File #2334: "2018_Book_MaritimeInterceptionAndTheLawO.pdf"
Text
1|Acknowledgements|5
1|Contents|6
1|Abbreviations|12
1|General Aspects of Maritime Interception Operations|16
1|1 Introduction: Maritime Interception and the Law of Naval Operations|17
2|1.1 Introduction|17
2|1.2 Purpose of the Study|20
3|1.2.1 Naval Operations and International Peace and Security|20
3|1.2.2 Operations Outside the Territorial Sovereignty of a State|22
3|1.2.3 Contemporary Naval Operations|23
2|1.3 What Are Maritime Interception Operations?|24
2|1.4 Maritime Interception Operations and the Right of Visit|28
2|1.5 Structure|30
2|References|31
1|2 Some Introductory Remarks on Naval Operations|33
2|Abstract|33
2|2.1 Introduction|33
2|2.2 Evolution of the Role of Naval Forces|34
2|2.3 Maritime Geography|38
2|2.4 Some Operational Points on MIO|40
3|2.4.1 Maritime Coalition Operations|40
3|2.4.2 Boarding Operations|41
3|2.4.3 Maritime Rules of Engagement|42
2|References|44
1|3 A Short History of Maritime Interception Operations|46
2|Abstract|46
2|3.1 Introduction|47
2|3.2 Strand 1: Enforcing UN Sanctions at Sea|48
3|3.2.1 Iraq (1990–2003)|49
3|3.2.2 The Former Yugoslavia (1992–1996)|50
3|3.2.3 Haiti (1993–1996)|52
3|3.2.4 Sierra Leone (1997–2010)|52
3|3.2.5 Lebanon (2006–Present)|53
3|3.2.6 Libya (2011–Present)|54
2|3.3 Strand 2: The September 11 Attacks|55
3|3.3.1 Operation Enduring Freedom|56
3|3.3.2 Operation Active Endeavour|56
3|3.3.3 Operation Iraqi Freedom|57
3|3.3.4 Multiple MIO|58
2|3.4 Strand 3: Enhancing Maritime Security|60
3|3.4.1 Expanded MIO and Maritime Security Operations (MSO)|60
3|3.4.2 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)|61
3|3.4.3 Updating International Agreements: The SUA Protocol 2005|63
2|3.5 Strand 4: Piracy|63
3|3.5.1 Counter-Piracy Operations|64
2|3.6 The Israeli Interception Operations|67
2|3.7 Final Remarks|68
2|References|69
1|4 The Right for Warships to Intervene on Foreign-Flagged Vessels on the High Seas|73
2|Abstract|73
2|4.1 Introduction|73
2|4.2 Fundamental Principles of the Law of the Sea|74
2|4.3 Limited Exceptions to Non-Interference|77
2|4.4 Principles of the Law of the Sea Versus Maritime Security|79
2|References|81
1|Legal Basis for Maritime Interception Operations|83
1|5 The UN Collective Security System and Maritime Interception Operations|84
2|Abstract|84
2|5.1 Introduction|85
2|5.2 The UN Collective Security System|86
2|5.3 Maritime Embargo Operations|88
3|5.3.1 Two Types of Maritime Embargo Operations|89
4|5.3.1.1 Implied Maritime Embargo Operations|90
4|5.3.1.2 Legal Basis for Implied Maritime Embargo Operations|92
3|5.3.2 Explicit Maritime Embargo Operations|93
2|5.4 Between Implied and Explicit|94
3|5.4.1 Lebanon|94
3|5.4.2 Iran|96
3|5.4.3 Libya|97
2|5.5 Legal Basis for Explicit Maritime Embargo Operations: Article 41 or 42?|97
3|5.5.1 The Evolving Scope of Article 42|98
3|5.5.2 Large-Scale Military Operations|99
3|5.5.3 Article 43 UN Charter|101
3|5.5.4 Inadequate Measures Under Article 41|102
2|5.6 Article 41 and the Use of Force|102
2|5.7 Sub-Conclusion Maritime Embargo Operations|105
