File #2686: "2019_Book_YearbookOfInternationalHumanit.pdf"
Text
1|Board of Advisors to the Editorial Board|6
1|Board of Recommendation|6
1|Editorial|7
1|Contents|9
1|The Development and Interpretation of International Humanitarian Law|11
1|1 The Role of Non-State Armed Groups in the Development and Interpretation of International Humanitarian Law|12
2|Abstract|12
2|1.1 Introduction|13
2|1.2 Should NSAGs Be Included in the Creation of IHL Applicable in NIACs?|15
3|1.2.1 Disadvantages of Involving NSAGs in the Creation of IHL|15
3|1.2.2 Advantages of Including NSAGs in the Development of IHL|18
2|1.3 The Participation of Non-State Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law|19
3|1.3.1 Normative Basis for the Capacity of NSAGs to Participate in the Creation of IHL|19
3|1.3.2 International Agreements and Unilateral Declarations|21
4|1.3.2.1 Traditional Treaties|21
4|1.3.2.2 “Hybrid” Treaties and Special Agreements|24
4|1.3.2.3 Unilateral Declarations|27
3|1.3.3 Customary IHL|28
4|1.3.3.1 Scope of NSAGs’ Capacity to Contribute to the Formation of Customary IHL|30
4|1.3.3.2 Identification, Selection and Weight of the Practice of NSAGs|32
4|1.3.3.3 Indirect Influence on the Formation of Customary IHL|35
2|1.4 The Contribution of NSAGs to the Interpretation of IHL|35
3|1.4.1 NSAGs as Interpreters|36
3|1.4.2 The Relevance of the Practice of NSAGs in the Interpretation of IHL|38
2|1.5 Conclusion|39
2|References|40
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|40
2|Case Law|43
2|Treaties|44
1|2 A Fine Line Between Protection and Humanisation: The Interplay Between the Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law and Jurisdiction over Alleged War Crimes Under International Criminal Law|45
2|Abstract|45
2|2.1 Introduction|46
2|2.2 Clarification of IHL by International Courts and Tribunals|49
2|2.3 The Notion of Armed Conflict in IHL and ICL|54
3|2.3.1 ICTY Practice|57
2|2.4 Expansion of the Scope of Application of IHL|59
3|2.4.1 Expansion of the Concept of International Armed Conflict|59
3|2.4.2 Expansion of the Scope of Non-International Armed Conflicts|61
3|2.4.3 Temporal Scope Without End?|65
3|2.4.4 Undue Expansion?|67
3|2.4.5 Impact on Fair Trial Rights|68
3|2.4.6 Potential Distortion of Reality on the Ground Due to the Nature and Limitations of Criminal Trials|70
2|2.5 Concluding Remarks|72
2|References|74
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|74
2|Cases|80
2|Treaties|81
1|3 The Notion of External NIACs: Reconsidering the Intensity Threshold in Light of Contemporary Armed Conflicts|83
2|Abstract|84
2|3.1 Introduction|84
2|3.2 Evaluation of the Notion of NIAC in Relation to Counterterrorism Operations|87
3|3.2.1 The Relationship Between Counterterrorism and Armed Conflict|87
3|3.2.2 Preliminary Examination of NIAC Sub-Classifications|89
3|3.2.3 Inimitability of Cross-Border NIACs and Transnational NIACs|90
2|3.3 Assessment of the Consequences of the Application of the Tadić Test to External NIACs|91
3|3.3.1 Policy Arguments Against the Use of the Tadić Test for External NIACs|91
3|3.3.2 Arguments Against Revisiting the Tadić Test|96
4|3.3.2.1 Application of Humanitarian Principles Outside of the IAC/NIAC Binary|96
