File #2508: "2018_Book_AnUnamendableConstitution.pdf"
Text
1|Acknowledgements|6
1|Contents|7
1|Contributors|9
1|1 The Forms of Unamendability|10
2|Abstract|10
2|1 The Duality of Formal Amendment Rules|11
2|2 Classifying Unamendability|13
2|3 Substantive Unamendability|15
2|4 The Purposes of Formal Unamendability|16
2|5 Informal Unamendability|18
2|6 Procedural Unamendability|20
2|7 Temporal Unamendability|21
2|8 Foundational Questions in Modern Constitutionalism|23
2|9 Examining Unamendability in Constitutional Democracies|24
2|10 Four Themes|27
2|11 Three Aspirations|32
2|References|33
1|The Legitimacy and Limits of Unamendability|36
1|2 Necrocracy or Democracy? Assessing Objections to Constitutional Unamendability|37
2|Abstract|37
2|1 Introduction|38
2|2 Theoretical Challenges to Unamendability|40
3|2.1 The ‘Dead Hand’|40
3|2.2 Logical Subordination|43
3|2.3 Undemocratic|44
2|3 Practical Objections to Unamendability|48
3|3.1 Revolutionary or Forcible Change|48
3|3.2 Limited Effectiveness|49
3|3.3 Enhancing Judiciary’s Power|52
2|4 Textual Challenges to Constitutional Unamendability|55
3|4.1 The Meaning of ‘Amendment’|55
3|4.2 Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius|57
2|5 Conclusion|61
2|References|62
1|3 A Constitution for Eternity: An Economic Theory of Explicit Unamendability|70
2|Abstract|70
2|1 Introduction|70
2|2 Delineating Eternity Clauses|73
2|3 Justifying Eternity Clauses|78
3|3.1 Protective Theories|79
3|3.2 Expressive and Signaling Theories|82
2|4 Rent-Redistribution Optimization|84
3|4.1 Rent-Seeking and Rent-Extraction|84
3|4.2 Justifying Through Rent-Redistribution Optimization|88
2|5 Conclusion|91
2|Acknowledgements|91
2|References|91
1|4 Conventions of Unamendability: Covert Constitutional Unamendability in (Two) Politically Enforced Constitutions|95
2|Abstract|95
2|1 Introduction|96
2|2 The Different Forms of Constitutional Unamendability|99
2|3 Constitutional Amendment and the Role of the Courts|102
2|4 Two Politically Enforced Constitutions: The UK and the Netherlands|106
3|4.1 United Kingdom|106
3|4.2 The Netherlands|110
2|5 Unamendability in Politically Enforced Constitutions|112
3|5.1 Judicial Creativity and Deafness in the United Kingdom|113
3|5.2 Judicial Disobedience in the Netherlands|116
2|6 Constitutional Conventions as a Model|118
3|6.1 The Nature of Constitutional Conventions|118
3|6.2 Constitutional Conventions and Covert Constitutional Unamendability|121
2|7 Concluding Remarks: ‘Which in Our Case We Have not Got’?|122
2|Acknowledgements|124
2|References|124
1|5 Credible Commitment or Paternalism? The Case of Unamendability|128
2|Abstract|128
2|1 Introduction|128
2|2 Reasons for Constitutional Pre-commitment|131
2|3 Constitutional Pre-commitment and Unamendability|132
2|4 Desirability of Unamendable Provisions|135
2|5 An Expressive Device with a Functional Effect|144
2|6 Conclusion|147
2|References|148
1|Unamendability Around the World|151
1|6 Constitutional Falsehoods: The Fourth Judges Case and the Basic Structure Doctrine in India|152
2|Abstract|152
2|1 Introduction|152
2|2 The Birth of the Basic Structure Doctrine|154
2|3 Basic Structure Review and the Emerging Disjunctures Between Text and Practice|156
2|4 The Treatment of Constitutional Falsehoods by Public Officials|160
2|5 The Fourth Judges Case and the New Basic Structure Doctrine|163
2|6 Conclusion|169
2|Acknowledgement|170
2|References|170
1|7 Unamendability in Israel: A Critical Perspective|172
2|Abstract|172
2|1 Introduction|172
2|2 The Meaning and Significance of Unamenable Constitutional Provisions|174
2|3 Concealed Unamendability|177
3|3.1 Unamendability in Other Name: The Yerdor Case|179
3|3.2 Formalizing Concealed Unamendability: Section 7A of Basic Law: The Knesset|180
3|3.3 Rules of Procedures of the Knesset|183