2|5.8 UN-Mandated Interception Operations Under ‘All Necessary Means’|107
3|5.8.1 All Necessary Means|107
2|5.9 Specific Measures|108
3|5.9.1 “Article 42” Blockade|109
3|5.9.2 Piracy|110
3|5.9.3 Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism|111
3|5.9.4 Crude Oil Export: Libya 2014|113
2|5.10 Conclusions|113
2|References|114
1|6 Self-Defence and Maritime Interception|117
2|Abstract|117
2|6.1 Introduction|118
2|6.2 The Right of Self-Defence|119
2|6.3 Large-Scale Military Campaigns|121
3|6.3.1 Iraq (1990–1991)|121
3|6.3.2 Enduring Freedom, Change of Direction and Cast Lead|122
3|6.3.3 Operation Active Endeavour|123
2|6.4 Self-Defence Against Vessel-Borne WMD and Non-State Actors|124
3|6.4.1 WMD and Armed Attack|125
3|6.4.2 Reaction to Armed Attack: Flag State Jurisdiction and Self-Defence|127
3|6.4.3 Advantages of the Ius ad Bellum Approach to Boarding|129
2|6.5 Final Remarks|131
2|References|132
1|7 (Ad Hoc) Consent|135
2|Abstract|135
2|7.1 Introduction|135
2|7.2 Legal Framework Consent|138
3|7.2.1 The Consenting Authority|139
4|7.2.1.1 Flag State Consent|140
4|7.2.1.2 Master’s Consent|140
2|7.3 Analysis|142
3|7.3.1 The “Broken Taillight-Approach”|143
2|7.4 Stateless Vessels|145
3|7.4.1 Conditions for Statelessness as a Legal Basis|146
2|7.5 Final Remarks|147
2|References|148
1|8 International Agreements on Maritime Interception|150
2|Abstract|150
2|8.1 Introduction|150
2|8.2 The Increasing Role of International Agreements in MIO|152
2|8.3 International Agreements and the Law of the Sea|154
2|8.4 UNCLOS|156
2|8.5 The SUA Convention and Protocol|158
2|8.6 PSI Bilateral Boarding Agreements Between the US and Others|158
2|8.7 Final Remarks|159
2|References|159
1|Legal Regimes for Maritime Interception Operations|161
1|9 The Right of Visit|162
2|Abstract|162
2|9.1 Introduction|163
2|9.2 General Remarks on the Right of Visit|164
2|9.3 Ad Hoc Consent-Based Right of Visit|166
2|9.4 International Agreements and the Right of Visit|167
3|9.4.1 The Limited Character of the Right of Visit in UNCLOS|167
3|9.4.2 The SUA Provisions|171
3|9.4.3 Bilateral Ship Boarding Agreements Between the US and Other States|172
2|9.5 Self-Defence and the Right of Visit|172
3|9.5.1 The Belligerent Right of Visit and Search|173
3|9.5.2 The Subregimes of the Law of Naval Warfare|176
4|9.5.2.1 The Law of Contraband|177
4|9.5.2.2 The Law of Un-Neutral Service|178
4|9.5.2.3 The Law of Blockade|178
4|9.5.2.4 Enemy Merchant Vessels|179
2|9.6 Non-International Armed Conflicts|180
3|9.6.1 Operation Enduring Freedom|181
3|9.6.2 Operation Active Endeavour|184
3|9.6.3 A NIAC Right of Visit?|185
2|9.7 The Right of Visit Conferred Through the UN Collective Security System|187
3|9.7.1 All Necessary Means|191
3|9.7.2 The Law of Blockade and Article 42 of the UN Charter|192
2|9.8 Final Remarks|193
2|References|194
1|10 The Application of Force in Maritime Interception Operations|197
2|Abstract|197
2|10.1 Introduction|198
2|10.2 Naval Forces and the Use of Force|200
2|10.3 International Law of the Sea|201
2|10.4 Applicability of Human Rights to High Seas Interceptions|205
2|10.5 The Right to Life in a Naval Operations Dimension|210
