File #2329: "2018_Book_EnergyLawAndEconomics.pdf"
Testo
1|Foreword|6
1|Preface|8
1|Introduction|9
1|Contents|19
1|Contributors|21
1|Part I: Energy Transition|23
2|Sustainability Strategies and the Problem of the Rebound Effect|24
3|1 Introduction|24
3|2 Efficiency Strategy|25
3|3 Consistency Strategy|29
3|4 Sufficiency Strategy|29
3|5 Conclusion|36
3|References|36
2|Energy Transition Law and Economics|39
3|1 Costs of the Energy Transition|39
3|2 A Short History of Energy Transitions|41
3|3 Policy Choices: The Legal/Constitutional Framework|43
4|3.1 Energy Supply and Sovereignty|43
4|3.2 Policy Choices in Europe|44
5|3.2.1 Market Liberalisation|44
5|3.2.2 Climate Change and Carbon Free Energy|46
5|3.2.3 Phasing Out Nuclear Energy|47
3|4 Examples of Limiting Individual Choices in the Energy Market|48
4|4.1 The Emissions Trading Scheme|49
4|4.2 Contributing to the Costs of the Supply Net|52
4|4.3 Mechanism for Cost Allocation of Renewable Energies|52
4|4.4 Exclusion of Foreign Electricity Producers from the Cost Covering Feed-in Tariff|54
4|4.5 Allocating the Exit from Nuclear Energy Costs|55
3|5 Prospects for a Law and Economics Approach?|58
3|6 The Legal Duty for an Economic Analysis|59
3|References|60
2|Energy Transition in Switzerland|62
3|1 Introduction|62
4|1.1 Most Utilized Energy Forms|62
4|1.2 Decarbonization and Withdrawal from Nuclear Energy|63
4|1.3 Market Challenges|65
3|2 Governmental Incentives|65
4|2.1 Overview|65
4|2.2 Current Feed-in Tariff System (``KEV System´´)|66
4|2.3 New Market Incentives According to the Energy Strategy 2050|68
5|2.3.1 Main Goals of the Energy Strategy 2050|68
5|2.3.2 First Measure Package|69
5|2.3.3 Second Measure Package (2021-2050)|73
3|3 Appraisal|74
3|References|75
2|The Interplay Between Liberalization and Decarbonization in the European Internal Energy Market for Electricity|77
3|1 Introduction|77
3|2 The Materialization of the EU Internal Energy Market|79
3|3 Liberalizing the EU Electricity Sector: Decarbonization as a Positive Externality?|84
3|4 EU Renewable Energy Policy: Legal Instruments Correcting for Market Failures|88
3|5 Conclusion|91
3|References|92
2|The Temperature Target of the Paris Agreement and the Forgotten Aspects of a Meaningful Energy Transition|94
3|1 Problem|94
3|2 The Paris Temperature Limit and the Structure of the Paris Agreement|95
3|3 Frictions with the Current Energy Transition|97
3|4 Purely Technical Approaches Versus Sufficiency|99
3|5 Motivations for Energy Transition|103
3|6 Governance Problems|107
3|7 Economic Governance Approaches|111
3|References|113
2|A Shocking Truth for Law and Economics: Consumer Welfare Explains the Internal Market for Electricity Better Than Total Welfare|118
3|1 Introduction|119
3|2 Efficiency Hypothesis as Internal Explanation of the Law|120
3|3 Parallel Circuits: Building Blocks for Total and Consumer Welfare|125
4|3.1 Preliminary Remarks|125
4|3.2 Distribution, Deadweight Loss, and Productive Efficiency|127
4|3.3 The Focus on Energy-Only Pricing Methods|130
3|4 Alternating Currents in Economically-Informed Research|132
4|4.1 Axiological Commitments in Legal Economically-Informed Research in Electricity Market(s)|133
4|4.2 Axiological Commitments in Economic Research in Electricity Market(s)|136
4|4.3 Axiological Commitments, Economics and Electricity Market(s): Concluding Remarks|139