4|3.3.2.2 Application of the Tadić Factors as “Guideposts”|98
4|3.3.2.3 Application of IHRL and IHL During Extraterritorial NIACs|99
2|3.4 Investigation of Whether Applying the Tadić Test Is Mandatory for External NIACs|103
3|3.4.1 Intensity and Organization in the Drafting History of the Geneva Conventions|103
3|3.4.2 Intensity and Organization in the Tadić Decision and Judgment|106
3|3.4.3 Conclusion on the Scope of the Tadić Test in Light of Its History and Purpose|108
2|3.5 The External NIAC Test|108
3|3.5.1 Preliminary Note on the Wisdom of Identifying Several Armed Conflict Threshold Tests|108
3|3.5.2 High-Organization Threshold|109
3|3.5.3 The Low-Intensity Threshold|112
3|3.5.4 Revised Armed Conflict Test for External NIACs|113
2|3.6 Implications of the External NIAC Test on Other Aspects of IHL’s Scope of Application|114
3|3.6.1 Temporal Scope of Application|114
3|3.6.2 Material Scope of Application|115
2|3.7 Conclusion|115
2|Acknowledgements|116
2|References|116
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|116
2|Case Law|119
2|Treaties|120
1|4 Towards a Counter-Hegemonic Law of Occupation: On the Regulation of Predatory Interstate Acts in Contemporary International Law|121
2|Abstract|122
2|4.1 Introduction|123
2|4.2 Occupation Law as Conflict Management Law: The Internal Point of View|127
3|4.2.1 Occupation Law as We Know It: Basic Tenets|127
3|4.2.2 Managing Expectations About Conflict Management Law: The Limits of Occupation Law’s Remedial Nature|130
4|4.2.2.1 Material Limits|130
4|4.2.2.2 Temporal Limits|132
4|4.2.2.3 Spatial Limits|133
2|4.3 The Ends of War, and the Law to End War: Occupation and Conflict Prevention Law|134
3|4.3.1 The End(s) of Occupation|134
3|4.3.2 Perpetual, Unlawfully Prolonged Occupation|137
2|4.4 The Jus Ad Bellum of Occupation|139
3|4.4.1 Cause for Concern: The Application of the Jus in Bello-Jus Ad Bellum Distinction to Occupation|139
3|4.4.2 The Jus Ad Bellum Predicates of Occupation (Law)|141
2|4.5 Preventing the Occurrence of Unlawfully Prolonged Occupation: Consequences Under an Integrated Legal Framework|144
3|4.5.1 An Illegal Territorial Regime? Operationalising the Obligation to Withdraw|144
3|4.5.2 The Structures of an Unlawful Administration: Between Discrimination and Self-Determination|147
2|4.6 The Resolution of Unlawfully Prolonged Occupations: The Responses of International Law (and Their Discontents)|149
3|4.6.1 International Adjudication: Rights and Responsibility|149
3|4.6.2 Non-Recognition of Invalid Acts and Entities|152
3|4.6.3 Local Wrongs, Transnational Protection|154
2|4.7 Concluding Remarks: A Counter-Hegemonic Law of Occupation|157
2|References|160
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|160
2|Case Law|167
2|Treaties|168
1|Targeting in Armed Conflicts|169
1|5 Precautions in Attack and Urban and Siege Warfare|170
2|Abstract|170
2|5.1 Introduction|171
2|5.2 Urban and Siege Warfare|172
2|5.3 The Place of Precautions in the Law of Targeting|176
2|5.4 Precautions in Attack|179
3|5.4.1 Constant Care: The General Principle of Precautions in Attack|179
4|5.4.1.1 Personal Scope|180
4|5.4.1.2 Feasible|181
4|5.4.1.3 Collecting and Assessing Information to Enable Decisions to Be Made|183
