|11.4.2 The Austrian State of Vienna|379
2|11.5 Discussion|381
3|11.5.1 Are the New States Financially Sustainable Without Brisbane?|381
3|11.5.2 What Are the Constitutional Hurdles?|383
4|11.5.2.1 Admitting or Establishing New States|383
4|11.5.2.2 Formation of New States|390
4|11.5.2.3 Alteration of State Limits|391
4|11.5.2.4 The Creation of Territories|391
3|11.5.3 What Are the Political Hurdles?|392
2|11.6 Concluding Remarks|396
2|References|399
1|Chapter 12: Case Study: The United States, Canada, and Australia|402
2|12.1 Introduction|402
2|12.2 Theoretical Underpinnings|403
2|12.3 From the ‘Transplant’ to the ‘Canonical’|407
3|12.3.1 The Transplant|407
3|12.3.2 The Canonical|412
2|12.4 From the ‘Canonical’ to the ‘Efficient’|415
2|12.5 Concluding Remarks|423
2|References|424
1|Chapter 13: Towards an Olympic World System|426
2|13.1 Introduction|426
2|13.2 Evading Collapse|429
3|13.2.1 The Hayekian Solution|431
3|13.2.2 The Kohresque Solution|432
3|13.2.3 The Jacobsian Solution|439
3|13.2.4 Jarlsberg Economics and the Fiduciary Approach|449
2|13.3 Towards an ‘Olympic’ World System|455
3|13.3.1 The Legal Personality of Cities|455
3|13.3.2 Amalgamation and Economic Growth|463
3|13.3.3 The Economic Case for Charter Cities|466
2|13.4 Case Study: An ‘Olympic’ Middle East|472
3|13.4.1 The Tension Induced by the Middle East Mosaic|473
3|13.4.2 Prophylactic Intervention (1): Continental Differentiation|474
3|13.4.3 Prophylactic Intervention (2): Sovereignty à la Spinoza|477
2|13.5 Concluding Remarks|480
2|References|481
1|Chapter 14: Envoi: The Need for Jarlsberg Constitutions|487
2|References|491
1|Correction to: Axial Shift|493
1|Index|495
1|Contents|10
1|List of Figures|12
1|List of Tables|16
1|Chapter 1: On the Problem of Scale|17
2|References|33
1|Chapter 2: Economic Cubism, Economic Surrealism, and Scale Relativity|35
2|2.1 Introduction|36
2|2.2 Scale Invariance|38
2|2.3 Cubism and Scale Invariance|44
2|2.4 Surrealism and Scale Invariance|54
2|2.5 Concluding Remarks|59
2|References|60
1|Chapter 3: Scale Invariance in Constitutional Political Economy (CPE)|63
2|3.1 Introduction|63
2|3.2 CPE’s Scale Invariance|64
2|3.3 CPE’s Dichotomies|69
3|3.3.1 The Analogy Between Markets and Politics|69
3|3.3.2 CPE and Complexity|71
3|3.3.3 CPE and Methodological Individualism|75
3|3.3.4 Modalities of Small-Scale Organization|76
4|3.3.4.1 Rationality|76
4|3.3.4.2 Risk Aversion and Privacy|77
4|3.3.4.3 The Contractarian Approach and the Origin of the State|78
4|3.3.4.4 Economies of Scale and Political Group Size|82
4|3.3.4.5 Power Relations and Welfare Economics|85
3|3.3.5 Modalities of Large-Scale Organization|88
4|3.3.5.1 Political Economy and the National Scale|88
4|3.3.5.2 The State as a Machine|88
4|3.3.5.3 Methodological Individualism|90
4|3.3.5.4 Homo Economicus|91
2|3.4 Examples of CPE’s Scale Invariance|92
2|3.5 Concluding Remarks|96
2|References|98
1|Chapter 4: The Tower of Babel Syndrome|102
2|4.1 Introduction|102
2|4.2 The Emergence of the Ecological Crisis|108
2|4.3 Locality in the Responses to the Ecological Crisis|111
3|4.3.1 The Historical Response|112
3|4.3.2 The Modern Response|113
3|4.3.3 Localism and the Earth Charter|118
4|4.3.3.1 The Preamble|120
4|4.3.3.2 The Principles|122
4|4.3.3.3 The Way Forward|123
4|4.3.3.4 How the Modern Response Marginalized Localism: The Fiction of ‘Indigenous Peoples’|124
3|4.3.4 How the Modern Response Marginalized Localism: The ‘Natural Rights’ Paradigm|128
3|4.3.5 The ‘Complexity Imperative’ Illusion|130
3|4.3.6 Summary|134
2|4.4 Concluding Remarks|135
2|References|137
1|Chapter 5: A Décollage of Kropotkin, Mumford, Boulding, Bookchin, and Schumacher|140
2|5.1 Introduction|140
2|5.2 Evolution, Organisms, and Hobbes|142
2|5.3 Morphology, Structure, and Scale|146
2|5.4 Civilization, Capitalism, and the Nation-State|153
2|5.5 The Resurrection of City Confederations|158
2|5.6 Concluding Remarks|162
2|References|163
1|Chapter 6: The Morphogenetic Foundations of Economic Change|165
2|6.1 Introduction|165
2|6.2 An Analogy with Organisms and Complexity|166
2|6.3 Economic Change as Morphogenesis|170
2|6.4 A ‘Histopathology’ of Economic Change|174
2|6.5 Democracy as Evolutionary Fitness|177
3|6.5.1 Issues with Defining the Concepts of Democracy and Size|177
3|6.5.2 Democracy and Output Proxies|179
3|6.5.3 Democracy as Evolutionary Fitness|185
3|6.5.4 Summary|190
2|6.6 A General Theory of Morphogenesis|191