3|5 EU Electricity Law as a System: Revealing the Value of Consumer Welfare in Positive Integration|140
3|6 Conclusion: The `Shocking Truth´ Revealed by the Internal Explanation of EU Electricity Law|146
3|References|147
1|Part II: Investment in Infrastructure|151
2|Paying for Energy|152
3|1 Introduction|152
3|2 Paying for Energy: An Example|155
3|3 Historical Examples|156
4|3.1 The Insull Era|157
4|3.2 The Expansion Era|158
4|3.3 The Big Dam Era|160
3|4 Current Issues and Applications|162
4|4.1 Transmission|163
4|4.2 Distributed Generation|167
3|5 Conclusion|169
3|References|170
2|Energy Market and Policy Revolutions: Regulatory Process and the Cost of Capital|173
3|1 Introduction: Attracting Capital to Build the New Energy Economy|174
3|2 Transitioning to a Low Carbon Economy Will Require Massive Long-Term Energy Investment|175
3|3 Energy Law Trends Are Raising Uncertainty for Energy Investors and Increasing the Cost of Building the Energy Future|177
3|4 Principles Toward Encouraging Investment in the Energy Future|180
4|4.1 Principle 1: Wide Participation, One Decision-Maker|180
4|4.2 Principle 2: Prospective Rulemaking for Environmental Reviews|181
3|5 Enabling the Energy Future|182
3|References|182
2|Intergenerational Choice Under Uncertainty: The Case of Future Energy Technologies-Legal and Economic Perspectives|184
3|1 Some Brief Interdisciplinary Remarks on Intergenerational Sustainability|184
4|1.1 Law as a Policy Tool for Achieving Intergenerational Sustainability?|184
5|1.1.1 The Future-Orientated Nature of Law|184
5|1.1.2 Democracy as a Possible Limit to Permissible Sustainability Policy|185
4|1.2 Economic Aspects and Caveats|187
5|1.2.1 Modelability of Sustainability|187
5|1.2.2 Ignorance of Future Preferences as a Source of Uncertainty|188
6|Hyperbolic Discounting: Harm or Benefit for Future Generations?|188
6|Randomness of Preference Change|189
5|1.2.3 Non-identity as Barring from Intergenerational Discounting|189
3|2 Electric Transportation in Germany: An Overview|191
4|2.1 Electric Transportation as a Policy Goal|191
4|2.2 Key Instruments|191
5|2.2.1 Direct Research and Infrastructure Funding|191
5|2.2.2 Consumer Incentives|192
3|3 Economic Justifiability of Public RandD Funding in the Electric Transportation Sector|192
4|3.1 Uncertainty and Indivisibility as Reasons of Market Failure|193
5|3.1.1 Research Risk and Market Risk|193
5|3.1.2 Indivisibility as a Reinforcer of Uncertainty|194
4|3.2 Dubiousness of State Intervention to Account for the Market Failure in Question|196
3|4 Proposal: Time as the Relevant Currency of Sustainability|197
4|4.1 Precautionary Approach: Disambiguations|197
4|4.2 Prima Facie Obligation to Temporally Minimise De Facto Bindingness of Present-Day Policy Choices|198
3|5 Conclusion|199
3|References|200
1|Part III: Regulatory Innovation|203
2|Creating Social Norms Through Media, Cascades and Cognitive Anchors: Judicial Activism and the Quality of Energy Law from the ...|204
3|1 Three Basic Assumptions of the Quality of Judicial Decisions|204
3|2 Quality of Judicial Law-Making from the Perspective of Law and Economics|206
3|3 The Impact of Heuristics and Biases on Adjudication|208
3|4 From Heuristics to Cascades: Emotions and Social Norms Creation in Judge Made Law|210
