File #2332: "2018_Book_DehumanizationOfWarfare.pdf"
Text
1|Preface|5
1|Contents|9
1|Introduction|11
2|References|19
1|Part I Dehumanization of Warfare and International Humanitarian Law|22
2|Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law|23
2|Dehumanization: Is There a Legal Problem Under Article 36?|29
3|1 Introduction|29
3|2 Does the Depersonalisation of Warfare per se Raise Legal Issues?|33
3|3 The Ethical/Legal Dimension|33
3|4 The Law That Article 36 Reviews Must Apply|37
3|5 The Legal Criteria to be Applied in a Weapon Review|43
3|6 How Do Specific Remote Attack Technologies Match Up to These Criteria?|45
4|6.1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft|45
4|6.2 Autonomous Weapon Systems|46
4|6.3 Cyber Weapons|53
3|7 Conclusions|58
3|References|59
1|Part II Ethical Challenges of Dehumanization|61
2|Dehumanization: The Ethical Perspective|62
3|1 Two Meanings of “Dehumanization”|63
3|2 Unfairness of Asymmetric Warfare?|63
3|3 The Distinction Between Evaluation Rules and Imputation Rules|65
3|4 Ban on Usage of Certain Weapons and Weapon-Systems|66
3|5 Kant's Suggestion|67
3|6 The Difference Between Murder and Intentional Homicide in German Criminal Law as Distinctive Criterion|69
3|7 Consequences for Evaluating Certain Acts of Killing in War|73
3|8 Drones and “Stealth”|75
3|9 The Distinction Between Combatants and Civilians|76
3|10 Problems of Imputation|77
3|References|79
1|Part III Unmanned Systems in Particular at Sea and Land|81
2|Autonomy of Mobile Robots|82
3|1 Introduction|82
3|2 History of Robot Development|83
3|3 Autonomy of Mobile Robots|85
4|3.1 Mobile Industrial Robots|86
4|3.2 Mobile Field and Service Robots|87
4|3.3 Rational Agents|89
3|4 Understanding the Surrounding|92
3|5 Examples|93
4|5.1 KAIRO III|94
5|5.1.1 Lessons Learned|96
4|5.2 CoCar|96
5|5.2.1 Lessons Learned|99
3|6 Limits and Possibilities: Capabilities of Modern Robots|99
3|7 Conclusions|101
3|References|102
2|Feasible Precautions in Attack and Autonomous Weapons|104
3|1 Introduction|105
3|2 Levels of Autonomy|106
3|3 Drivers of Greater Levels of Autonomy in Weapon Systems|108
4|3.1 Advances in Autonomous Technology|108
4|3.2 Operational Benefits of Autonomy|110
3|4 An Analysis of Autonomous Weapons and Feasible Precautions in Attack|112
4|4.1 Verify Objectives|113
4|4.2 Suspend or Cancel Attack|114
4|4.3 Provide Effective Warning|116
4|4.4 Choose Between Objectives|117
4|4.5 Choose Means and Methods with a View to Minimizing Harm to Civilians|118
3|5 Conclusion|119
3|References|121
2|Unmanned Maritime Systems: Does the Increasing Use of Naval Weapon Systems Present a Challenge for IHL?|123
3|1 Systems and Vehicles|123
3|2 Missions/Tasks of UMS|124
3|3 Legal Status and Navigational Rights in General|125
4|3.1 Sovereign Immunity|126
4|3.2 Navigational Rights|126
3|4 UMS and IHL|126
4|4.1 Exercise of Belligerent Rights|126
4|4.2 UMS as Means of Warfare|127
5|4.2.1 Weapons Law|127
5|4.2.2 Targeting Law|128
5|4.2.3 Law of Neutrality|129
3|5 Concluding Remarks|130
3|References|130
1|Part IV Cyber Warfare|131
2|Digital Forensics|132
3|1 Introduction|132
3|2 Digital Forensics|133
4|2.1 Forensic Principles|134
4|2.2 Digital Evidence|137
5|2.2.1 Evidence and Counter Evidence of Events|139
5|2.2.2 Evidence Volatility|140
5|2.2.3 Evidence Manipulability|141
5|2.2.4 Authenticity|141
5|2.2.5 Integrity|141
5|2.2.6 Levels of Certainty in Digital Evidence|142
4|2.3 Attribution with Digital Evidence|142
3|3 Digital Forensics and Cyber Attacks|143
4|3.1 Malware Attack|143
4|3.2 Distributed Denial of Service Attack|145
3|4 Conclusions and Outlook|147
3|References|147
2|CPU and Keyboard: Weapons of Mass Disruption?|149
3|1 Introduction|149
3|2 Vulnerability|150
3|3 Methods and Means|151
4|3.1 Human Factor|151
4|3.2 Machines|152
3|4 Examples|152
3|5 Legal Challenges|153
4|5.1 Structure of Cyber Conflict|153
4|5.2 Selected Issues of Ius Ad Bellum|154
5|5.2.1 Force, Aggression, Attack?|154
5|5.2.2 Target?|155
5|5.2.3 Attribution|155
5|5.2.4 What If Not…?|156
