File #2319: "2018_Book_ThePalgraveHandbookOfCriminalA.pdf"
Testo
1|Contents|5
1|List of Figures|11
1|List of Tables|13
1|Part I: Introductory Section|15
2|1: Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law: An Introduction|16
3|Background|16
3|Agendas|19
3|Our Research Inquiries|20
3|Book Plan|21
1|Part II: Anti-Money Laundering|26
2|2: Anti-Money Laundering: An Overview|27
2|3: The Global AML Regime and the EU AML Directives: Prevention and Control|44
3|Introduction|44
3|The Emergence and Development of the Global and Regional EU AML Regime|45
3|Regulations and Regulators|46
4|International Rules and European Regulations|46
4|The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)|46
4|The European Union|47
4|Private Actors|48
3|Major Changes After 2000|49
4|Financing of Terrorism|49
4|The Risk-Based Approach|50
3|Recent Developments at the EU Level|51
4|The Broader Regulatory Framework|51
4|The Current EU AML Framework|52
5|More Cooperation Between National Authorities|53
5|A More Targeted and Focused Risk-Based Approach|53
4|The Proposed Amendments|54
4|The Criminal Law Proposal|55
5|The Fourth AML Directive and Criminal Law|56
5|The Proposed EU AML Criminal Law Directive|57
3|Conclusions: Preventing and Controlling ML and Terrorism Financing?|59
2|4: Globalization, Money Laundering and the City of London|68
3|Introduction|68
3|Money Laundering in the City of London|72
3|The UK and Anti-Money Laundering Legislation|76
3|AMLR and the City of London|80
3|Conclusion|85
2|5: The Production of Suspicion in Retail Banking: An Examination of Unusual Transaction Reporting|91
3|Introduction|91
3|Risk, AML/CTF, and Suspicious Funds|93
3|Methodology|97
3|Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Risk Management|99
3|Financial Instruments and the Production of Risk|101
3|Sums of Money and the Production of Moral Risk|105
3|Discussion|110
3|Conclusion|112
2|6: Money Laundering, Anti-Money Laundering and the Legal Profession|118
3|Introduction|118
3|The Facilitation of Money Laundering by Professionals: A Significant Concern?|120
4|The Official Narrative|120
4|A Lack of Understanding|122
3|Lawyers as ‘Gatekeepers’: The Preventative Obligations of Regulated Professionals|124
3|Prosecution of Lawyers Involved in Money Laundering in the UK|127
4|Proceeds of Crime Act 2002: Sections 327, 328 and 329|127
5|Section 330: ‘Failure to Disclose: Regulated Sector’|130
5|Implications for Legal Professionals: Considering Cases of Convicted Solicitors|132
5|Conclusion|135
2|7: Cash, Crime and Anti-Money Laundering|143
3|Introduction|143
3|Measuring Cash: Paradoxes and Surprises|144
4|The Increasing Value of Banknotes in Circulation|144
4|Only Part of Circulating Cash Is Used for Transactions|146
4|Cash-Ratio: South-Eastern Europe on Top|147
4|How to Explain the Gap? The Illegal Economy|147
3|Cash-Generating Illicit Activities|149
3|Cash Smuggling|151
4|Smuggling or Laundering?|151
4|Cash Smuggling Methods|152
3|Cash-Intensive Businesses and Assets|153
4|Cash-Intensive Businesses|153
4|Cash-Intensive Assets|155
3|Reducing Cash Use|155
4|Limits on Cash Purchases|156
4|Limits on Cash Transfers|158
4|Limits on Banknote Denominations|158
4|The Anomaly of the 500 Euro Banknote|159
3|Seizing Cash|160
3|Policy and Research Implications|161
4|In Summary|161
4|Implications for Criminals|162
4|Implications for Policymakers|163
4|Implications for Researchers|164
2|8: Money Laundering in a Virtual World|172
3|Introduction|172
3|Virtual Worlds|173
3|Virtual Currencies and Money Laundering|176
3|Analysis of Money Laundering Cases in the Virtual World|179
4|Gold Farming|179
4|Virtual Money Inc.|181
4|Attorney Turned Launderer|181
3|Legal Perspective|182
3|Analysis and Reflection|185
2|9: A Bit(Coin) of a Problem for the EU AML Framework|190
3|Introduction|190
3|The Bitcoin Phenomena|192
3|Initial Regulation|194
3|Bitcoin and Crime|198
3|Policy as a Transitional Tool|200
3|Extending AML to Actors in the Bitcoin System|202
3|Policing in Shifting Regulatory Space|207
3|Conclusion|208
2|10: ‘Fake Passports’: What Is to Be Done About Trade-Based Money Laundering?|216
3|Introduction|216
3|What Is TBML?|217
3|The Size and Incidence of TBML|218
3|Current Responses to TBML|220
3|The Difficulties of Applying Financial Sector-Based Responses to International Trade|221
