File #2331: "2018_Book_TransnationalCommercialAndCons.pdf"
Text
1|Dedication|6
1|Introduction|7
1|Contents|12
1|About the Editors|15
1|Chapter 1: The Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: A Statistical Analysis|17
2|1 Introduction|18
2|2 The Number of Cases over the Years|22
2|3 Who Are the Users of the System?|23
2|4 Is There a Correlation Between GDP and GNI per Capita and Number of Complaints Filed?|31
2|5 Is There a Higher Propensity for Poorer Countries to Settle?|33
2|6 Compliance with DSB Rulings: What Is the Motivation for Article 21.5 Procedures?|35
2|7 Compliance with DSB Rulings: Who Complies and Who Doesn’t?|38
2|8 How Long Do WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures Take?|42
2|9 The Appellate Body’s Inability to Remand a Case to the Panel|48
3|9.1 Background to the Problem|48
3|9.2 The Findings|49
3|9.3 Demonstration of the Problem: DS449|50
2|10 Conclusion|54
2|References|57
1|Chapter 2: Documentary Fraud Under the UCP: Revisiting an ‘Exception from Exception’ Principle|60
2|1 Introduction|60
2|2 Principle of Autonomy and Risk of Fraud Under the UCP|61
2|3 Risk of Fraud|62
2|4 Fraud Exception Rule|63
2|5 The United City Merchants Case|63
3|5.1 Facts and Holding|63
3|5.2 Forgery and Nullity|64
2|6 Analyses|65
3|6.1 Rationale|65
3|6.2 Criticism|65
3|6.3 Risk of Banks|66
3|6.4 Risk of Applicant|68
3|6.5 How Far Should the Protection of Beneficiary Go?|68
3|6.6 Caveat Venditor|69
3|6.7 Genuine Documents and the Autonomy Principle|71
3|6.8 Conflict Between Public Policies|72
2|7 Comparative Law Overview|73
3|7.1 Canada|73
3|7.2 US|74
3|7.3 Singapore|74
3|7.4 France|75
2|8 Need to Regulate the Fraud|75
2|9 Conclusion|76
2|References|77
1|Chapter 3: A Transnational Consensus on Secured Transactions Law? The 2016 UNCITRAL Model Law|78
2|1 Introduction|79
2|2 General Challenges in Drafting Internationally Uniform Laws|81
3|2.1 Form and Style|81
3|2.2 Avoidance of Interference with “Other Laws” of the Enacting State|83
3|2.3 Deference to Specialized Laws and Regimes|84
3|2.4 Need for Neutral Terminology|87
2|3 The Degree of Facial Consensus Achieved by the Model Law|89
3|3.1 Formulation of the Writing Requirement for Security Agreements|90
3|3.2 Whether to Limit the Priority of the First Ranking Secured Creditor for Future Advances|91
3|3.3 Conditions for Super Priority of Acquisition Security Rights in Inventory|93
3|3.4 Entitlement to Apply for Expeditious Relief in the Context of Enforcement Proceedings?|95
3|3.5 Law Applicable to Security Rights in Bank Accounts|96
3|3.6 Unauthorized Amendments and Discharges: Secured Creditor vs. Third Party Protection|97
3|3.7 Impact of a Post-registration Change of Grantor Name and Transfer of Encumbered Assets to a New ‘Grantor’|99
3|3.8 Additional Registry-Related Options|102
2|4 An Illusory or Real Consensus?|103
2|References|104
1|Chapter 4: Detailed Contract Regulations and the UPICC: Parallels with National Law and Potential for Improvement: The Example of Norwegian Law|105
2|1 Introduction|106
2|2 Why Is the Relationship Between the UPICC and Detailed Contract Regulation an Issue?|107
3|2.1 The Practice of Contract Drafting and the Need for Predictability|108
3|2.2 The Relationship Between Applicable Law and Contract Regulation|110
2|3 The Example of Norwegian Law|111
3|3.1 Ancillary Obligations Not Regulated in the Contract|112
3|3.2 Competing Contract Regulation|114
3|3.3 Discretionary Contract Rights|116
3|3.4 Conclusion|117
2|4 The UPICC and Contract Terms|117
3|4.1 Ancillary Obligations Not Regulated in the Contract|119
3|4.2 Competing Contract Regulation|120
3|4.3 Discretionary Contract Rights|121
2|5 Conclusion|123
2|References|123
1|Chapter 5: Consumer Law in the Digital Economy|125