4|5.3 Selected Issues of ius in bello|157
5|5.3.1 Legitimate Targets|157
5|5.3.2 Proportionality|157
5|5.3.3 Special Objects|159
5|5.3.4 Indiscriminate Attacks|159
5|5.3.5 Personnel|160
3|6 Conclusion|161
3|References|162
1|Part V Specific Aspects of Dehumanization|163
2|Soldier 2.0: Military Human Enhancement and International Law|164
3|1 Introduction|164
3|2 Law of Armed Conflict|167
4|2.1 Weapons Review|167
4|2.2 Superfluous Injury and Unnecessary Suffering|169
4|2.3 Distinction, Proportionality and Precaution Issues|172
4|2.4 Principle of Protection (Detention and Treatment of the Wounded and Sick)|174
5|2.4.1 Coercion|175
5|2.4.2 Experimental Treatments|175
5|2.4.3 Solving Medical Problems Through Enhancement|176
5|2.4.4 Detaining Enhanced Personnel|178
3|3 Human Rights of Enhanced Humans|179
3|4 Human Rights Law Implications for Human Enhancement Technologies|181
4|4.1 The Right to Life|181
4|4.2 Bodily Integrity, Torture, and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment|184
4|4.3 Privacy, Thought and Expression|187
4|4.4 Fair Trial Rights|191
3|5 Human Rights Aspects of Reintegrating Enhanced Soldiers into Civilian Society|193
4|5.1 Removal of Enhancements|193
4|5.2 Societal Rights and Discrimination|194
3|6 Accountability and Individual Criminal Responsibility|196
4|6.1 State Responsibility|196
4|6.2 Individual Responsibility|197
5|6.2.1 Free Will|198
5|6.2.2 Excused and Diminished Responsibility|200
3|7 Conclusion|202
3|References|202
2|Meaningful Human Control – and the Politics of International Law|207
3|1 Introduction|207
3|2 The Politics of Terminology|208
3|3 Time and Place as Challenges of Targeting|212
3|4 Cognition (Predictability) and Volition (Intent) as Elements of Human Control|214
3|5 Value-Based and Discretionary Decision-Making?|216
3|6 Meeting the Challenges of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems by Contextual Application of the Law|217
3|References|217
2|Concluding Remarks by the Editors|219
2|Erratum to: Feasible Precautions in Attack and AutonomousWeapons|231
1|Index|232
1|Contents|9
1|Introduction|11
2|References|19
1|Part I Dehumanization of Warfare and International Humanitarian Law|22
2|Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law|23
2|Dehumanization: Is There a Legal Problem Under Article 36?|29
3|1 Introduction|29
3|2 Does the Depersonalisation of Warfare per se Raise Legal Issues?|33
3|3 The Ethical/Legal Dimension|33
3|4 The Law That Article 36 Reviews Must Apply|37
3|5 The Legal Criteria to be Applied in a Weapon Review|43
3|6 How Do Specific Remote Attack Technologies Match Up to These Criteria?|45
4|6.1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft|45
4|6.2 Autonomous Weapon Systems|46
4|6.3 Cyber Weapons|53
3|7 Conclusions|58
3|References|59
1|Part II Ethical Challenges of Dehumanization|61
2|Dehumanization: The Ethical Perspective|62
3|1 Two Meanings of “Dehumanization”|63
3|2 Unfairness of Asymmetric Warfare?|63
3|3 The Distinction Between Evaluation Rules and Imputation Rules|65
3|4 Ban on Usage of Certain Weapons and Weapon-Systems|66
3|5 Kant's Suggestion|67
3|6 The Difference Between Murder and Intentional Homicide in German Criminal Law as Distinctive Criterion|69
3|7 Consequences for Evaluating Certain Acts of Killing in War|73
3|8 Drones and “Stealth”|75
3|9 The Distinction Between Combatants and Civilians|76
3|10 Problems of Imputation|77
3|References|79
1|Part III Unmanned Systems in Particular at Sea and Land|81
2|Autonomy of Mobile Robots|82
3|1 Introduction|82
3|2 History of Robot Development|83
3|3 Autonomy of Mobile Robots|85
4|3.1 Mobile Industrial Robots|86
4|3.2 Mobile Field and Service Robots|87
4|3.3 Rational Agents|89
3|4 Understanding the Surrounding|92
3|5 Examples|93
4|5.1 KAIRO III|94
5|5.1.1 Lessons Learned|96
4|5.2 CoCar|96
5|5.2.1 Lessons Learned|99
3|6 Limits and Possibilities: Capabilities of Modern Robots|99
3|7 Conclusions|101
3|References|102
2|Feasible Precautions in Attack and Autonomous Weapons|104
3|1 Introduction|105
3|2 Levels of Autonomy|106