3|6.6.1 Definitions|192
3|6.6.2 Propositions|196
2|6.7 Concluding Remarks|204
2|References|206
1|Chapter 7: The Principle of Subsidiarity|212
2|7.1 Introduction|212
2|7.2 A Brief Introduction to the Principle of Subsidiarity|213
3|7.2.1 Subsidiarity’s Economic and Ethical Foundations|222
3|7.2.2 Subprinciples of Subsidiarity|225
3|7.2.3 Subsidiarity as Self-Organization|226
3|7.2.4 Subsidiarity and the Prisoner’s Dilemma|228
2|7.3 A Rendition of Methodological Individualism and Collectivism|230
3|7.3.1 Methodological Individualism|230
3|7.3.2 Methodological Collectivism (Holism)|232
3|7.3.3 Attempts to Reconcile Individualism and Holism|233
2|7.4 Subsidiarity and Methodological Collectivism|234
2|7.5 Subsidiarity and Methodological Individualism|240
2|7.6 Concluding Remarks|244
2|References|245
1|Chapter 8: The Auxilium Model|252
2|8.1 Introduction|252
2|8.2 Two Competing Paradigms|258
2|8.3 The Calculus of Trust|261
2|8.4 An Application of the Auxilium Model: Roberts V Hopwood|270
2|8.5 Trust and Judicial Review: The Fiduciary Principle|273
2|8.6 Concluding Remarks|278
2|References|280
1|Chapter 9: An Economic Model of Political Fission and Fusion|284
2|9.1 Introduction|284
2|9.2 Sovereignty and the Analogy Between Markets and Politics|289
2|9.3 Sovereignty Between Societas and Universitas|292
2|9.4 Direct Attacks on the Nation-State|297
2|9.5 Implications: Towards a Polycentric Constitutional Order|301
2|9.6 An Economic Model of Political Fission and Fusion|303
3|9.6.1 Failure of Federal Orders|310
3|9.6.2 War As a Stabilizing Mechanism|312
3|9.6.3 The Calculus of Independence|313
3|9.6.4 Technology and Subsidiarity|316
2|9.7 Concluding Remarks|321
2|References|325
1|Chapter 10: Case Study: New England and New Zealand|330
2|10.1 Introduction|330
2|10.2 Insights from Buchanan’s Constitutional Economics|332
2|10.3 Subsidiarity in New England and New Zealand|340
3|10.3.1 The United Colonies of New England (1643–1684)|340
3|10.3.2 The United Tribes of New Zealand (1834) and the Treaty of Waitangi (1840)|342
2|10.4 Centralization in New England and New Zealand|346
3|10.4.1 The New England Dominion (1686–1689)|347
3|10.4.2 The New Zealand Provincial System (1852–1876)|349
2|10.5 The Economic Evidence Today|352
2|10.6 Concluding Remarks|357
2|References|358
1|Chapter 11: Case Study: The Territorial Evolution of Australia and the United States|365
2|11.1 Introduction|365
2|11.2 A Comparison Between the United States and Australia|369
2|11.3 The Rationale for New States|372
3|11.3.1 Development in the Large Australian States Is Inhomogeneous|374
3|11.3.2 Specialization in Australia’s Territorial Evolution in the 21st Century|375
2|11.4 Case Studies|376
3|11.4.1 The German State of Hamburg|378
3|11.4.2 The Austrian State of Vienna|379
2|11.5 Discussion|381
3|11.5.1 Are the New States Financially Sustainable Without Brisbane?|381
3|11.5.2 What Are the Constitutional Hurdles?|383
4|11.5.2.1 Admitting or Establishing New States|383
4|11.5.2.2 Formation of New States|390
4|11.5.2.3 Alteration of State Limits|391
4|11.5.2.4 The Creation of Territories|391
3|11.5.3 What Are the Political Hurdles?|392
2|11.6 Concluding Remarks|396
2|References|399
1|Chapter 12: Case Study: The United States, Canada, and Australia|402
2|12.1 Introduction|402
2|12.2 Theoretical Underpinnings|403
2|12.3 From the ‘Transplant’ to the ‘Canonical’|407
3|12.3.1 The Transplant|407
3|12.3.2 The Canonical|412
2|12.4 From the ‘Canonical’ to the ‘Efficient’|415
2|12.5 Concluding Remarks|423
2|References|424
1|Chapter 13: Towards an Olympic World System|426
2|13.1 Introduction|426
2|13.2 Evading Collapse|429
3|13.2.1 The Hayekian Solution|431
3|13.2.2 The Kohresque Solution|432
3|13.2.3 The Jacobsian Solution|439
3|13.2.4 Jarlsberg Economics and the Fiduciary Approach|449
2|13.3 Towards an ‘Olympic’ World System|455
3|13.3.1 The Legal Personality of Cities|455
3|13.3.2 Amalgamation and Economic Growth|463
3|13.3.3 The Economic Case for Charter Cities|466
2|13.4 Case Study: An ‘Olympic’ Middle East|472
3|13.4.1 The Tension Induced by the Middle East Mosaic|473
3|13.4.2 Prophylactic Intervention (1): Continental Differentiation|474
3|13.4.3 Prophylactic Intervention (2): Sovereignty à la Spinoza|477
2|13.5 Concluding Remarks|480
2|References|481
1|Chapter 14: Envoi: The Need for Jarlsberg Constitutions|487
2|References|491
1|Correction to: Axial Shift|493
1|Index|495