2|1 Introduction|126
2|2 Conclusion of Contract|127
3|2.1 Information and Packaging|128
4|2.1.1 Hardware and Software|128
4|2.1.2 Services and Data|128
3|2.2 Information: Consent and Terms and Conditions|129
3|2.3 Information and the Subject Matter of the Legal Relationship|130
3|2.4 Internet of Things: Use of E-People|131
4|2.4.1 Conclusion of Contract: Declarations of Intent|131
4|2.4.2 Liability for Criminal Acts|132
2|3 Role of Online Platforms|133
3|3.1 Vagueness of the Applied Terminology|133
3|3.2 Information, Supplier, Liability, Transparency and Competition|134
4|3.2.1 Information Problem: Knowing Who the Supplier Is and The Supplier’s Status|135
4|3.2.2 Liability Issues in the Triangular Relationship Between the Supplier, Platform Operator and Consumer|135
4|3.2.3 Competition: Manipulated Reviews|136
4|3.2.4 Competition: Lack of Transparency in Search Results Lists|137
3|3.3 Health App|137
4|3.3.1 Uncertainty Regarding the Contracting Party|137
4|3.3.2 Unequivocal Apple App Store’s Terms and Conditions|138
3|3.4 The Reform of Platforms|139
4|3.4.1 Information Asymmetries|140
4|3.4.2 Definition of “Platform”|141
4|3.4.3 Liability Issues|142
4|3.4.4 Outlook|143
2|4 Consumer Data Protection|144
3|4.1 Prohibition of Coupling|144
3|4.2 Monitoring of Terms and Conditions in Privacy Notices|145
3|4.3 Personal Nature of Data and Data Protection by Technology|145
3|4.4 Consent Through “Business Purposes”|146
3|4.5 International Data Transfers|146
2|5 Deterritorialization and the Enforcement of Rights|147
3|5.1 Impact on Consumer Rights|147
3|5.2 Individual Legal Redress|150
3|5.3 Cross-Border Collective Redress|152
3|5.4 Cross-Border Cooperation Between Authorities|155
2|6 Potential Solutions as Regards the Law of Digital Services|158
3|6.1 Continuity or Disruption|158
3|6.2 Where to Go|161
2|References|163
1|Chapter 6: Regulation Tomorrow: Strategies for Regulating New Technologies|167
2|1 What Happens When Technology Is Faster than the Law?|167
2|2 The “Pacing Problem”|168
2|3 The Factual Basis of Regulation|170
2|4 A “Post-Fact Society”?|177
2|5 Three Strategies for Regulation Tomorrow|178
3|5.1 Data Driven Regulatory Intervention|179
3|5.2 A Principle-Based Approach|182
3|5.3 The Regulatory “Sandbox”|184
2|6 Conclusion|185
2|References|186
1|Chapter 7: The Enforceability of Promises to Negotiate in Good Faith: Rethinking Traditional Common Law Attitudes|189
2|1 Introduction|190
2|2 Present State of Authority|191
2|3 Indications of Change|192
2|4 Position in Singapore and Hong Kong|195
3|4.1 Singapore|195
3|4.2 Hong Kong|197
2|5 The Constituents of Good Faith Conduct|197
2|6 What Is the Available Remedy for Breach?|198
2|7 Conclusion|199
2|References|200
1|Chapter 8: Continuing Representations and Strict Responsibility for Accuracy After Cramaso: Fact or (Legal) Fiction?|201
2|1 Introduction|201
2|2 Cramaso: The Facts, Litigation and Supreme Court Decision|206
3|2.1 The Facts and Litigation|206
3|2.2 The Supreme Court’s Decision|207
2|3 Reflections On What Cramaso Decided (and Did Not Decide?)|210
2|4 The Unanswered Question: Is Innocently Unknown and Unsuspected Supervening Falsification an ‘Innocent Misrepresentation’?|215
3|4.1 The Locus Classicus: Lord Wright MR’s Judgment in With v. O’Flanagan|216
4|4.1.1 The Duty-to-Communicate Approach: A ‘Non-disclosure’ Theory of Responsibility for Accuracy|218
4|4.1.2 The Continuing-Representation Approach: Strict Responsibility for Accuracy|221
2|5 Which Approach Should Be Followed: The Duty-To-Communicate Approach or the Continuing-Representation Approach, or Perhaps Neither?|223
2|6 The Continuing-Representation Approach: Innocent Misrepresentation by (Assumptive) Fiction|228
2|7 Summary and Conclusion|233