3|10.5.1 Counter-Piracy Operations off the Coast of Somalia|212
2|10.6 The Law of Armed Conflict|214
3|10.6.1 Use of Force Against Neutral and Enemy Merchant Vessels|216
3|10.6.2 Use of Force Under the Prize Law Rules|221
2|10.7 Human Rights Law and the Law of Naval Warfare|223
2|10.8 Use of Force in UN-Mandated Interception Operations|225
2|10.9 Use of Self-Defence Interception Operations|228
2|10.10 Final Remarks|229
2|References|230
1|11 Detention and Maritime Interception|233
2|Abstract|233
2|11.1 Introduction|234
2|11.2 Operational Detention|235
2|11.3 What Constitutes Detention During Maritime Interception Operations|236
2|11.4 Prisoners of War at Sea and Crews of Enemy and Neutral Merchant Vessels|238
3|11.4.1 Passengers|239
2|11.5 Security Detainees at Sea|240
3|11.5.1 Security Detention Under LOAC|240
3|11.5.2 Security Detention Under Human Rights Law|242
2|11.6 Criminal Detention|243
2|11.7 Safeguards and Treatment at Sea|245
2|11.8 Detention in UN-Mandated Maritime Interception Operations|248
2|11.9 The Freedom Flotilla Incident|251
2|11.10 Final Remarks|254
2|References|255
1|Conclusions|257
1|12 Conclusions|258
2|12.1 Introduction|258
2|12.2 Legal Bases for MIO|260
2|12.3 Legal Regimes in MIO|262
2|12.4 Final Remarks|264
2|References|265
1|Annex A: List of Vessels|266
1|Annex B: List of Incidents|268
1|Annex C: List of Naval Operations|274
1|Annex D: Table of UN-Mandated Maritime Embargo Operations|275
1|Table of Cases|276
1|Literature|278
1|(Selected) Other Materials|312
2|International Organizations|312
2|National Materials|313
1|Index|315
1|Contents|6
1|Abbreviations|12
1|General Aspects of Maritime Interception Operations|16
1|1 Introduction: Maritime Interception and the Law of Naval Operations|17
2|1.1 Introduction|17
2|1.2 Purpose of the Study|20
3|1.2.1 Naval Operations and International Peace and Security|20
3|1.2.2 Operations Outside the Territorial Sovereignty of a State|22
3|1.2.3 Contemporary Naval Operations|23
2|1.3 What Are Maritime Interception Operations?|24
2|1.4 Maritime Interception Operations and the Right of Visit|28
2|1.5 Structure|30
2|References|31
1|2 Some Introductory Remarks on Naval Operations|33
2|Abstract|33
2|2.1 Introduction|33
2|2.2 Evolution of the Role of Naval Forces|34
2|2.3 Maritime Geography|38
2|2.4 Some Operational Points on MIO|40
3|2.4.1 Maritime Coalition Operations|40
3|2.4.2 Boarding Operations|41
3|2.4.3 Maritime Rules of Engagement|42
2|References|44
1|3 A Short History of Maritime Interception Operations|46
2|Abstract|46
2|3.1 Introduction|47
2|3.2 Strand 1: Enforcing UN Sanctions at Sea|48
3|3.2.1 Iraq (1990–2003)|49
3|3.2.2 The Former Yugoslavia (1992–1996)|50
3|3.2.3 Haiti (1993–1996)|52
3|3.2.4 Sierra Leone (1997–2010)|52
3|3.2.5 Lebanon (2006–Present)|53
3|3.2.6 Libya (2011–Present)|54
2|3.3 Strand 2: The September 11 Attacks|55
3|3.3.1 Operation Enduring Freedom|56
3|3.3.2 Operation Active Endeavour|56
3|3.3.3 Operation Iraqi Freedom|57
3|3.3.4 Multiple MIO|58
2|3.4 Strand 3: Enhancing Maritime Security|60
3|3.4.1 Expanded MIO and Maritime Security Operations (MSO)|60