3|5 From the Love Canal to the Fukushima Case and Beyond: Towards Cascades in Energy Law|214
3|6 Nuclear Energy in Germany, Fukushima Cascade and Federal Constitutional Court Ruling|217
3|7 Conclusion|219
3|References|220
2|Capacity Mechanisms: An Intervention Needed in Failing Markets?|222
3|1 Introduction|222
3|2 The ``Missing Money´´ Problem|223
4|2.1 The Lack of Incentives for New Flexible Generating Capacity|223
4|2.2 Qualification as a Market Failure|226
5|2.2.1 Commercial Risks|226
5|2.2.2 Government Interventions|228
5|2.2.3 The Free Rider Problem|229
5|2.2.4 Summary of Results|231
3|3 Possible Capacity Mechanisms|232
4|3.1 Strategic Reserve|232
4|3.2 Capacity Auctions (Capacity Markets)|235
4|3.3 Capacity Obligations|236
3|4 Potential Alternatives to Capacity Mechanisms|238
3|5 Situation in the European Union and in Switzerland|239
4|5.1 Legal Restrictions Under EU State Aid Law|239
5|5.1.1 The State Aid Frame Work for Capacity Mechanisms|239
5|5.1.2 Market Failure as a Requirement for Government Intervention|240
5|5.1.3 The Commission´s Approach in the UK State Aid Case|242
5|5.1.4 Further Requirements Under EU State Aid Law|243
4|5.2 Implications of EU State Aid Law for Swiss Energy Regulation|243
3|6 Conclusion|245
3|References|246
2|Energy Labels: Nudging Policy to Avoid Trade Implications?|249
3|1 Introduction|249
3|2 Characteristics of Energy Labels and Nudging Policy|250
4|2.1 Characteristics of Energy Labels|251
4|2.2 Nudging Policies and Efficiency of Labels|252
3|3 Implications of Energy Labels on International Trade Law|253
4|3.1 Tacking Stock of Legal Challenges|253
4|3.2 Process and Production Methods: Technical Regulations|254
4|3.3 Non-discrimination Under the GATT|255
5|3.3.1 National Treatment Obligation|255
5|3.3.2 MFN Obligation|256
5|3.3.3 Quantitative Restrictions|256
3|4 Energy Labels in Public Procurement Law|257
4|4.1 Green Procurement|257
4|4.2 Methods for Defining the Requirements|258
4|4.3 General Procurement Agreement (GPA)|258
4|4.4 EU Court Practice|260
3|5 Conclusions|260
3|References|261
2|Consumer Protection in Energy Markets: Selected Insights from Behavioural Law and Economics and Regulatory Practice|263
3|1 Introduction|263
3|2 Vacuum Cleaner Energy Labelling: An Analysis of the Dyson Ltd vs. European Commission Case|264
4|2.1 The Dyson Judgment: Background and Content|264
4|2.2 The Dyson Judgment and Designing Disclosures|267
4|2.3 Framing and Salience in Labelling|268
4|2.4 Modifying Disclosure|268
3|3 The Quality of Consumers´ Choice and Its Limits: The Impact of Heuristics and Biases on Energy Law|270
4|3.1 General Assumptions|270
4|3.2 Determination Whether the Test Object Matches with a Rule Which Defines a Given Category|275
4|3.3 Determination of the Similarity of the Test Object O to a Memorised Exemplars E1, E2 of a Given Category Cat. A|276
4|3.4 Determination of the Similarity Between a Given Object O and the Prototype of a Given Category (Prot. A)|276
4|3.5 Theory Based Categorisation|277
3|4 Conclusion|279
3|References|280
1|Part IV: State Aid|282
2|The Trade and Environment Debate on the Regulation of Energy Subsidies in the WTO: What Kept Fossil Fuel Subsidies Off the Rad...|283
3|1 Introduction|283
3|2 The Trade and Environment Debate|286
3|3 The SCM Agreement Under Environmental Scrutiny|289
4|3.1 The Renewable Energy Subsidy Issue|290