2|References|235
1|Index|236
1|Introduction|7
1|Contents|12
1|About the Editors|15
1|Chapter 1: The Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: A Statistical Analysis|17
2|1 Introduction|18
2|2 The Number of Cases over the Years|22
2|3 Who Are the Users of the System?|23
2|4 Is There a Correlation Between GDP and GNI per Capita and Number of Complaints Filed?|31
2|5 Is There a Higher Propensity for Poorer Countries to Settle?|33
2|6 Compliance with DSB Rulings: What Is the Motivation for Article 21.5 Procedures?|35
2|7 Compliance with DSB Rulings: Who Complies and Who Doesn’t?|38
2|8 How Long Do WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures Take?|42
2|9 The Appellate Body’s Inability to Remand a Case to the Panel|48
3|9.1 Background to the Problem|48
3|9.2 The Findings|49
3|9.3 Demonstration of the Problem: DS449|50
2|10 Conclusion|54
2|References|57
1|Chapter 2: Documentary Fraud Under the UCP: Revisiting an ‘Exception from Exception’ Principle|60
2|1 Introduction|60
2|2 Principle of Autonomy and Risk of Fraud Under the UCP|61
2|3 Risk of Fraud|62
2|4 Fraud Exception Rule|63
2|5 The United City Merchants Case|63
3|5.1 Facts and Holding|63
3|5.2 Forgery and Nullity|64
2|6 Analyses|65
3|6.1 Rationale|65
3|6.2 Criticism|65
3|6.3 Risk of Banks|66
3|6.4 Risk of Applicant|68
3|6.5 How Far Should the Protection of Beneficiary Go?|68
3|6.6 Caveat Venditor|69
3|6.7 Genuine Documents and the Autonomy Principle|71
3|6.8 Conflict Between Public Policies|72
2|7 Comparative Law Overview|73
3|7.1 Canada|73
3|7.2 US|74
3|7.3 Singapore|74
3|7.4 France|75
2|8 Need to Regulate the Fraud|75
2|9 Conclusion|76
2|References|77
1|Chapter 3: A Transnational Consensus on Secured Transactions Law? The 2016 UNCITRAL Model Law|78
2|1 Introduction|79
2|2 General Challenges in Drafting Internationally Uniform Laws|81
3|2.1 Form and Style|81
3|2.2 Avoidance of Interference with “Other Laws” of the Enacting State|83
3|2.3 Deference to Specialized Laws and Regimes|84
3|2.4 Need for Neutral Terminology|87
2|3 The Degree of Facial Consensus Achieved by the Model Law|89
3|3.1 Formulation of the Writing Requirement for Security Agreements|90
3|3.2 Whether to Limit the Priority of the First Ranking Secured Creditor for Future Advances|91
3|3.3 Conditions for Super Priority of Acquisition Security Rights in Inventory|93
3|3.4 Entitlement to Apply for Expeditious Relief in the Context of Enforcement Proceedings?|95
3|3.5 Law Applicable to Security Rights in Bank Accounts|96
3|3.6 Unauthorized Amendments and Discharges: Secured Creditor vs. Third Party Protection|97
3|3.7 Impact of a Post-registration Change of Grantor Name and Transfer of Encumbered Assets to a New ‘Grantor’|99
3|3.8 Additional Registry-Related Options|102
2|4 An Illusory or Real Consensus?|103
2|References|104
1|Chapter 4: Detailed Contract Regulations and the UPICC: Parallels with National Law and Potential for Improvement: The Example of Norwegian Law|105
2|1 Introduction|106
2|2 Why Is the Relationship Between the UPICC and Detailed Contract Regulation an Issue?|107
3|2.1 The Practice of Contract Drafting and the Need for Predictability|108
3|2.2 The Relationship Between Applicable Law and Contract Regulation|110
2|3 The Example of Norwegian Law|111
3|3.1 Ancillary Obligations Not Regulated in the Contract|112
3|3.2 Competing Contract Regulation|114
3|3.3 Discretionary Contract Rights|116
3|3.4 Conclusion|117
2|4 The UPICC and Contract Terms|117
3|4.1 Ancillary Obligations Not Regulated in the Contract|119
3|4.2 Competing Contract Regulation|120
3|4.3 Discretionary Contract Rights|121
2|5 Conclusion|123
2|References|123
1|Chapter 5: Consumer Law in the Digital Economy|125
2|1 Introduction|126