2|4 Unwritten Unamendability: Constituent Power and Its Limits|184
2|5 Unamendability in Israel: Implications for Constitutionalism and Democracy|187
3|5.1 Unamendability in Context: The Israeli Constitutional Order|188
3|5.2 Unamendability and the Hierarchy of Values and Norms|189
3|5.3 Unamendability: The Particular v. the Universal|191
2|6 Conclusions|193
2|Acknowledgements|194
2|References|194
1|8 Eternal Provisions in the Constitution of Bangladesh: A Constitution Once and for All?|197
2|Abstract|197
2|1 Introduction|197
2|2 Amendment Rules of the Constitution of Bangladesh|200
2|3 Founding Values and the Development of the Idea of Unamendable Provisions|202
2|4 The Theory of Unamendability of Basic Structure of the Constitution|210
2|5 Bangladesh’s Eternal Clauses: a Constitution Once and for All?|215
3|5.1 The Unwieldy Scope of the Broad Eternity Clause|216
3|5.2 Constitutional Entrenchment V Popular Sovereignty: Legitimacy and Implications of the Eternity Clause|220
2|6 Conclusion|227
2|Acknowledgements|227
2|References|228
1|9 Unamendability as a Judicial Discovery? Inductive Learning Lessons from Hungary|232
2|Abstract|232
2|1 Introduction|232
2|2 Case Law of the Hungarian Constitutional Court on Unamendability|235
3|2.1 Circumstances|235
3|2.2 Assessment of Unamendability Between 1990 and 2010 in Constitutional Court Case Law|237
3|2.3 Scope and Enforcement After 2010|239
2|3 Implicit Unamendability in the Fundamental Law of Hungary Discovered by Applying Different Legal Methods|244
3|3.1 The Discovery of Unamendability by Purposive Interpretation|244
3|3.2 The Discovery of Unamendability by Structural Approach|249
3|3.3 Unamendability by Textual Interpretation|250
3|3.4 Unamendability by Logical Interpretation|252
2|4 Juridical Review of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments|253
2|5 Concluding Remarks|254
2|References|256
1|10 Amending the Unamendable: The Case of Article 20 of the German Basic Law|260
2|Abstract|260
2|1 Introduction|260
2|2 The Source of the Separation of the Original and Derived Pouvoir Constituant|261
3|2.1 The Relation Between the Pouvoir Constituant and Unamendable Provisions|261
4|2.1.1 What Is the Pouvoir Constituant?|262
4|2.1.2 Who Is the Sovereign?|264
3|2.2 Challenging the Quality of Being “Constituent” of the Derived Pouvoir Constituant|265
4|2.2.1 “Constituent” versus “Constituted”|265
4|2.2.2 The Original Pouvoir Constituant in Terms of the Unamendable Provisions|266
5|The Definition of the Original Pouvoir Constituant|267
5|The Quality of Being Pre-law Order of the Original Pouvoir Constituant|268
2|3 The Privilege of the Will of the Founders and the Impotence of the Derived Pouvoir Constituant: The Example of the 4th Paragraph of Article 20 of the German Basic Law|270
3|3.1 The Source of the Hierarchy Between the Original and Derived Pouvoir Constituants|270
4|3.1.1 The Special Qualities of the Original Pouvoir Constituant|270
4|3.1.2 Derived Pouvoir Constituant’s Duty to Show Respect to the Founders’ Will|272
4|3.1.3 Derived Pouvoir Constituant’s Duty to Show Respect to the Unamendable Provisions|273
3|3.2 The Impossibility for the Derived Pouvoir Constituant to Create an Unamendable Provision|274
4|3.2.1 The Counter-arguments Which Follows the Misleading Example of the 4th Paragraph of Article 20 of the German Basic Law|274
4|3.2.2 The Judicial Value of the 4th Paragraph of Article 20 of the German Basic Law|276
4|3.2.3 Another Misleading Counter-Argument: The Declaration of the Republic in France|277
2|4 Conclusion|279
2|References|280
1|11 Debating Unamendability: Deadlock in Turkey’s Constitution-Making Process|282
2|Abstract|282
2|1 The 1982 Constitution and Its Discontents|284
3|1.1 Constitutional Change Process of Turkey|285
4|1.1.1 Constitutional Amendments|285
4|1.1.2 Amendment-Making Procedures|288