4|3.2 The Fossil Fuel Subsidy Issue|294
3|4 What Kept Fossil Fuel Subsidies Off the Radar Screen?|297
4|4.1 Excluded by the `Gentlemen´s Agreement´?|298
4|4.2 No Dispute, No Debate?|300
4|4.3 Ask Not What the WTO Can Do for the Environment by a Positive Action, But What It Can Do by Inaction|301
4|4.4 A Sustainable Development Problem?|303
3|5 Concluding Remarks|304
3|References|306
2|Promoting Renewable Energies Through State Aid, a Reform is Required|311
3|1 Introduction|311
3|2 Incentivizing Renewable Energies in Cost Effective Ways|315
4|2.1 The Economic Structure of the 2014 Guidelines|316
5|2.1.1 General Compatibility Provisions|316
5|2.1.2 The Case of Aid for the Production of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources|320
4|2.2 The Economic Logic of the 2014 General Block Exemption Regulation|322
5|2.2.1 The Economic Logic of Exemption|323
5|2.2.2 The Case of Aids for Renewable Energy Sources|325
3|3 Expanding the Conceptualization of State Aid|327
4|3.1 State Aid and Negative Externalities|327
5|3.1.1 The Economic Rationale|328
5|3.1.2 A Difficult Implementation?|331
4|3.2 State Aids, Negative Externalities and Policy Making|333
5|3.2.1 Implementing the Reconceptualization|334
5|3.2.2 The International Level and the Problem of Competitiveness|335
3|4 Conclusion|337
3|References|337
2|State Measures in Support of Sustainable Mobility Infrastructure: The Case of Estonia, the Netherlands, and Norway|339
3|1 Introduction|339
4|1.1 Research Question and Methodology|339
4|1.2 Scope and Definitions|340
3|2 Legal Framework for State Intervention in Support of CEV|343
4|2.1 EU Policy Goals|343
5|2.1.1 Europe 2020 and Horizon 2020|344
5|2.1.2 The Renewables Strategy|344
5|2.1.3 The CEV Strategy|345
5|2.1.4 The Alternative Fuels Directive|345
5|2.1.5 European Strategy for Low-Emission Mobility|347
5|2.1.6 European Strategy on Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems|347
5|2.1.7 Proposed Electricity Directive|348
5|2.1.8 EU Funds|348
4|2.2 Legal Instruments of Member States|349
5|2.2.1 Regulation|349
5|2.2.2 Taxation|350
5|2.2.3 Consensual Constraints|350
5|2.2.4 Public Sector Management|351
5|2.2.5 Information|351
4|2.3 State Aid Control|351
5|2.3.1 General Block Exemption Regulation|352
5|2.3.2 Environmental and Energy Aid Guidelines|352
5|2.3.3 Important Projects of Common European Interest|352
5|2.3.4 Services of General Economic Interest|352
3|3 Selected National Experiences|353
4|3.1 Estonia|353
4|3.2 The Netherlands|354
4|3.3 Norway|356
3|4 Critical Legal Assessment of the Dutch and Norwegian Decisions|358
4|4.1 Direct and Indirect Aids|359
5|4.1.1 Legal Basis and for the Compatibility of State Aids to CEV Infrastructure|359
5|4.1.2 Direct Aid|359
5|4.1.3 Indirect Aid to Commercial Users|360
5|4.1.4 Indirect Aid to Equipment, CEV and Fuel Suppliers|361
5|4.1.5 Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid|362
4|4.2 Broader Impact of the Aid Measures|363
5|4.2.1 Impact on Electricity Markets|363
5|4.2.2 Impact on the Environment and the Energy Mix|363
5|4.2.3 Impact on Technological Development|365
5|4.2.4 Impact on Other EU Infrastructure Targets|366
5|4.2.5 Impact on Global Competitiveness|366
3|5 Summary and Conclusions|368
4|5.1 Funding Strategies for CEV Infrastructure|368
4|5.2 State Aid Decisions on PEV Infrastructures|369