4|5.4.1.4 Evaluation of Measures Taken: Mistakes and Violations|184
3|5.4.2 The Obligation to Verify that the Target Is a Military Objective|186
3|5.4.3 Choosing the Means and Methods of Attack|189
3|5.4.4 Proportionality in Precautions|191
3|5.4.5 The Obligation to Cancel or Suspend an Attack|192
3|5.4.6 Effective Advance Warning|195
3|5.4.7 Choosing the Target that Will Cause the Least Collateral Damage|199
2|5.5 Conclusion|201
2|References|201
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|201
2|Case Law|204
2|Treaties|204
1|6 Targeting the Islamic State’s Religious Personnel Under International Humanitarian Law|206
2|Abstract|206
2|6.1 Introduction|207
2|6.2 IS’s Religious Personnel on the Battlefield|208
3|6.2.1 Chaplaincy in War|209
3|6.2.2 IS’s Chaplains and Their Military Function|210
3|6.2.3 Distinguishing “IS-Chaplains” and “IS-Civil Chaplains”|211
2|6.3 Legality of Targeting IS’s Religious Personnel|212
3|6.3.1 (The Prohibition of) Targeting Religious Personnel in NIACs|212
4|6.3.1.1 Relevant Aspects of Common Article 3 Geneva Conventions I–IV|213
4|6.3.1.2 Relevant Aspects of Additional Protocol II|214
4|6.3.1.3 Relevant Aspects of Customary International Humanitarian Law|216
4|6.3.1.4 The Role of the International Human Right to Freedom of Religion|216
3|6.3.2 Relevant Distinction Between IS-Chaplains and IS-Civil Chaplains|219
3|6.3.3 Targeting IS-Chaplains|220
4|6.3.3.1 Membership of IS-Chaplains in the Organized Armed Group IS|220
4|6.3.3.2 Loss of Exclusivity|223
4|6.3.3.3 The Obligation to a Case-By-Case Target Verification|225
3|6.3.4 Targeting IS-Civil Chaplains|226
4|6.3.4.1 The Concept of DPH with Regard to (Religious) Propaganda and Recruiting|226
4|6.3.4.2 (Religious) Recruiting and Direct Causation|227
4|6.3.4.3 Temporal Scope of (Religious) Recruiting and Loss of Protection|228
2|6.4 Conclusion|229
2|References|230
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|230
2|Case Law|234
2|Treaties|234
1|7 Are the Targets of Aerial Spraying Operations in Colombia Lawful Under International Humanitarian Law?|236
2|Abstract|237
2|7.1 Introduction|237
2|7.2 Historical Development of the Program of Aerial Spraying of Illicit Crops with Glyphosate in Colombia|241
2|7.3 Can Some of the Operations of Aerial Spraying of Illicit Crops with Glyphosate Carried Out in Colombia Amount to “Attacks” Under International Humanitarian Law?|244
2|7.4 Are the Targets of Aerial Spraying Operations in Colombia, that Amount to Attacks, Lawful Under International Humanitarian Law?|247
3|7.4.1 Are Illicit Crops a Lawful Target?|247
3|7.4.2 Can Those Persons Who Grow Illicit Crops for Some of the Parties to the NIAC in Colombia Be Lawfully Attacked?|251
2|7.5 Conclusions|254
2|References|256
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|256
2|Cases|259
2|Treaties|259
1|Other Articles|260
1|8 Year in Review 2017|261
2|Abstract|262
2|8.1 Ongoing Conflicts and Other Developments|263
3|8.1.1 Afghanistan|263
3|8.1.2 Burundi|263
3|8.1.3 Central African Republic|265
3|8.1.4 Colombia|267
3|8.1.5 Democratic Republic of the Congo|269
3|8.1.6 Egypt|270
3|8.1.7 Iraq|271
3|8.1.8 Israel/Palestine|273
3|8.1.9 Libya|273
3|8.1.10 Mali|275
3|8.1.11 Myanmar|275