3|1.2 Criticism Toward the Turkish Constitution|289
2|2 The Unamendable Amendments and Its Discontents|291
2|3 The Failed Process of Constitutional-Making in Turkey|295
2|4 The Debate on Unamendable Articles|299
2|5 Conclusion|309
2|References|310
1|12 The Unamendability of Amendable Clauses: The Case of the Turkish Constitution|313
2|Abstract|313
2|1 Introduction|314
2|2 A Theory of Constitutional Stratification|315
3|2.1 Why Carl Schmitt?|315
3|2.2 The Positive Concept of Constitution|316
3|2.3 The Guardian of the Constitution|319
2|3 Constitutional Unamendability in Turkey|324
3|3.1 The Early Activism of the TCC (1962–1971)|326
3|3.2 Substantive Review under the Guise of Formal Review (1971–1982)|329
3|3.3 Restrained Formal Review (1982–2008)|332
3|3.4 The Activist Comeback in 2008|333
2|4 A Political Clause of Unamendability|337
2|5 Concluding Remarks|341
2|Acknowledgements|341
2|References|341
1|13 Brazil in the Context of the Debate Over Unamendability in Latin America|344
2|Abstract|344
2|1 Introduction|344
2|2 The Debate Over Unamendable Clauses in the Brazilian Constitutional Literature|348
2|3 The Brazilian Supreme Court and the Unamendable Clauses|357
2|4 Conclusion|360
2|References|362
1|14 Unamendable Constitutional Provisions and the European Common Constitutional Heritage: A Comparison Among Three Waves of Constitutionalism|364
2|Abstract|364
2|1 Introduction|364
2|2 The European Common Constitutional Heritage|367
2|3 Unamendability in Post-World War II Constitutions: The Cases of Italy and Germany|371
2|4 After the Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Cases of Romania and the Czech Republic|376
2|5 The Arab Uprisings and the Constituent Processes in Tunisia and Morocco|380
3|5.1 A New Tunisia: Which Values Need to Be Protected by Unamendable Clauses?|381
3|5.2 A Reformist King and the Uprising: The 2011 Moroccan Constitution and Its Unamendable Provisions|383
2|6 Concluding Remarks|385
2|References|387
1|Contents|7
1|Contributors|9
1|1 The Forms of Unamendability|10
2|Abstract|10
2|1 The Duality of Formal Amendment Rules|11
2|2 Classifying Unamendability|13
2|3 Substantive Unamendability|15
2|4 The Purposes of Formal Unamendability|16
2|5 Informal Unamendability|18
2|6 Procedural Unamendability|20
2|7 Temporal Unamendability|21
2|8 Foundational Questions in Modern Constitutionalism|23
2|9 Examining Unamendability in Constitutional Democracies|24
2|10 Four Themes|27
2|11 Three Aspirations|32
2|References|33
1|The Legitimacy and Limits of Unamendability|36
1|2 Necrocracy or Democracy? Assessing Objections to Constitutional Unamendability|37
2|Abstract|37
2|1 Introduction|38
2|2 Theoretical Challenges to Unamendability|40
3|2.1 The ‘Dead Hand’|40
3|2.2 Logical Subordination|43
3|2.3 Undemocratic|44
2|3 Practical Objections to Unamendability|48
3|3.1 Revolutionary or Forcible Change|48
3|3.2 Limited Effectiveness|49
3|3.3 Enhancing Judiciary’s Power|52
2|4 Textual Challenges to Constitutional Unamendability|55
3|4.1 The Meaning of ‘Amendment’|55
3|4.2 Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius|57
2|5 Conclusion|61
2|References|62
1|3 A Constitution for Eternity: An Economic Theory of Explicit Unamendability|70
2|Abstract|70
2|1 Introduction|70
2|2 Delineating Eternity Clauses|73
2|3 Justifying Eternity Clauses|78
3|3.1 Protective Theories|79
3|3.2 Expressive and Signaling Theories|82
2|4 Rent-Redistribution Optimization|84
3|4.1 Rent-Seeking and Rent-Extraction|84
3|4.2 Justifying Through Rent-Redistribution Optimization|88
2|5 Conclusion|91
2|Acknowledgements|91
2|References|91
1|4 Conventions of Unamendability: Covert Constitutional Unamendability in (Two) Politically Enforced Constitutions|95
2|Abstract|95
2|1 Introduction|96
2|2 The Different Forms of Constitutional Unamendability|99
2|3 Constitutional Amendment and the Role of the Courts|102