3|References|370
1|Index|373
1|Preface|8
1|Introduction|9
1|Contents|19
1|Contributors|21
1|Part I: Energy Transition|23
2|Sustainability Strategies and the Problem of the Rebound Effect|24
3|1 Introduction|24
3|2 Efficiency Strategy|25
3|3 Consistency Strategy|29
3|4 Sufficiency Strategy|29
3|5 Conclusion|36
3|References|36
2|Energy Transition Law and Economics|39
3|1 Costs of the Energy Transition|39
3|2 A Short History of Energy Transitions|41
3|3 Policy Choices: The Legal/Constitutional Framework|43
4|3.1 Energy Supply and Sovereignty|43
4|3.2 Policy Choices in Europe|44
5|3.2.1 Market Liberalisation|44
5|3.2.2 Climate Change and Carbon Free Energy|46
5|3.2.3 Phasing Out Nuclear Energy|47
3|4 Examples of Limiting Individual Choices in the Energy Market|48
4|4.1 The Emissions Trading Scheme|49
4|4.2 Contributing to the Costs of the Supply Net|52
4|4.3 Mechanism for Cost Allocation of Renewable Energies|52
4|4.4 Exclusion of Foreign Electricity Producers from the Cost Covering Feed-in Tariff|54
4|4.5 Allocating the Exit from Nuclear Energy Costs|55
3|5 Prospects for a Law and Economics Approach?|58
3|6 The Legal Duty for an Economic Analysis|59
3|References|60
2|Energy Transition in Switzerland|62
3|1 Introduction|62
4|1.1 Most Utilized Energy Forms|62
4|1.2 Decarbonization and Withdrawal from Nuclear Energy|63
4|1.3 Market Challenges|65
3|2 Governmental Incentives|65
4|2.1 Overview|65
4|2.2 Current Feed-in Tariff System (``KEV System´´)|66
4|2.3 New Market Incentives According to the Energy Strategy 2050|68
5|2.3.1 Main Goals of the Energy Strategy 2050|68
5|2.3.2 First Measure Package|69
5|2.3.3 Second Measure Package (2021-2050)|73
3|3 Appraisal|74
3|References|75
2|The Interplay Between Liberalization and Decarbonization in the European Internal Energy Market for Electricity|77
3|1 Introduction|77
3|2 The Materialization of the EU Internal Energy Market|79
3|3 Liberalizing the EU Electricity Sector: Decarbonization as a Positive Externality?|84
3|4 EU Renewable Energy Policy: Legal Instruments Correcting for Market Failures|88
3|5 Conclusion|91
3|References|92
2|The Temperature Target of the Paris Agreement and the Forgotten Aspects of a Meaningful Energy Transition|94
3|1 Problem|94
3|2 The Paris Temperature Limit and the Structure of the Paris Agreement|95
3|3 Frictions with the Current Energy Transition|97
3|4 Purely Technical Approaches Versus Sufficiency|99
3|5 Motivations for Energy Transition|103
3|6 Governance Problems|107
3|7 Economic Governance Approaches|111
3|References|113
2|A Shocking Truth for Law and Economics: Consumer Welfare Explains the Internal Market for Electricity Better Than Total Welfare|118
3|1 Introduction|119
3|2 Efficiency Hypothesis as Internal Explanation of the Law|120
3|3 Parallel Circuits: Building Blocks for Total and Consumer Welfare|125
4|3.1 Preliminary Remarks|125
4|3.2 Distribution, Deadweight Loss, and Productive Efficiency|127
4|3.3 The Focus on Energy-Only Pricing Methods|130
3|4 Alternating Currents in Economically-Informed Research|132
4|4.1 Axiological Commitments in Legal Economically-Informed Research in Electricity Market(s)|133
4|4.2 Axiological Commitments in Economic Research in Electricity Market(s)|136
4|4.3 Axiological Commitments, Economics and Electricity Market(s): Concluding Remarks|139