3|3.4.2 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)|61
3|3.4.3 Updating International Agreements: The SUA Protocol 2005|63
2|3.5 Strand 4: Piracy|63
3|3.5.1 Counter-Piracy Operations|64
2|3.6 The Israeli Interception Operations|67
2|3.7 Final Remarks|68
2|References|69
1|4 The Right for Warships to Intervene on Foreign-Flagged Vessels on the High Seas|73
2|Abstract|73
2|4.1 Introduction|73
2|4.2 Fundamental Principles of the Law of the Sea|74
2|4.3 Limited Exceptions to Non-Interference|77
2|4.4 Principles of the Law of the Sea Versus Maritime Security|79
2|References|81
1|Legal Basis for Maritime Interception Operations|83
1|5 The UN Collective Security System and Maritime Interception Operations|84
2|Abstract|84
2|5.1 Introduction|85
2|5.2 The UN Collective Security System|86
2|5.3 Maritime Embargo Operations|88
3|5.3.1 Two Types of Maritime Embargo Operations|89
4|5.3.1.1 Implied Maritime Embargo Operations|90
4|5.3.1.2 Legal Basis for Implied Maritime Embargo Operations|92
3|5.3.2 Explicit Maritime Embargo Operations|93
2|5.4 Between Implied and Explicit|94
3|5.4.1 Lebanon|94
3|5.4.2 Iran|96
3|5.4.3 Libya|97
2|5.5 Legal Basis for Explicit Maritime Embargo Operations: Article 41 or 42?|97
3|5.5.1 The Evolving Scope of Article 42|98
3|5.5.2 Large-Scale Military Operations|99
3|5.5.3 Article 43 UN Charter|101
3|5.5.4 Inadequate Measures Under Article 41|102
2|5.6 Article 41 and the Use of Force|102
2|5.7 Sub-Conclusion Maritime Embargo Operations|105
2|5.8 UN-Mandated Interception Operations Under ‘All Necessary Means’|107
3|5.8.1 All Necessary Means|107
2|5.9 Specific Measures|108
3|5.9.1 “Article 42” Blockade|109
3|5.9.2 Piracy|110
3|5.9.3 Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism|111
3|5.9.4 Crude Oil Export: Libya 2014|113
2|5.10 Conclusions|113
2|References|114
1|6 Self-Defence and Maritime Interception|117
2|Abstract|117
2|6.1 Introduction|118
2|6.2 The Right of Self-Defence|119
2|6.3 Large-Scale Military Campaigns|121
3|6.3.1 Iraq (1990–1991)|121
3|6.3.2 Enduring Freedom, Change of Direction and Cast Lead|122
3|6.3.3 Operation Active Endeavour|123
2|6.4 Self-Defence Against Vessel-Borne WMD and Non-State Actors|124
3|6.4.1 WMD and Armed Attack|125
3|6.4.2 Reaction to Armed Attack: Flag State Jurisdiction and Self-Defence|127
3|6.4.3 Advantages of the Ius ad Bellum Approach to Boarding|129
2|6.5 Final Remarks|131
2|References|132
1|7 (Ad Hoc) Consent|135
2|Abstract|135
2|7.1 Introduction|135
2|7.2 Legal Framework Consent|138
3|7.2.1 The Consenting Authority|139
4|7.2.1.1 Flag State Consent|140
4|7.2.1.2 Master’s Consent|140
2|7.3 Analysis|142
3|7.3.1 The “Broken Taillight-Approach”|143
2|7.4 Stateless Vessels|145
3|7.4.1 Conditions for Statelessness as a Legal Basis|146
2|7.5 Final Remarks|147
2|References|148
1|8 International Agreements on Maritime Interception|150
2|Abstract|150
2|8.1 Introduction|150
2|8.2 The Increasing Role of International Agreements in MIO|152
2|8.3 International Agreements and the Law of the Sea|154
2|8.4 UNCLOS|156
2|8.5 The SUA Convention and Protocol|158
2|8.6 PSI Bilateral Boarding Agreements Between the US and Others|158
