File #2833: "2020_Book_APost-WTOInternationalLegalOrd.pdf"
Testo
1|Preface|5
1|Contents|6
1|About the Contributors|8
1|Abbreviations|14
1|Part I: The Post-WTO: Introduction|16
2|An Introduction to Utopian and Dystopian Post-WTO Regimes and Environments|17
3|1 Introduction|17
3|2 Project Conceptual Issues (e.g., Methodological and Theoretical Bases)|20
3|3 Approaches|23
4|3.1 Utopian|23
5|3.1.1 Fundamental Negative Features of the WTO|23
5|3.1.2 Identify the Goals or Fundamental Character of the Successor Regime|26
4|3.2 Dystopian|27
5|3.2.1 Successful or Positive Aspects of the WTO|27
5|3.2.2 Consequences of Not Replacing Those Positives|28
4|3.3 Substitutes to Fill the Void Left by a Lost WTO|29
3|4 Conclusion|30
3|References|30
1|Part II: The Post-WTO: Macro and Theoretical Perspectives|31
2|To Dystopia and Beyond: The WTO in a Warming Megaregional World|32
3|1 Introduction|32
3|2 Climate Change and Its Impact on the Post-WTO Trade Regime|33
3|3 The Post-WTO Trade Regime and BRICS+ Countries|36
3|4 Conclusion|45
3|References|47
2|Narrowed Down Utopia: Adjusting the WTO to a Changing Trade Environment|49
3|1 Introduction|50
3|2 Typology of WTO Obligations|52
3|3 Rise of Collective Obligations|55
4|3.1 Services Domestic Regulation|55
4|3.2 Investment Facilitation|56
4|3.3 Electronic Commerce|57
4|3.4 Evidence from Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs)|58
3|4 Inconsistencies Between Collective Obligations and the WTO Institutional Framework|59
4|4.1 Rule-Making Process|59
4|4.2 Enforcement Process|61
3|5 Looking Ahead|62
4|5.1 Keep Fighting Trade Protectionism|62
4|5.2 Avoid Expanding the WTO Rule-Book with Hard Collective Obligations|63
4|5.3 Strengthen the WTO´s Deliberative Function|64
3|6 Conclusion|66
3|References|67
2|Waiting for Cordell Hull|68
3|1 Introduction|68
3|2 Interest Group Paralysis in Trade Policy|70
3|3 The Cordell Hull Vision of Peace and Prosperity Through Trade|71
3|4 Breaking Free from Interest Group Influence|72
3|5 What Might a Utopian WTO 2.0 Look Like?|76
3|6 Trade vs. Foreign Policy|78
3|7 Conclusion|79
3|References|79
2|GAIA 2048-A `Glocal Agency in Anthropocene´: Cognitive and Institutional Change as `Legal Science Fiction´|81
3|1 Introduction|81
3|2 Dystopian Scenario: Specialization and `Fragmented We Fail´|84
3|3 Utopian Scenario: Synaesthesia and `United We Sense´|91
3|4 Conclusion: `Dystopian Utopia´ or Oxymora to Predict the Future by Creating It|95
3|References|98
2|If the WTO Were to Break Down Completely, Would We Stoop and Build It Up with Worn-Out Tools?|102
3|1 Introduction|103
3|2 The Tension Between the Economics and the Politics of Trade and the Choice of Policy Instruments|103
4|2.1 Public Choice Theory|103
4|2.2 What If the WTO Breaks Down Completely?|106
3|3 Constructing an International Economic Order|107
4|3.1 Counteracting Protectionist Interests|107
4|3.2 Balancing Non-Protectionist Interests|108
3|4 Reflecting on the WTO|111
4|4.1 Selected WTO Rules|111
4|4.2 Selected Dispute Settlement Rulings|114
5|4.2.1 China - Publications and Audiovisual Products (2010)|115
5|4.2.2 EC - Seal Products (2014)|116
5|4.2.3 Concluding Remarks|118
3|5 Conclusion|118
3|References|120
1|Part III: The Post-WTO: Dispute Settlement|122
2|The EU Approach to Overcome the WTO Dispute Settlement Vacuum: Article 25 DSU Interim Appeal Arbitration as a Bridge Between R...|123
3|1 Introduction|123