3|Implications of the ‘Do Nothing’ Response|222
3|The Impact of TBML on the Credibility of AML Efforts as a Whole|223
3|TBML and Terrorist Financing|224
3|TBML and the Law|225
3|Tackling TBML Through Compliance ‘Red Flags’|228
3|TBML and Prosecutions|229
3|TBML and Proving Criminality|231
3|New Tools to Tackle TBML: Alternative Methods of Combat|234
3|The UK Bribery Act: Transferable Lessons?|237
3|TBML: Redefining the Offence|238
3|TBML: A Difficult Problem Maybe, But It Won’t Go Away|239
2|11: De-risking: An Unintended Negative Consequence of AML/CFT Regulation|244
3|Introduction|244
3|The Great De-banking of Money Transfer Organizations|245
4|Evidence of Account Closures|245
4|Drivers of De-banking|248
5|Background Increase in Regulatory Pressure|248
5|MTOs as High-Risk Clients|251
4|Scale of De-banking and the Impact on Industry|253
4|Negative Impacts on Remittance Flows and Transparency|255
5|Lower Flows of Remittances to Developing Countries|257
5|Remittance Flows Become Less Transparent|258
3|Correspondent Banking and Other Cross-Border Transactions Under Threat|259
4|The Decline of Correspondent Banking Relationships and Trade Finance in Some Corridors|259
4|Drivers of the Reduction in Correspondent Accounts|261
4|Potential Consequences|264
3|Responses are Hamstrung by Poor Data Availability|265
4|Responses to Date|265
4|Towards Adequate Data|266
5|Data Generation|266
5|Data Sharing|267
3|Conclusion|268
2|12: Punishing Banks, Their Clients and Their Clients’ Clients|280
3|Introduction|280
3|Who Is Harmed by De-risking?|283
4|Bank Policies and Practices|284
4|Changes to Reduce the Counter-Productive Effects|286
4|Punishing the Banks and Individuals|288
4|Sentencing Council Guidelines for England and Wales|289
4|Regulatory Penalties in the UK|291
3|Conclusions|293
2|13: A Critical Analysis of the Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures with Reference to Australia|299
3|Objectives and Development of AML Systems|300
3|The FATF Standards, Peer Review System and the Concept of Effectiveness|303
3|Implementation of AML Systems in Australia|306
3|Supervisory Capacity and Effectiveness|307
3|Regulation of Designated Non-financial Businesses and the Professions|308
3|Reporting Obligations and Effectiveness|309
3|Financial Intelligence and Effectiveness|312
3|Money Laundering Prosecutions|314
3|International Co-operation|315
3|Conclusions|316
2|14: The Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Policy: A Cost-Benefit Perspective|323
3|Introduction|323
3|Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Policy|324
3|A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Anti-Money Laundering Policy|325
3|The Costs of AML Policy|327
4|Ongoing Policy Making|327
4|FIU|327
4|Supervision|328
4|Law Enforcement and Judiciary|330
4|Sanction Costs (Repressive)|332
4|Duties of the Private Sector|335
4|Reduction in Privacy|337
4|Efficiency Costs for Society and the Financial System|337
3|The Benefits of AML Policy|338
4|Fines (Repressive)|338
4|Confiscated Proceeds|339
4|Reduction in the Amount of Money Laundering and Terrorism|340
4|Effects of Money Laundering: Fewer Predicate Crimes, Reduced Damage Effect on Real Economy and Less Risk for the Financial Sector|341
3|Conclusion|344
2|15: A ‘Risky’ Risk Approach: Proportionality in ML/TF Regulation|351
3|Introduction: Risk, Protection and Proportionality|351
3|The Risk Approach/Concept of the FATF|352
3|Save the Nut, Restrain the Sledgehammer|354
4|The Crime-Money Risk: Faith, Facts and Recycling|354
4|Laundered and Unlaundered Money: More Than Semantics|356
4|The Rumbling Pot of Empirical Research|356
3|The Risk-Based Approach and Proportionality|359
3|The Fourth Round: Evidence from 13 Mutual Evaluation Reports|361
4|Country-Wise Evidence of Risks and Proportionality|366
4|National Risk Assessment and Strategy Evaluated|368
5|Fully Compliant|368
5|Largely Compliant|368
5|Partly Compliant|369
5|Non-compliant|370
3|Conclusion and Discussion|371
1|Part III: Asset Recovery|381
2|16: Asset Recovery: An Overview|382
2|17: Mutual Recognition and Confiscation of Assets: An EU Perspective|403
3|Introduction|403
3|Harmonisation of the Extended Confiscation: Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA|404