3|3 Drivers of Greater Levels of Autonomy in Weapon Systems|108
4|3.1 Advances in Autonomous Technology|108
4|3.2 Operational Benefits of Autonomy|110
3|4 An Analysis of Autonomous Weapons and Feasible Precautions in Attack|112
4|4.1 Verify Objectives|113
4|4.2 Suspend or Cancel Attack|114
4|4.3 Provide Effective Warning|116
4|4.4 Choose Between Objectives|117
4|4.5 Choose Means and Methods with a View to Minimizing Harm to Civilians|118
3|5 Conclusion|119
3|References|121
2|Unmanned Maritime Systems: Does the Increasing Use of Naval Weapon Systems Present a Challenge for IHL?|123
3|1 Systems and Vehicles|123
3|2 Missions/Tasks of UMS|124
3|3 Legal Status and Navigational Rights in General|125
4|3.1 Sovereign Immunity|126
4|3.2 Navigational Rights|126
3|4 UMS and IHL|126
4|4.1 Exercise of Belligerent Rights|126
4|4.2 UMS as Means of Warfare|127
5|4.2.1 Weapons Law|127
5|4.2.2 Targeting Law|128
5|4.2.3 Law of Neutrality|129
3|5 Concluding Remarks|130
3|References|130
1|Part IV Cyber Warfare|131
2|Digital Forensics|132
3|1 Introduction|132
3|2 Digital Forensics|133
4|2.1 Forensic Principles|134
4|2.2 Digital Evidence|137
5|2.2.1 Evidence and Counter Evidence of Events|139
5|2.2.2 Evidence Volatility|140
5|2.2.3 Evidence Manipulability|141
5|2.2.4 Authenticity|141
5|2.2.5 Integrity|141
5|2.2.6 Levels of Certainty in Digital Evidence|142
4|2.3 Attribution with Digital Evidence|142
3|3 Digital Forensics and Cyber Attacks|143
4|3.1 Malware Attack|143
4|3.2 Distributed Denial of Service Attack|145
3|4 Conclusions and Outlook|147
3|References|147
2|CPU and Keyboard: Weapons of Mass Disruption?|149
3|1 Introduction|149
3|2 Vulnerability|150
3|3 Methods and Means|151
4|3.1 Human Factor|151
4|3.2 Machines|152
3|4 Examples|152
3|5 Legal Challenges|153
4|5.1 Structure of Cyber Conflict|153
4|5.2 Selected Issues of Ius Ad Bellum|154
5|5.2.1 Force, Aggression, Attack?|154
5|5.2.2 Target?|155
5|5.2.3 Attribution|155
5|5.2.4 What If Not…?|156
4|5.3 Selected Issues of ius in bello|157
5|5.3.1 Legitimate Targets|157
5|5.3.2 Proportionality|157
5|5.3.3 Special Objects|159
5|5.3.4 Indiscriminate Attacks|159
5|5.3.5 Personnel|160
3|6 Conclusion|161
3|References|162
1|Part V Specific Aspects of Dehumanization|163
2|Soldier 2.0: Military Human Enhancement and International Law|164
3|1 Introduction|164
3|2 Law of Armed Conflict|167
4|2.1 Weapons Review|167
4|2.2 Superfluous Injury and Unnecessary Suffering|169
4|2.3 Distinction, Proportionality and Precaution Issues|172
4|2.4 Principle of Protection (Detention and Treatment of the Wounded and Sick)|174
5|2.4.1 Coercion|175
5|2.4.2 Experimental Treatments|175
5|2.4.3 Solving Medical Problems Through Enhancement|176
5|2.4.4 Detaining Enhanced Personnel|178
3|3 Human Rights of Enhanced Humans|179
3|4 Human Rights Law Implications for Human Enhancement Technologies|181
4|4.1 The Right to Life|181
4|4.2 Bodily Integrity, Torture, and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment|184
4|4.3 Privacy, Thought and Expression|187
4|4.4 Fair Trial Rights|191
3|5 Human Rights Aspects of Reintegrating Enhanced Soldiers into Civilian Society|193
4|5.1 Removal of Enhancements|193
4|5.2 Societal Rights and Discrimination|194
3|6 Accountability and Individual Criminal Responsibility|196
4|6.1 State Responsibility|196
4|6.2 Individual Responsibility|197
5|6.2.1 Free Will|198
5|6.2.2 Excused and Diminished Responsibility|200
3|7 Conclusion|202
3|References|202
2|Meaningful Human Control – and the Politics of International Law|207
3|1 Introduction|207
3|2 The Politics of Terminology|208
3|3 Time and Place as Challenges of Targeting|212
3|4 Cognition (Predictability) and Volition (Intent) as Elements of Human Control|214
3|5 Value-Based and Discretionary Decision-Making?|216
3|6 Meeting the Challenges of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems by Contextual Application of the Law|217
3|References|217
2|Concluding Remarks by the Editors|219
2|Erratum to: Feasible Precautions in Attack and AutonomousWeapons|231
1|Index|232