3|2 Arbitration Within the Multilateral Trade System: From GATT 1947 to Article 25 of the DSU|127
3|3 The Interim Appeal Arbitration Agreement Based on Article 25 of the DSU Proposed by the European Union|129
3|4 Reactions of the WTO Membership to the EU ad hoc Arbitration Proposal and the Strengthening of the EU Trade Toolbox for Ensu...|134
3|5 Conclusions|138
3|References|139
2|Like a Rolling Stone: Exploring Viable Options for the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism to Evolve Forward in the Post-WTO Era|141
3|1 Introduction|142
3|2 Problems with the Current WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism|142
3|3 Transplanting the Appeal Mechanism Into the Panel Process|144
4|3.1 Reviewing the Role of the Panel Process|145
4|3.2 ``Expert Review Groups´´ as a Potential Vehicle to Incorporate the Appellate Function|147
3|4 Trade Dispute Settlement Mechanism Accessible by Private Parties|149
4|4.1 Standing: Can Private Parties Be Entitled to Have Recourse to Trade Dispute Settlement?|149
4|4.2 Remedies: How Should Violations Be Redressed?|152
3|5 Conclusion|154
3|References|155
2|What Can We Learn from Our Struggling Cousin?: Recent Discussions on Reform of International Investment Law and Investment Dis...|156
3|1 Multilateralism at a Critical Crossroad|156
3|2 Recent Phenomena in Investment Agreements and Arbitration|158
4|2.1 Fragmentation|159
4|2.2 Challenges to Legitimacy and Spreading Mistrust|160
4|2.3 Absence of an Institutional Framework|161
4|2.4 Lack of Leadership|162
4|2.5 Increasing Gaps Between Reality and Norms|163
3|3 What Can Be Done to Disprove a Dystopia?|164
4|3.1 Revive Belief in Multilateralism|165
4|3.2 Lower Expectations|167
4|3.3 Focus on (Small) Tangible Outcomes|167
4|3.4 Facilitate Monitoring and Advisory Roles|168
4|3.5 Facilitate Non-Binding Dispute Settlement Proceedings|169
3|4 Conclusion|170
3|References|171
2|Reaching for Utopia, Geneva as Inspiration for Investment Disputes?|174
3|1 Introduction|175
3|2 The Backlash Against Investment Treaties and Investment Arbitration, and the Proposals for an Appellate Mechanism in a Two-T...|176
3|3 The Proposal for Appellate Review of Investment Arbitration|178
3|4 The EU´s Full-Blown ``Two-Tier MIC´´ Proposal|179
3|5 Questions Surrounding the Broader Proposal|181
4|5.1 A Right to Appellate Review?|181
4|5.2 Scope of Review|182
4|5.3 Applicable Law|183
4|5.4 Enforcement|184
3|6 The Geneva Lesson and the Vienna Initiative|184
3|7 Conclusion|188
3|References|190
2|A Possible Hierarchy of Dispute Settlement Systems?|193
3|1 Introduction|193
3|2 Sovereignty and Governance|194
3|3 Governance Through Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Trade Agreements|195
4|3.1 The Development of the Law of the World Trade Organisation|197
4|3.2 International Economic or Trade Law as a Special International Law Regime|200
3|4 Hierarchy of Treaties|202
4|4.1 Introduction|202
4|4.2 Overlapping Jurisdictions: Preferential Trade Agreements and the World Trade Organisation|205
3|5 Conclusion|207
3|References|208
1|Part IV: The Post-WTO: Specific International Economic Law Issues|210
2|The Concern with Non-concerns: For the End of Trade Dystopia|211
3|1 Introduction|211
3|2 Setting the Scene|214
4|2.1 The Problem at the WTO|214
4|2.2 Between Sovereignty and Fragmentation: Justifying NTC|215
3|3 How to End Dystopia|217
4|3.1 Take Words Seriously: Take Rights Seriously|218