3|8.1.12 Nigeria|278
3|8.1.13 South Sudan|280
3|8.1.14 Somalia|281
3|8.1.15 Syria|283
3|8.1.16 Ukraine|285
3|8.1.17 Yemen|286
2|8.2 Tribunal and Courts|287
3|8.2.1 International Tribunals|287
4|8.2.1.1 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia|287
4|8.2.1.2 Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals|292
4|8.2.1.3 International Criminal Court|295
3|8.2.2 Hybrid Tribunals|305
4|8.2.2.1 Republic of Kosovo|305
4|8.2.2.2 Extraordinary African Chambers|306
4|8.2.2.3 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia|307
4|8.2.2.4 Special Criminal Court in the Central African Republic|308
4|8.2.2.5 Special Tribunal for Lebanon|309
3|8.2.3 National Courts|310
4|8.2.3.1 Argentina|310
4|8.2.3.2 Austria|311
4|8.2.3.3 Bangladesh|311
4|8.2.3.4 Bosnia and Herzegovina|312
4|8.2.3.5 Croatia|313
4|8.2.3.6 Democratic Republic of the Congo|314
4|8.2.3.7 France|314
4|8.2.3.8 Germany|315
4|8.2.3.9 Guatemala|316
4|8.2.3.10 Lithuania|317
4|8.2.3.11 The Netherlands|317
4|8.2.3.12 Serbia|318
4|8.2.3.13 Spain|319
4|8.2.3.14 Sweden|320
4|8.2.3.15 United Kingdom|321
2|8.3 Arms Control and Disarmament|321
3|8.3.1 Conventional Weapons|321
4|8.3.1.1 Cluster Munition|321
4|8.3.1.2 Landmines|322
3|8.3.2 Non-Conventional Weapons|323
4|8.3.2.1 Chemical Weapons|323
4|8.3.2.2 Biological Weapons|324
4|8.3.2.3 Nuclear Weapons|325
4|8.3.2.4 Autonomous Weapons|326
2|8.4 Miscellaneous|327
3|8.4.1 Tallinn Manual 2.0: The International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations|327
2|References|329
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|329
2|Case Law|332
1|Table of Cases|335
2|INTERNATIONAL|335
3|NATIONAL|340
1|Index|344
1|Board of Recommendation|6
1|Editorial|7
1|Contents|9
1|The Development and Interpretation of International Humanitarian Law|11
1|1 The Role of Non-State Armed Groups in the Development and Interpretation of International Humanitarian Law|12
2|Abstract|12
2|1.1 Introduction|13
2|1.2 Should NSAGs Be Included in the Creation of IHL Applicable in NIACs?|15
3|1.2.1 Disadvantages of Involving NSAGs in the Creation of IHL|15
3|1.2.2 Advantages of Including NSAGs in the Development of IHL|18
2|1.3 The Participation of Non-State Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law|19
3|1.3.1 Normative Basis for the Capacity of NSAGs to Participate in the Creation of IHL|19
3|1.3.2 International Agreements and Unilateral Declarations|21
4|1.3.2.1 Traditional Treaties|21
4|1.3.2.2 “Hybrid” Treaties and Special Agreements|24
4|1.3.2.3 Unilateral Declarations|27
3|1.3.3 Customary IHL|28
4|1.3.3.1 Scope of NSAGs’ Capacity to Contribute to the Formation of Customary IHL|30
4|1.3.3.2 Identification, Selection and Weight of the Practice of NSAGs|32
4|1.3.3.3 Indirect Influence on the Formation of Customary IHL|35
2|1.4 The Contribution of NSAGs to the Interpretation of IHL|35
3|1.4.1 NSAGs as Interpreters|36
3|1.4.2 The Relevance of the Practice of NSAGs in the Interpretation of IHL|38
2|1.5 Conclusion|39
2|References|40
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|40
2|Case Law|43
2|Treaties|44
1|2 A Fine Line Between Protection and Humanisation: The Interplay Between the Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law and Jurisdiction over Alleged War Crimes Under International Criminal Law|45