3|5 EU Electricity Law as a System: Revealing the Value of Consumer Welfare in Positive Integration|140
3|6 Conclusion: The `Shocking Truth´ Revealed by the Internal Explanation of EU Electricity Law|146
3|References|147
1|Part II: Investment in Infrastructure|151
2|Paying for Energy|152
3|1 Introduction|152
3|2 Paying for Energy: An Example|155
3|3 Historical Examples|156
4|3.1 The Insull Era|157
4|3.2 The Expansion Era|158
4|3.3 The Big Dam Era|160
3|4 Current Issues and Applications|162
4|4.1 Transmission|163
4|4.2 Distributed Generation|167
3|5 Conclusion|169
3|References|170
2|Energy Market and Policy Revolutions: Regulatory Process and the Cost of Capital|173
3|1 Introduction: Attracting Capital to Build the New Energy Economy|174
3|2 Transitioning to a Low Carbon Economy Will Require Massive Long-Term Energy Investment|175
3|3 Energy Law Trends Are Raising Uncertainty for Energy Investors and Increasing the Cost of Building the Energy Future|177
3|4 Principles Toward Encouraging Investment in the Energy Future|180
4|4.1 Principle 1: Wide Participation, One Decision-Maker|180
4|4.2 Principle 2: Prospective Rulemaking for Environmental Reviews|181
3|5 Enabling the Energy Future|182
3|References|182
2|Intergenerational Choice Under Uncertainty: The Case of Future Energy Technologies-Legal and Economic Perspectives|184
3|1 Some Brief Interdisciplinary Remarks on Intergenerational Sustainability|184
4|1.1 Law as a Policy Tool for Achieving Intergenerational Sustainability?|184
5|1.1.1 The Future-Orientated Nature of Law|184
5|1.1.2 Democracy as a Possible Limit to Permissible Sustainability Policy|185
4|1.2 Economic Aspects and Caveats|187
5|1.2.1 Modelability of Sustainability|187
5|1.2.2 Ignorance of Future Preferences as a Source of Uncertainty|188
6|Hyperbolic Discounting: Harm or Benefit for Future Generations?|188
6|Randomness of Preference Change|189
5|1.2.3 Non-identity as Barring from Intergenerational Discounting|189
3|2 Electric Transportation in Germany: An Overview|191
4|2.1 Electric Transportation as a Policy Goal|191
4|2.2 Key Instruments|191
5|2.2.1 Direct Research and Infrastructure Funding|191
5|2.2.2 Consumer Incentives|192
3|3 Economic Justifiability of Public RandD Funding in the Electric Transportation Sector|192
4|3.1 Uncertainty and Indivisibility as Reasons of Market Failure|193
5|3.1.1 Research Risk and Market Risk|193
5|3.1.2 Indivisibility as a Reinforcer of Uncertainty|194
4|3.2 Dubiousness of State Intervention to Account for the Market Failure in Question|196
3|4 Proposal: Time as the Relevant Currency of Sustainability|197
4|4.1 Precautionary Approach: Disambiguations|197
4|4.2 Prima Facie Obligation to Temporally Minimise De Facto Bindingness of Present-Day Policy Choices|198
3|5 Conclusion|199
3|References|200
1|Part III: Regulatory Innovation|203
2|Creating Social Norms Through Media, Cascades and Cognitive Anchors: Judicial Activism and the Quality of Energy Law from the ...|204
3|1 Three Basic Assumptions of the Quality of Judicial Decisions|204
3|2 Quality of Judicial Law-Making from the Perspective of Law and Economics|206
3|3 The Impact of Heuristics and Biases on Adjudication|208
3|4 From Heuristics to Cascades: Emotions and Social Norms Creation in Judge Made Law|210
3|5 From the Love Canal to the Fukushima Case and Beyond: Towards Cascades in Energy Law|214