4|3.2 Re-politicize Law|218
3|4 Conclusion|222
3|References|223
2|The Rise of Import Substitution Subsidies and Local Content Requirements in a Dystopian WTO 2.0 Regime|225
3|1 Introduction|225
4|1.1 The Economic Effects of LCRs|227
3|2 LCRs: Typology and Characteristics|229
3|3 Rise in LCRs Globally|230
3|4 Taming LCRs: A Comparison of Frameworks|234
4|4.1 The Existing WTO Framework Regulating LCRs|234
4|4.2 The Framework Regulating LCRs Under BITs and RTA|237
4|4.3 LCRs Within a (Post) WTO Regime|240
3|5 Conclusion|241
3|Annexure 1: Tale of Key WTO Disputes on LCRs|242
3|References|243
2|A Development-Driven Post WTO World|245
3|1 Introduction|246
3|2 Pluralism As the New Normal|247
3|3 Two Paradigms for Pluralism|249
4|3.1 ``Regional´´ Pluralism|249
5|3.1.1 Normative Nature|249
5|3.1.2 Institutional Features|252
4|3.2 Topical Pluralism|253
3|4 How to Build a Development-Oriented Pluralist System?|255
4|4.1 What Normative Governing Principles for a Development-Oriented Pluralist System?|256
4|4.2 How to Police Legal Conflicts Among Component Parts of a Pluralist Order?|258
4|4.3 What Would Pluralism Mean for a WTO 2.0?|259
3|References|262
2|Saving the World Trade Order from the Bottom Up: A Role for Preferential Trade Agreements|263
3|1 Introduction|264
3|2 Preferential Trade Agreements: A Mapping Exercise|265
4|2.1 The Momentum for Regionalism and Its Limits|265
4|2.2 Distant Bilateralism|266
4|2.3 Plurilateralism: The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership-CPTPP|267
4|2.4 Linking Regional Trade Blocs: The Transregional Dimension|268
4|2.5 Preferential Trade Agreements: Conclusion|268
3|3 Market Access and the Multilateralization of Regionalism|269
4|3.1 Bilateralism à la BIT: A Merely Theoretical Option|269
4|3.2 Enlarging Existing Agreements: The Accession Option|270
4|3.3 Creating New and More Encompassing Agreements|270
4|3.4 Linking Existing Schemes of Liberalization at Intra-regional and Trans-regional Levels|271
4|3.5 MFN Clauses in PTAs as a Means to Spread Market Access|271
4|3.6 In Conclusion: Multilateralization of Regionalism and Its Limits|272
3|4 NTBs, Standards and Spillover Effects|273
4|4.1 Multilateral Disciplines of Regulatory Action: Can They Be Preserved by PTAs?|273
4|4.2 Convergence of Regulatory Environments: Decentralized and Multilateral Benefits|274
4|4.3 Spillover Effects: The Larger Picture|274
5|4.3.1 Spillover Effects: de facto or de iure?|275
5|4.3.2 Participation: An Open Question with Regard to Standards|276
3|5 The Governance Question|276
4|5.1 Implementation|277
4|5.2 Dispute Settlement|277
4|5.3 Negotiations and Forum Functions|278
5|5.3.1 Negotiation and Innovation|278
5|5.3.2 Forum Function|279
3|6 Conclusion|279
3|References|280
2|A New International Trade Framework for Digital Assets|281
3|1 Introduction: Utopia and Dystopia in the WTO Context|281
3|2 Tensions Between New Developments and Old Categories|283
4|2.1 Technological Advances|283
4|2.2 Limited Suitability of GATT and GATS|284
5|2.2.1 History and Notion|285
5|2.2.2 Difficulties in Classifying Digital Assets|286
5|2.2.3 Servitization of Manufacturing|287
3|3 Dystopia: New Wine in Old Skins or ``Lawless´´ Regime|288
3|4 Utopia: Dream of a Digital Assets Framework|289
4|4.1 Need for a Bottom-up Approach|289
4|4.2 Procedures for Standardization|291
4|4.3 Taxonomy of Digital Asset Classes|292
4|4.4 Contents of Standards for Digital Assets|293