2|Abstract|45
2|2.1 Introduction|46
2|2.2 Clarification of IHL by International Courts and Tribunals|49
2|2.3 The Notion of Armed Conflict in IHL and ICL|54
3|2.3.1 ICTY Practice|57
2|2.4 Expansion of the Scope of Application of IHL|59
3|2.4.1 Expansion of the Concept of International Armed Conflict|59
3|2.4.2 Expansion of the Scope of Non-International Armed Conflicts|61
3|2.4.3 Temporal Scope Without End?|65
3|2.4.4 Undue Expansion?|67
3|2.4.5 Impact on Fair Trial Rights|68
3|2.4.6 Potential Distortion of Reality on the Ground Due to the Nature and Limitations of Criminal Trials|70
2|2.5 Concluding Remarks|72
2|References|74
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|74
2|Cases|80
2|Treaties|81
1|3 The Notion of External NIACs: Reconsidering the Intensity Threshold in Light of Contemporary Armed Conflicts|83
2|Abstract|84
2|3.1 Introduction|84
2|3.2 Evaluation of the Notion of NIAC in Relation to Counterterrorism Operations|87
3|3.2.1 The Relationship Between Counterterrorism and Armed Conflict|87
3|3.2.2 Preliminary Examination of NIAC Sub-Classifications|89
3|3.2.3 Inimitability of Cross-Border NIACs and Transnational NIACs|90
2|3.3 Assessment of the Consequences of the Application of the Tadić Test to External NIACs|91
3|3.3.1 Policy Arguments Against the Use of the Tadić Test for External NIACs|91
3|3.3.2 Arguments Against Revisiting the Tadić Test|96
4|3.3.2.1 Application of Humanitarian Principles Outside of the IAC/NIAC Binary|96
4|3.3.2.2 Application of the Tadić Factors as “Guideposts”|98
4|3.3.2.3 Application of IHRL and IHL During Extraterritorial NIACs|99
2|3.4 Investigation of Whether Applying the Tadić Test Is Mandatory for External NIACs|103
3|3.4.1 Intensity and Organization in the Drafting History of the Geneva Conventions|103
3|3.4.2 Intensity and Organization in the Tadić Decision and Judgment|106
3|3.4.3 Conclusion on the Scope of the Tadić Test in Light of Its History and Purpose|108
2|3.5 The External NIAC Test|108
3|3.5.1 Preliminary Note on the Wisdom of Identifying Several Armed Conflict Threshold Tests|108
3|3.5.2 High-Organization Threshold|109
3|3.5.3 The Low-Intensity Threshold|112
3|3.5.4 Revised Armed Conflict Test for External NIACs|113
2|3.6 Implications of the External NIAC Test on Other Aspects of IHL’s Scope of Application|114
3|3.6.1 Temporal Scope of Application|114
3|3.6.2 Material Scope of Application|115
2|3.7 Conclusion|115
2|Acknowledgements|116
2|References|116
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|116
2|Case Law|119
2|Treaties|120
1|4 Towards a Counter-Hegemonic Law of Occupation: On the Regulation of Predatory Interstate Acts in Contemporary International Law|121
2|Abstract|122
2|4.1 Introduction|123
2|4.2 Occupation Law as Conflict Management Law: The Internal Point of View|127
3|4.2.1 Occupation Law as We Know It: Basic Tenets|127
3|4.2.2 Managing Expectations About Conflict Management Law: The Limits of Occupation Law’s Remedial Nature|130
4|4.2.2.1 Material Limits|130
4|4.2.2.2 Temporal Limits|132
4|4.2.2.3 Spatial Limits|133
2|4.3 The Ends of War, and the Law to End War: Occupation and Conflict Prevention Law|134