2|8.7 Final Remarks|159
2|References|159
1|Legal Regimes for Maritime Interception Operations|161
1|9 The Right of Visit|162
2|Abstract|162
2|9.1 Introduction|163
2|9.2 General Remarks on the Right of Visit|164
2|9.3 Ad Hoc Consent-Based Right of Visit|166
2|9.4 International Agreements and the Right of Visit|167
3|9.4.1 The Limited Character of the Right of Visit in UNCLOS|167
3|9.4.2 The SUA Provisions|171
3|9.4.3 Bilateral Ship Boarding Agreements Between the US and Other States|172
2|9.5 Self-Defence and the Right of Visit|172
3|9.5.1 The Belligerent Right of Visit and Search|173
3|9.5.2 The Subregimes of the Law of Naval Warfare|176
4|9.5.2.1 The Law of Contraband|177
4|9.5.2.2 The Law of Un-Neutral Service|178
4|9.5.2.3 The Law of Blockade|178
4|9.5.2.4 Enemy Merchant Vessels|179
2|9.6 Non-International Armed Conflicts|180
3|9.6.1 Operation Enduring Freedom|181
3|9.6.2 Operation Active Endeavour|184
3|9.6.3 A NIAC Right of Visit?|185
2|9.7 The Right of Visit Conferred Through the UN Collective Security System|187
3|9.7.1 All Necessary Means|191
3|9.7.2 The Law of Blockade and Article 42 of the UN Charter|192
2|9.8 Final Remarks|193
2|References|194
1|10 The Application of Force in Maritime Interception Operations|197
2|Abstract|197
2|10.1 Introduction|198
2|10.2 Naval Forces and the Use of Force|200
2|10.3 International Law of the Sea|201
2|10.4 Applicability of Human Rights to High Seas Interceptions|205
2|10.5 The Right to Life in a Naval Operations Dimension|210
3|10.5.1 Counter-Piracy Operations off the Coast of Somalia|212
2|10.6 The Law of Armed Conflict|214
3|10.6.1 Use of Force Against Neutral and Enemy Merchant Vessels|216
3|10.6.2 Use of Force Under the Prize Law Rules|221
2|10.7 Human Rights Law and the Law of Naval Warfare|223
2|10.8 Use of Force in UN-Mandated Interception Operations|225
2|10.9 Use of Self-Defence Interception Operations|228
2|10.10 Final Remarks|229
2|References|230
1|11 Detention and Maritime Interception|233
2|Abstract|233
2|11.1 Introduction|234
2|11.2 Operational Detention|235
2|11.3 What Constitutes Detention During Maritime Interception Operations|236
2|11.4 Prisoners of War at Sea and Crews of Enemy and Neutral Merchant Vessels|238
3|11.4.1 Passengers|239
2|11.5 Security Detainees at Sea|240
3|11.5.1 Security Detention Under LOAC|240
3|11.5.2 Security Detention Under Human Rights Law|242
2|11.6 Criminal Detention|243
2|11.7 Safeguards and Treatment at Sea|245
2|11.8 Detention in UN-Mandated Maritime Interception Operations|248
2|11.9 The Freedom Flotilla Incident|251
2|11.10 Final Remarks|254
2|References|255
1|Conclusions|257
1|12 Conclusions|258
2|12.1 Introduction|258
2|12.2 Legal Bases for MIO|260
2|12.3 Legal Regimes in MIO|262
2|12.4 Final Remarks|264
2|References|265
1|Annex A: List of Vessels|266
1|Annex B: List of Incidents|268
1|Annex C: List of Naval Operations|274
1|Annex D: Table of UN-Mandated Maritime Embargo Operations|275
1|Table of Cases|276
1|Literature|278
1|(Selected) Other Materials|312
2|International Organizations|312
2|National Materials|313
1|Index|315