4|4.5 Possible Roadmap|294
3|References|295
1|Contents|6
1|About the Contributors|8
1|Abbreviations|14
1|Part I: The Post-WTO: Introduction|16
2|An Introduction to Utopian and Dystopian Post-WTO Regimes and Environments|17
3|1 Introduction|17
3|2 Project Conceptual Issues (e.g., Methodological and Theoretical Bases)|20
3|3 Approaches|23
4|3.1 Utopian|23
5|3.1.1 Fundamental Negative Features of the WTO|23
5|3.1.2 Identify the Goals or Fundamental Character of the Successor Regime|26
4|3.2 Dystopian|27
5|3.2.1 Successful or Positive Aspects of the WTO|27
5|3.2.2 Consequences of Not Replacing Those Positives|28
4|3.3 Substitutes to Fill the Void Left by a Lost WTO|29
3|4 Conclusion|30
3|References|30
1|Part II: The Post-WTO: Macro and Theoretical Perspectives|31
2|To Dystopia and Beyond: The WTO in a Warming Megaregional World|32
3|1 Introduction|32
3|2 Climate Change and Its Impact on the Post-WTO Trade Regime|33
3|3 The Post-WTO Trade Regime and BRICS+ Countries|36
3|4 Conclusion|45
3|References|47
2|Narrowed Down Utopia: Adjusting the WTO to a Changing Trade Environment|49
3|1 Introduction|50
3|2 Typology of WTO Obligations|52
3|3 Rise of Collective Obligations|55
4|3.1 Services Domestic Regulation|55
4|3.2 Investment Facilitation|56
4|3.3 Electronic Commerce|57
4|3.4 Evidence from Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs)|58
3|4 Inconsistencies Between Collective Obligations and the WTO Institutional Framework|59
4|4.1 Rule-Making Process|59
4|4.2 Enforcement Process|61
3|5 Looking Ahead|62
4|5.1 Keep Fighting Trade Protectionism|62
4|5.2 Avoid Expanding the WTO Rule-Book with Hard Collective Obligations|63
4|5.3 Strengthen the WTO´s Deliberative Function|64
3|6 Conclusion|66
3|References|67
2|Waiting for Cordell Hull|68
3|1 Introduction|68
3|2 Interest Group Paralysis in Trade Policy|70
3|3 The Cordell Hull Vision of Peace and Prosperity Through Trade|71
3|4 Breaking Free from Interest Group Influence|72
3|5 What Might a Utopian WTO 2.0 Look Like?|76
3|6 Trade vs. Foreign Policy|78
3|7 Conclusion|79
3|References|79
2|GAIA 2048-A `Glocal Agency in Anthropocene´: Cognitive and Institutional Change as `Legal Science Fiction´|81
3|1 Introduction|81
3|2 Dystopian Scenario: Specialization and `Fragmented We Fail´|84
3|3 Utopian Scenario: Synaesthesia and `United We Sense´|91
3|4 Conclusion: `Dystopian Utopia´ or Oxymora to Predict the Future by Creating It|95
3|References|98
2|If the WTO Were to Break Down Completely, Would We Stoop and Build It Up with Worn-Out Tools?|102
3|1 Introduction|103
3|2 The Tension Between the Economics and the Politics of Trade and the Choice of Policy Instruments|103
4|2.1 Public Choice Theory|103
4|2.2 What If the WTO Breaks Down Completely?|106
3|3 Constructing an International Economic Order|107
4|3.1 Counteracting Protectionist Interests|107
4|3.2 Balancing Non-Protectionist Interests|108
3|4 Reflecting on the WTO|111
4|4.1 Selected WTO Rules|111
4|4.2 Selected Dispute Settlement Rulings|114
5|4.2.1 China - Publications and Audiovisual Products (2010)|115
5|4.2.2 EC - Seal Products (2014)|116
5|4.2.3 Concluding Remarks|118
3|5 Conclusion|118
3|References|120
1|Part III: The Post-WTO: Dispute Settlement|122
2|The EU Approach to Overcome the WTO Dispute Settlement Vacuum: Article 25 DSU Interim Appeal Arbitration as a Bridge Between R...|123
3|1 Introduction|123
3|2 Arbitration Within the Multilateral Trade System: From GATT 1947 to Article 25 of the DSU|127