3|6 Nuclear Energy in Germany, Fukushima Cascade and Federal Constitutional Court Ruling|217
3|7 Conclusion|219
3|References|220
2|Capacity Mechanisms: An Intervention Needed in Failing Markets?|222
3|1 Introduction|222
3|2 The ``Missing Money´´ Problem|223
4|2.1 The Lack of Incentives for New Flexible Generating Capacity|223
4|2.2 Qualification as a Market Failure|226
5|2.2.1 Commercial Risks|226
5|2.2.2 Government Interventions|228
5|2.2.3 The Free Rider Problem|229
5|2.2.4 Summary of Results|231
3|3 Possible Capacity Mechanisms|232
4|3.1 Strategic Reserve|232
4|3.2 Capacity Auctions (Capacity Markets)|235
4|3.3 Capacity Obligations|236
3|4 Potential Alternatives to Capacity Mechanisms|238
3|5 Situation in the European Union and in Switzerland|239
4|5.1 Legal Restrictions Under EU State Aid Law|239
5|5.1.1 The State Aid Frame Work for Capacity Mechanisms|239
5|5.1.2 Market Failure as a Requirement for Government Intervention|240
5|5.1.3 The Commission´s Approach in the UK State Aid Case|242
5|5.1.4 Further Requirements Under EU State Aid Law|243
4|5.2 Implications of EU State Aid Law for Swiss Energy Regulation|243
3|6 Conclusion|245
3|References|246
2|Energy Labels: Nudging Policy to Avoid Trade Implications?|249
3|1 Introduction|249
3|2 Characteristics of Energy Labels and Nudging Policy|250
4|2.1 Characteristics of Energy Labels|251
4|2.2 Nudging Policies and Efficiency of Labels|252
3|3 Implications of Energy Labels on International Trade Law|253
4|3.1 Tacking Stock of Legal Challenges|253
4|3.2 Process and Production Methods: Technical Regulations|254
4|3.3 Non-discrimination Under the GATT|255
5|3.3.1 National Treatment Obligation|255
5|3.3.2 MFN Obligation|256
5|3.3.3 Quantitative Restrictions|256
3|4 Energy Labels in Public Procurement Law|257
4|4.1 Green Procurement|257
4|4.2 Methods for Defining the Requirements|258
4|4.3 General Procurement Agreement (GPA)|258
4|4.4 EU Court Practice|260
3|5 Conclusions|260
3|References|261
2|Consumer Protection in Energy Markets: Selected Insights from Behavioural Law and Economics and Regulatory Practice|263
3|1 Introduction|263
3|2 Vacuum Cleaner Energy Labelling: An Analysis of the Dyson Ltd vs. European Commission Case|264
4|2.1 The Dyson Judgment: Background and Content|264
4|2.2 The Dyson Judgment and Designing Disclosures|267
4|2.3 Framing and Salience in Labelling|268
4|2.4 Modifying Disclosure|268
3|3 The Quality of Consumers´ Choice and Its Limits: The Impact of Heuristics and Biases on Energy Law|270
4|3.1 General Assumptions|270
4|3.2 Determination Whether the Test Object Matches with a Rule Which Defines a Given Category|275
4|3.3 Determination of the Similarity of the Test Object O to a Memorised Exemplars E1, E2 of a Given Category Cat. A|276
4|3.4 Determination of the Similarity Between a Given Object O and the Prototype of a Given Category (Prot. A)|276
4|3.5 Theory Based Categorisation|277
3|4 Conclusion|279
3|References|280
1|Part IV: State Aid|282
2|The Trade and Environment Debate on the Regulation of Energy Subsidies in the WTO: What Kept Fossil Fuel Subsidies Off the Rad...|283
3|1 Introduction|283
3|2 The Trade and Environment Debate|286
3|3 The SCM Agreement Under Environmental Scrutiny|289
4|3.1 The Renewable Energy Subsidy Issue|290
4|3.2 The Fossil Fuel Subsidy Issue|294