2|4 Two Politically Enforced Constitutions: The UK and the Netherlands|106
3|4.1 United Kingdom|106
3|4.2 The Netherlands|110
2|5 Unamendability in Politically Enforced Constitutions|112
3|5.1 Judicial Creativity and Deafness in the United Kingdom|113
3|5.2 Judicial Disobedience in the Netherlands|116
2|6 Constitutional Conventions as a Model|118
3|6.1 The Nature of Constitutional Conventions|118
3|6.2 Constitutional Conventions and Covert Constitutional Unamendability|121
2|7 Concluding Remarks: ‘Which in Our Case We Have not Got’?|122
2|Acknowledgements|124
2|References|124
1|5 Credible Commitment or Paternalism? The Case of Unamendability|128
2|Abstract|128
2|1 Introduction|128
2|2 Reasons for Constitutional Pre-commitment|131
2|3 Constitutional Pre-commitment and Unamendability|132
2|4 Desirability of Unamendable Provisions|135
2|5 An Expressive Device with a Functional Effect|144
2|6 Conclusion|147
2|References|148
1|Unamendability Around the World|151
1|6 Constitutional Falsehoods: The Fourth Judges Case and the Basic Structure Doctrine in India|152
2|Abstract|152
2|1 Introduction|152
2|2 The Birth of the Basic Structure Doctrine|154
2|3 Basic Structure Review and the Emerging Disjunctures Between Text and Practice|156
2|4 The Treatment of Constitutional Falsehoods by Public Officials|160
2|5 The Fourth Judges Case and the New Basic Structure Doctrine|163
2|6 Conclusion|169
2|Acknowledgement|170
2|References|170
1|7 Unamendability in Israel: A Critical Perspective|172
2|Abstract|172
2|1 Introduction|172
2|2 The Meaning and Significance of Unamenable Constitutional Provisions|174
2|3 Concealed Unamendability|177
3|3.1 Unamendability in Other Name: The Yerdor Case|179
3|3.2 Formalizing Concealed Unamendability: Section 7A of Basic Law: The Knesset|180
3|3.3 Rules of Procedures of the Knesset|183
2|4 Unwritten Unamendability: Constituent Power and Its Limits|184
2|5 Unamendability in Israel: Implications for Constitutionalism and Democracy|187
3|5.1 Unamendability in Context: The Israeli Constitutional Order|188
3|5.2 Unamendability and the Hierarchy of Values and Norms|189
3|5.3 Unamendability: The Particular v. the Universal|191
2|6 Conclusions|193
2|Acknowledgements|194
2|References|194
1|8 Eternal Provisions in the Constitution of Bangladesh: A Constitution Once and for All?|197
2|Abstract|197
2|1 Introduction|197
2|2 Amendment Rules of the Constitution of Bangladesh|200
2|3 Founding Values and the Development of the Idea of Unamendable Provisions|202
2|4 The Theory of Unamendability of Basic Structure of the Constitution|210
2|5 Bangladesh’s Eternal Clauses: a Constitution Once and for All?|215
3|5.1 The Unwieldy Scope of the Broad Eternity Clause|216
3|5.2 Constitutional Entrenchment V Popular Sovereignty: Legitimacy and Implications of the Eternity Clause|220
2|6 Conclusion|227
2|Acknowledgements|227
2|References|228
1|9 Unamendability as a Judicial Discovery? Inductive Learning Lessons from Hungary|232
2|Abstract|232
2|1 Introduction|232
2|2 Case Law of the Hungarian Constitutional Court on Unamendability|235
3|2.1 Circumstances|235
3|2.2 Assessment of Unamendability Between 1990 and 2010 in Constitutional Court Case Law|237
3|2.3 Scope and Enforcement After 2010|239
2|3 Implicit Unamendability in the Fundamental Law of Hungary Discovered by Applying Different Legal Methods|244
3|3.1 The Discovery of Unamendability by Purposive Interpretation|244
3|3.2 The Discovery of Unamendability by Structural Approach|249
3|3.3 Unamendability by Textual Interpretation|250
3|3.4 Unamendability by Logical Interpretation|252
2|4 Juridical Review of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments|253
2|5 Concluding Remarks|254
2|References|256
1|10 Amending the Unamendable: The Case of Article 20 of the German Basic Law|260
2|Abstract|260