2|2 Conclusion of Contract|127
3|2.1 Information and Packaging|128
4|2.1.1 Hardware and Software|128
4|2.1.2 Services and Data|128
3|2.2 Information: Consent and Terms and Conditions|129
3|2.3 Information and the Subject Matter of the Legal Relationship|130
3|2.4 Internet of Things: Use of E-People|131
4|2.4.1 Conclusion of Contract: Declarations of Intent|131
4|2.4.2 Liability for Criminal Acts|132
2|3 Role of Online Platforms|133
3|3.1 Vagueness of the Applied Terminology|133
3|3.2 Information, Supplier, Liability, Transparency and Competition|134
4|3.2.1 Information Problem: Knowing Who the Supplier Is and The Supplier’s Status|135
4|3.2.2 Liability Issues in the Triangular Relationship Between the Supplier, Platform Operator and Consumer|135
4|3.2.3 Competition: Manipulated Reviews|136
4|3.2.4 Competition: Lack of Transparency in Search Results Lists|137
3|3.3 Health App|137
4|3.3.1 Uncertainty Regarding the Contracting Party|137
4|3.3.2 Unequivocal Apple App Store’s Terms and Conditions|138
3|3.4 The Reform of Platforms|139
4|3.4.1 Information Asymmetries|140
4|3.4.2 Definition of “Platform”|141
4|3.4.3 Liability Issues|142
4|3.4.4 Outlook|143
2|4 Consumer Data Protection|144
3|4.1 Prohibition of Coupling|144
3|4.2 Monitoring of Terms and Conditions in Privacy Notices|145
3|4.3 Personal Nature of Data and Data Protection by Technology|145
3|4.4 Consent Through “Business Purposes”|146
3|4.5 International Data Transfers|146
2|5 Deterritorialization and the Enforcement of Rights|147
3|5.1 Impact on Consumer Rights|147
3|5.2 Individual Legal Redress|150
3|5.3 Cross-Border Collective Redress|152
3|5.4 Cross-Border Cooperation Between Authorities|155
2|6 Potential Solutions as Regards the Law of Digital Services|158
3|6.1 Continuity or Disruption|158
3|6.2 Where to Go|161
2|References|163
1|Chapter 6: Regulation Tomorrow: Strategies for Regulating New Technologies|167
2|1 What Happens When Technology Is Faster than the Law?|167
2|2 The “Pacing Problem”|168
2|3 The Factual Basis of Regulation|170
2|4 A “Post-Fact Society”?|177
2|5 Three Strategies for Regulation Tomorrow|178
3|5.1 Data Driven Regulatory Intervention|179
3|5.2 A Principle-Based Approach|182
3|5.3 The Regulatory “Sandbox”|184
2|6 Conclusion|185
2|References|186
1|Chapter 7: The Enforceability of Promises to Negotiate in Good Faith: Rethinking Traditional Common Law Attitudes|189
2|1 Introduction|190
2|2 Present State of Authority|191
2|3 Indications of Change|192
2|4 Position in Singapore and Hong Kong|195
3|4.1 Singapore|195
3|4.2 Hong Kong|197
2|5 The Constituents of Good Faith Conduct|197
2|6 What Is the Available Remedy for Breach?|198
2|7 Conclusion|199
2|References|200
1|Chapter 8: Continuing Representations and Strict Responsibility for Accuracy After Cramaso: Fact or (Legal) Fiction?|201
2|1 Introduction|201
2|2 Cramaso: The Facts, Litigation and Supreme Court Decision|206
3|2.1 The Facts and Litigation|206
3|2.2 The Supreme Court’s Decision|207
2|3 Reflections On What Cramaso Decided (and Did Not Decide?)|210
2|4 The Unanswered Question: Is Innocently Unknown and Unsuspected Supervening Falsification an ‘Innocent Misrepresentation’?|215
3|4.1 The Locus Classicus: Lord Wright MR’s Judgment in With v. O’Flanagan|216
4|4.1.1 The Duty-to-Communicate Approach: A ‘Non-disclosure’ Theory of Responsibility for Accuracy|218
4|4.1.2 The Continuing-Representation Approach: Strict Responsibility for Accuracy|221
2|5 Which Approach Should Be Followed: The Duty-To-Communicate Approach or the Continuing-Representation Approach, or Perhaps Neither?|223
2|6 The Continuing-Representation Approach: Innocent Misrepresentation by (Assumptive) Fiction|228
2|7 Summary and Conclusion|233
2|References|235
1|Index|236