3|4 What Kept Fossil Fuel Subsidies Off the Radar Screen?|297
4|4.1 Excluded by the `Gentlemen´s Agreement´?|298
4|4.2 No Dispute, No Debate?|300
4|4.3 Ask Not What the WTO Can Do for the Environment by a Positive Action, But What It Can Do by Inaction|301
4|4.4 A Sustainable Development Problem?|303
3|5 Concluding Remarks|304
3|References|306
2|Promoting Renewable Energies Through State Aid, a Reform is Required|311
3|1 Introduction|311
3|2 Incentivizing Renewable Energies in Cost Effective Ways|315
4|2.1 The Economic Structure of the 2014 Guidelines|316
5|2.1.1 General Compatibility Provisions|316
5|2.1.2 The Case of Aid for the Production of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources|320
4|2.2 The Economic Logic of the 2014 General Block Exemption Regulation|322
5|2.2.1 The Economic Logic of Exemption|323
5|2.2.2 The Case of Aids for Renewable Energy Sources|325
3|3 Expanding the Conceptualization of State Aid|327
4|3.1 State Aid and Negative Externalities|327
5|3.1.1 The Economic Rationale|328
5|3.1.2 A Difficult Implementation?|331
4|3.2 State Aids, Negative Externalities and Policy Making|333
5|3.2.1 Implementing the Reconceptualization|334
5|3.2.2 The International Level and the Problem of Competitiveness|335
3|4 Conclusion|337
3|References|337
2|State Measures in Support of Sustainable Mobility Infrastructure: The Case of Estonia, the Netherlands, and Norway|339
3|1 Introduction|339
4|1.1 Research Question and Methodology|339
4|1.2 Scope and Definitions|340
3|2 Legal Framework for State Intervention in Support of CEV|343
4|2.1 EU Policy Goals|343
5|2.1.1 Europe 2020 and Horizon 2020|344
5|2.1.2 The Renewables Strategy|344
5|2.1.3 The CEV Strategy|345
5|2.1.4 The Alternative Fuels Directive|345
5|2.1.5 European Strategy for Low-Emission Mobility|347
5|2.1.6 European Strategy on Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems|347
5|2.1.7 Proposed Electricity Directive|348
5|2.1.8 EU Funds|348
4|2.2 Legal Instruments of Member States|349
5|2.2.1 Regulation|349
5|2.2.2 Taxation|350
5|2.2.3 Consensual Constraints|350
5|2.2.4 Public Sector Management|351
5|2.2.5 Information|351
4|2.3 State Aid Control|351
5|2.3.1 General Block Exemption Regulation|352
5|2.3.2 Environmental and Energy Aid Guidelines|352
5|2.3.3 Important Projects of Common European Interest|352
5|2.3.4 Services of General Economic Interest|352
3|3 Selected National Experiences|353
4|3.1 Estonia|353
4|3.2 The Netherlands|354
4|3.3 Norway|356
3|4 Critical Legal Assessment of the Dutch and Norwegian Decisions|358
4|4.1 Direct and Indirect Aids|359
5|4.1.1 Legal Basis and for the Compatibility of State Aids to CEV Infrastructure|359
5|4.1.2 Direct Aid|359
5|4.1.3 Indirect Aid to Commercial Users|360
5|4.1.4 Indirect Aid to Equipment, CEV and Fuel Suppliers|361
5|4.1.5 Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid|362
4|4.2 Broader Impact of the Aid Measures|363
5|4.2.1 Impact on Electricity Markets|363
5|4.2.2 Impact on the Environment and the Energy Mix|363
5|4.2.3 Impact on Technological Development|365
5|4.2.4 Impact on Other EU Infrastructure Targets|366
5|4.2.5 Impact on Global Competitiveness|366
3|5 Summary and Conclusions|368
4|5.1 Funding Strategies for CEV Infrastructure|368
4|5.2 State Aid Decisions on PEV Infrastructures|369
3|References|370
1|Index|373