3|3 The Interim Appeal Arbitration Agreement Based on Article 25 of the DSU Proposed by the European Union|129
3|4 Reactions of the WTO Membership to the EU ad hoc Arbitration Proposal and the Strengthening of the EU Trade Toolbox for Ensu...|134
3|5 Conclusions|138
3|References|139
2|Like a Rolling Stone: Exploring Viable Options for the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism to Evolve Forward in the Post-WTO Era|141
3|1 Introduction|142
3|2 Problems with the Current WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism|142
3|3 Transplanting the Appeal Mechanism Into the Panel Process|144
4|3.1 Reviewing the Role of the Panel Process|145
4|3.2 ``Expert Review Groups´´ as a Potential Vehicle to Incorporate the Appellate Function|147
3|4 Trade Dispute Settlement Mechanism Accessible by Private Parties|149
4|4.1 Standing: Can Private Parties Be Entitled to Have Recourse to Trade Dispute Settlement?|149
4|4.2 Remedies: How Should Violations Be Redressed?|152
3|5 Conclusion|154
3|References|155
2|What Can We Learn from Our Struggling Cousin?: Recent Discussions on Reform of International Investment Law and Investment Dis...|156
3|1 Multilateralism at a Critical Crossroad|156
3|2 Recent Phenomena in Investment Agreements and Arbitration|158
4|2.1 Fragmentation|159
4|2.2 Challenges to Legitimacy and Spreading Mistrust|160
4|2.3 Absence of an Institutional Framework|161
4|2.4 Lack of Leadership|162
4|2.5 Increasing Gaps Between Reality and Norms|163
3|3 What Can Be Done to Disprove a Dystopia?|164
4|3.1 Revive Belief in Multilateralism|165
4|3.2 Lower Expectations|167
4|3.3 Focus on (Small) Tangible Outcomes|167
4|3.4 Facilitate Monitoring and Advisory Roles|168
4|3.5 Facilitate Non-Binding Dispute Settlement Proceedings|169
3|4 Conclusion|170
3|References|171
2|Reaching for Utopia, Geneva as Inspiration for Investment Disputes?|174
3|1 Introduction|175
3|2 The Backlash Against Investment Treaties and Investment Arbitration, and the Proposals for an Appellate Mechanism in a Two-T...|176
3|3 The Proposal for Appellate Review of Investment Arbitration|178
3|4 The EU´s Full-Blown ``Two-Tier MIC´´ Proposal|179
3|5 Questions Surrounding the Broader Proposal|181
4|5.1 A Right to Appellate Review?|181
4|5.2 Scope of Review|182
4|5.3 Applicable Law|183
4|5.4 Enforcement|184
3|6 The Geneva Lesson and the Vienna Initiative|184
3|7 Conclusion|188
3|References|190
2|A Possible Hierarchy of Dispute Settlement Systems?|193
3|1 Introduction|193
3|2 Sovereignty and Governance|194
3|3 Governance Through Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Trade Agreements|195
4|3.1 The Development of the Law of the World Trade Organisation|197
4|3.2 International Economic or Trade Law as a Special International Law Regime|200
3|4 Hierarchy of Treaties|202
4|4.1 Introduction|202
4|4.2 Overlapping Jurisdictions: Preferential Trade Agreements and the World Trade Organisation|205
3|5 Conclusion|207
3|References|208
1|Part IV: The Post-WTO: Specific International Economic Law Issues|210
2|The Concern with Non-concerns: For the End of Trade Dystopia|211
3|1 Introduction|211
3|2 Setting the Scene|214
4|2.1 The Problem at the WTO|214
4|2.2 Between Sovereignty and Fragmentation: Justifying NTC|215
3|3 How to End Dystopia|217
4|3.1 Take Words Seriously: Take Rights Seriously|218
4|3.2 Re-politicize Law|218
3|4 Conclusion|222