3|4.3.1 The End(s) of Occupation|134
3|4.3.2 Perpetual, Unlawfully Prolonged Occupation|137
2|4.4 The Jus Ad Bellum of Occupation|139
3|4.4.1 Cause for Concern: The Application of the Jus in Bello-Jus Ad Bellum Distinction to Occupation|139
3|4.4.2 The Jus Ad Bellum Predicates of Occupation (Law)|141
2|4.5 Preventing the Occurrence of Unlawfully Prolonged Occupation: Consequences Under an Integrated Legal Framework|144
3|4.5.1 An Illegal Territorial Regime? Operationalising the Obligation to Withdraw|144
3|4.5.2 The Structures of an Unlawful Administration: Between Discrimination and Self-Determination|147
2|4.6 The Resolution of Unlawfully Prolonged Occupations: The Responses of International Law (and Their Discontents)|149
3|4.6.1 International Adjudication: Rights and Responsibility|149
3|4.6.2 Non-Recognition of Invalid Acts and Entities|152
3|4.6.3 Local Wrongs, Transnational Protection|154
2|4.7 Concluding Remarks: A Counter-Hegemonic Law of Occupation|157
2|References|160
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|160
2|Case Law|167
2|Treaties|168
1|Targeting in Armed Conflicts|169
1|5 Precautions in Attack and Urban and Siege Warfare|170
2|Abstract|170
2|5.1 Introduction|171
2|5.2 Urban and Siege Warfare|172
2|5.3 The Place of Precautions in the Law of Targeting|176
2|5.4 Precautions in Attack|179
3|5.4.1 Constant Care: The General Principle of Precautions in Attack|179
4|5.4.1.1 Personal Scope|180
4|5.4.1.2 Feasible|181
4|5.4.1.3 Collecting and Assessing Information to Enable Decisions to Be Made|183
4|5.4.1.4 Evaluation of Measures Taken: Mistakes and Violations|184
3|5.4.2 The Obligation to Verify that the Target Is a Military Objective|186
3|5.4.3 Choosing the Means and Methods of Attack|189
3|5.4.4 Proportionality in Precautions|191
3|5.4.5 The Obligation to Cancel or Suspend an Attack|192
3|5.4.6 Effective Advance Warning|195
3|5.4.7 Choosing the Target that Will Cause the Least Collateral Damage|199
2|5.5 Conclusion|201
2|References|201
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|201
2|Case Law|204
2|Treaties|204
1|6 Targeting the Islamic State’s Religious Personnel Under International Humanitarian Law|206
2|Abstract|206
2|6.1 Introduction|207
2|6.2 IS’s Religious Personnel on the Battlefield|208
3|6.2.1 Chaplaincy in War|209
3|6.2.2 IS’s Chaplains and Their Military Function|210
3|6.2.3 Distinguishing “IS-Chaplains” and “IS-Civil Chaplains”|211
2|6.3 Legality of Targeting IS’s Religious Personnel|212
3|6.3.1 (The Prohibition of) Targeting Religious Personnel in NIACs|212
4|6.3.1.1 Relevant Aspects of Common Article 3 Geneva Conventions I–IV|213
4|6.3.1.2 Relevant Aspects of Additional Protocol II|214
4|6.3.1.3 Relevant Aspects of Customary International Humanitarian Law|216
4|6.3.1.4 The Role of the International Human Right to Freedom of Religion|216
3|6.3.2 Relevant Distinction Between IS-Chaplains and IS-Civil Chaplains|219
3|6.3.3 Targeting IS-Chaplains|220
4|6.3.3.1 Membership of IS-Chaplains in the Organized Armed Group IS|220
4|6.3.3.2 Loss of Exclusivity|223
4|6.3.3.3 The Obligation to a Case-By-Case Target Verification|225
3|6.3.4 Targeting IS-Civil Chaplains|226
4|6.3.4.1 The Concept of DPH with Regard to (Religious) Propaganda and Recruiting|226