2|1 Introduction|260
2|2 The Source of the Separation of the Original and Derived Pouvoir Constituant|261
3|2.1 The Relation Between the Pouvoir Constituant and Unamendable Provisions|261
4|2.1.1 What Is the Pouvoir Constituant?|262
4|2.1.2 Who Is the Sovereign?|264
3|2.2 Challenging the Quality of Being “Constituent” of the Derived Pouvoir Constituant|265
4|2.2.1 “Constituent” versus “Constituted”|265
4|2.2.2 The Original Pouvoir Constituant in Terms of the Unamendable Provisions|266
5|The Definition of the Original Pouvoir Constituant|267
5|The Quality of Being Pre-law Order of the Original Pouvoir Constituant|268
2|3 The Privilege of the Will of the Founders and the Impotence of the Derived Pouvoir Constituant: The Example of the 4th Paragraph of Article 20 of the German Basic Law|270
3|3.1 The Source of the Hierarchy Between the Original and Derived Pouvoir Constituants|270
4|3.1.1 The Special Qualities of the Original Pouvoir Constituant|270
4|3.1.2 Derived Pouvoir Constituant’s Duty to Show Respect to the Founders’ Will|272
4|3.1.3 Derived Pouvoir Constituant’s Duty to Show Respect to the Unamendable Provisions|273
3|3.2 The Impossibility for the Derived Pouvoir Constituant to Create an Unamendable Provision|274
4|3.2.1 The Counter-arguments Which Follows the Misleading Example of the 4th Paragraph of Article 20 of the German Basic Law|274
4|3.2.2 The Judicial Value of the 4th Paragraph of Article 20 of the German Basic Law|276
4|3.2.3 Another Misleading Counter-Argument: The Declaration of the Republic in France|277
2|4 Conclusion|279
2|References|280
1|11 Debating Unamendability: Deadlock in Turkey’s Constitution-Making Process|282
2|Abstract|282
2|1 The 1982 Constitution and Its Discontents|284
3|1.1 Constitutional Change Process of Turkey|285
4|1.1.1 Constitutional Amendments|285
4|1.1.2 Amendment-Making Procedures|288
3|1.2 Criticism Toward the Turkish Constitution|289
2|2 The Unamendable Amendments and Its Discontents|291
2|3 The Failed Process of Constitutional-Making in Turkey|295
2|4 The Debate on Unamendable Articles|299
2|5 Conclusion|309
2|References|310
1|12 The Unamendability of Amendable Clauses: The Case of the Turkish Constitution|313
2|Abstract|313
2|1 Introduction|314
2|2 A Theory of Constitutional Stratification|315
3|2.1 Why Carl Schmitt?|315
3|2.2 The Positive Concept of Constitution|316
3|2.3 The Guardian of the Constitution|319
2|3 Constitutional Unamendability in Turkey|324
3|3.1 The Early Activism of the TCC (1962–1971)|326
3|3.2 Substantive Review under the Guise of Formal Review (1971–1982)|329
3|3.3 Restrained Formal Review (1982–2008)|332
3|3.4 The Activist Comeback in 2008|333
2|4 A Political Clause of Unamendability|337
2|5 Concluding Remarks|341
2|Acknowledgements|341
2|References|341
1|13 Brazil in the Context of the Debate Over Unamendability in Latin America|344
2|Abstract|344
2|1 Introduction|344
2|2 The Debate Over Unamendable Clauses in the Brazilian Constitutional Literature|348
2|3 The Brazilian Supreme Court and the Unamendable Clauses|357
2|4 Conclusion|360
2|References|362
1|14 Unamendable Constitutional Provisions and the European Common Constitutional Heritage: A Comparison Among Three Waves of Constitutionalism|364
2|Abstract|364
2|1 Introduction|364
2|2 The European Common Constitutional Heritage|367
2|3 Unamendability in Post-World War II Constitutions: The Cases of Italy and Germany|371
2|4 After the Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Cases of Romania and the Czech Republic|376
2|5 The Arab Uprisings and the Constituent Processes in Tunisia and Morocco|380
3|5.1 A New Tunisia: Which Values Need to Be Protected by Unamendable Clauses?|381
3|5.2 A Reformist King and the Uprising: The 2011 Moroccan Constitution and Its Unamendable Provisions|383
2|6 Concluding Remarks|385
2|References|387