3|References|223
2|The Rise of Import Substitution Subsidies and Local Content Requirements in a Dystopian WTO 2.0 Regime|225
3|1 Introduction|225
4|1.1 The Economic Effects of LCRs|227
3|2 LCRs: Typology and Characteristics|229
3|3 Rise in LCRs Globally|230
3|4 Taming LCRs: A Comparison of Frameworks|234
4|4.1 The Existing WTO Framework Regulating LCRs|234
4|4.2 The Framework Regulating LCRs Under BITs and RTA|237
4|4.3 LCRs Within a (Post) WTO Regime|240
3|5 Conclusion|241
3|Annexure 1: Tale of Key WTO Disputes on LCRs|242
3|References|243
2|A Development-Driven Post WTO World|245
3|1 Introduction|246
3|2 Pluralism As the New Normal|247
3|3 Two Paradigms for Pluralism|249
4|3.1 ``Regional´´ Pluralism|249
5|3.1.1 Normative Nature|249
5|3.1.2 Institutional Features|252
4|3.2 Topical Pluralism|253
3|4 How to Build a Development-Oriented Pluralist System?|255
4|4.1 What Normative Governing Principles for a Development-Oriented Pluralist System?|256
4|4.2 How to Police Legal Conflicts Among Component Parts of a Pluralist Order?|258
4|4.3 What Would Pluralism Mean for a WTO 2.0?|259
3|References|262
2|Saving the World Trade Order from the Bottom Up: A Role for Preferential Trade Agreements|263
3|1 Introduction|264
3|2 Preferential Trade Agreements: A Mapping Exercise|265
4|2.1 The Momentum for Regionalism and Its Limits|265
4|2.2 Distant Bilateralism|266
4|2.3 Plurilateralism: The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership-CPTPP|267
4|2.4 Linking Regional Trade Blocs: The Transregional Dimension|268
4|2.5 Preferential Trade Agreements: Conclusion|268
3|3 Market Access and the Multilateralization of Regionalism|269
4|3.1 Bilateralism à la BIT: A Merely Theoretical Option|269
4|3.2 Enlarging Existing Agreements: The Accession Option|270
4|3.3 Creating New and More Encompassing Agreements|270
4|3.4 Linking Existing Schemes of Liberalization at Intra-regional and Trans-regional Levels|271
4|3.5 MFN Clauses in PTAs as a Means to Spread Market Access|271
4|3.6 In Conclusion: Multilateralization of Regionalism and Its Limits|272
3|4 NTBs, Standards and Spillover Effects|273
4|4.1 Multilateral Disciplines of Regulatory Action: Can They Be Preserved by PTAs?|273
4|4.2 Convergence of Regulatory Environments: Decentralized and Multilateral Benefits|274
4|4.3 Spillover Effects: The Larger Picture|274
5|4.3.1 Spillover Effects: de facto or de iure?|275
5|4.3.2 Participation: An Open Question with Regard to Standards|276
3|5 The Governance Question|276
4|5.1 Implementation|277
4|5.2 Dispute Settlement|277
4|5.3 Negotiations and Forum Functions|278
5|5.3.1 Negotiation and Innovation|278
5|5.3.2 Forum Function|279
3|6 Conclusion|279
3|References|280
2|A New International Trade Framework for Digital Assets|281
3|1 Introduction: Utopia and Dystopia in the WTO Context|281
3|2 Tensions Between New Developments and Old Categories|283
4|2.1 Technological Advances|283
4|2.2 Limited Suitability of GATT and GATS|284
5|2.2.1 History and Notion|285
5|2.2.2 Difficulties in Classifying Digital Assets|286
5|2.2.3 Servitization of Manufacturing|287
3|3 Dystopia: New Wine in Old Skins or ``Lawless´´ Regime|288
3|4 Utopia: Dream of a Digital Assets Framework|289
4|4.1 Need for a Bottom-up Approach|289
4|4.2 Procedures for Standardization|291
4|4.3 Taxonomy of Digital Asset Classes|292
4|4.4 Contents of Standards for Digital Assets|293
4|4.5 Possible Roadmap|294
3|References|295