4|6.3.4.2 (Religious) Recruiting and Direct Causation|227
4|6.3.4.3 Temporal Scope of (Religious) Recruiting and Loss of Protection|228
2|6.4 Conclusion|229
2|References|230
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|230
2|Case Law|234
2|Treaties|234
1|7 Are the Targets of Aerial Spraying Operations in Colombia Lawful Under International Humanitarian Law?|236
2|Abstract|237
2|7.1 Introduction|237
2|7.2 Historical Development of the Program of Aerial Spraying of Illicit Crops with Glyphosate in Colombia|241
2|7.3 Can Some of the Operations of Aerial Spraying of Illicit Crops with Glyphosate Carried Out in Colombia Amount to “Attacks” Under International Humanitarian Law?|244
2|7.4 Are the Targets of Aerial Spraying Operations in Colombia, that Amount to Attacks, Lawful Under International Humanitarian Law?|247
3|7.4.1 Are Illicit Crops a Lawful Target?|247
3|7.4.2 Can Those Persons Who Grow Illicit Crops for Some of the Parties to the NIAC in Colombia Be Lawfully Attacked?|251
2|7.5 Conclusions|254
2|References|256
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|256
2|Cases|259
2|Treaties|259
1|Other Articles|260
1|8 Year in Review 2017|261
2|Abstract|262
2|8.1 Ongoing Conflicts and Other Developments|263
3|8.1.1 Afghanistan|263
3|8.1.2 Burundi|263
3|8.1.3 Central African Republic|265
3|8.1.4 Colombia|267
3|8.1.5 Democratic Republic of the Congo|269
3|8.1.6 Egypt|270
3|8.1.7 Iraq|271
3|8.1.8 Israel/Palestine|273
3|8.1.9 Libya|273
3|8.1.10 Mali|275
3|8.1.11 Myanmar|275
3|8.1.12 Nigeria|278
3|8.1.13 South Sudan|280
3|8.1.14 Somalia|281
3|8.1.15 Syria|283
3|8.1.16 Ukraine|285
3|8.1.17 Yemen|286
2|8.2 Tribunal and Courts|287
3|8.2.1 International Tribunals|287
4|8.2.1.1 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia|287
4|8.2.1.2 Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals|292
4|8.2.1.3 International Criminal Court|295
3|8.2.2 Hybrid Tribunals|305
4|8.2.2.1 Republic of Kosovo|305
4|8.2.2.2 Extraordinary African Chambers|306
4|8.2.2.3 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia|307
4|8.2.2.4 Special Criminal Court in the Central African Republic|308
4|8.2.2.5 Special Tribunal for Lebanon|309
3|8.2.3 National Courts|310
4|8.2.3.1 Argentina|310
4|8.2.3.2 Austria|311
4|8.2.3.3 Bangladesh|311
4|8.2.3.4 Bosnia and Herzegovina|312
4|8.2.3.5 Croatia|313
4|8.2.3.6 Democratic Republic of the Congo|314
4|8.2.3.7 France|314
4|8.2.3.8 Germany|315
4|8.2.3.9 Guatemala|316
4|8.2.3.10 Lithuania|317
4|8.2.3.11 The Netherlands|317
4|8.2.3.12 Serbia|318
4|8.2.3.13 Spain|319
4|8.2.3.14 Sweden|320
4|8.2.3.15 United Kingdom|321
2|8.3 Arms Control and Disarmament|321
3|8.3.1 Conventional Weapons|321
4|8.3.1.1 Cluster Munition|321
4|8.3.1.2 Landmines|322
3|8.3.2 Non-Conventional Weapons|323
4|8.3.2.1 Chemical Weapons|323
4|8.3.2.2 Biological Weapons|324
4|8.3.2.3 Nuclear Weapons|325
4|8.3.2.4 Autonomous Weapons|326
2|8.4 Miscellaneous|327
3|8.4.1 Tallinn Manual 2.0: The International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations|327
2|References|329
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|329
2|Case Law|332
1|Table of Cases|335
2|INTERNATIONAL|335
3|NATIONAL|340
1|Index|344