4|Directive 42/2014|405
3|Harmonisation: Non-conviction-Based Confiscation|410
3|Cooperation Through the 1990 Council of Europe Strasbourg Convention|411
3|Mutual Recognition of Confiscation: Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA|412
3|The Judgments of the ECHR: The Gogidtize Case and the Nature of Non-conviction-Based Confiscation|413
3|The Prospects for the Mutual Recognition of Confiscation Orders|418
2|18: Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States|430
3|Introduction|430
3|Why Make Forfeiture Part of the Criminal Process?|431
3|What Can Be Forfeited?|433
4|What Are ‘Proceeds’?|434
4|The Gross Versus Net Controversy|435
4|Facilitating Property|436
4|Money Laundering|437
3|Forfeiture Procedure|437
4|Administrative Forfeiture|437
4|Civil Judicial Forfeiture|439
5|Civil Forfeiture Procedure|441
4|Criminal Forfeiture|442
5|Obtaining a Criminal Forfeiture Order Step-by-Step|443
3|Conclusion|444
2|19: Post-conviction Confiscation in England and Wales|450
3|The Nature of ‘Confiscation Orders’ in England and Wales|451
3|Scope of the Enquiry into Benefit|452
4|Third-Party Rights|452
4|Family Law Matters|454
3|Considerations in Determining ‘Benefit’|454
4|Transient Nature of Holding or Possessing Property|455
4|Proportionality|456
4|Statutory Assumptions as to Benefit|457
3|The Amount to Be Repaid|459
3|Enforcing the Confiscation Order|461
4|Time to Pay|462
4|Default Sentences for Non-payment|463
4|Interest|463
4|Compliance Orders|464
3|Conclusion|464
2|20: Disproportionality in Asset Recovery: Recent Cases in the UK and Hong Kong|472
3|Introduction|472
3|Disproportionality in Asset Recovery|473
4|Disproportionate Restraint|475
4|Disproportionate Confiscation|476
3|Development of Proportionality in UK Confiscation Law|477
3|Recent Developments in Hong Kong|483
4|Indefinite Restraint|483
4|Confiscation and the Proceeds of Money Laundering|485
3|Conclusion|488
2|21: Confiscating Dirty Assets: The Italian Experience|493
3|Introduction|493
3|The Italian Traditional System of Criminal Confiscation|494
3|The Creation of Non-criminal Confiscation|497
3|The Extension of Criminal Confiscation|504
3|Concluding Remarks on the Italian Legislation on Asset Forfeiture|507
2|22: Civil Recovery in England and Wales: An Appraisal|517
3|Introduction|517
3|‘Recovery’? ‘Civil’?12|518
3|Rationales16|519
3|Matters Institutional|520
3|Human Rights Challenges to Civil Recovery68|526
3|Proof|530
3|Types of Evidence|532
4|Inference from Silence|532
4|Previous Behaviour|533
4|Illegally Obtained Evidence and Abuse of Process|533
4|Hearsay|534
4|Legal Advice|534
3|Results and Some Conclusions|535
2|23: An Empirical Glimpse of Civil Forfeiture Actions in Canada|545
3|Civil Forfeiture Regulation|546
3|A Controversial Approach|548
3|Manitoban Civil Forfeiture Law|552
3|A Glimpse of Context|554
4|The Findings|555
3|Observations on Contextual Study|558
3|Conclusion|560
2|24: The Difficulties of Belief Evidence and Anonymity in Practice: Challenges for Asset Recovery|566
3|Introduction|566
3|Methods|568
3|Belief Evidence: The Law|569
3|Belief Evidence in Practice|573
3|Anonymity: The Law|576
3|Anonymity in Practice|578
3|Conclusion|582
2|25: International Asset Recovery and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption|592
3|Introduction|592
3|Asset Recovery and the UNCAC in the Criminological and International Legal Context|595
4|UNCAC’s Broad Scope of Application|595
4|Applying the UNTOC to Grand Corruption|596
4|Practical Implications of Grand Corruption’s Transnational Organized Nature|596
4|The UNCAC as a Legal Basis for International Cooperation in Asset Recovery|598
3|Outline of UNCAC, Chapter V|599
3|Prevention of Laundering the Assets|599
4|Verification of Customer Identity|600
4|Identification of Beneficial Owners of High-Value Accounts|600
4|Enhanced Scrutiny over Accounts Held by Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs)|601
4|Record-Keeping|601
4|Preventing the Establishment of, and Correspondent Relationship with, Shell Banks|602
4|Financial Disclosure Systems for Public Officials|602
3|Detecting and Freezing the Assets|603
4|Determining the Proceeds of Corruption|603
4|Freezing the Assets of Corruption|603
3|Confiscating the Assets|604
3|Returning the Assets|605
3|Asset Recovery in Cases of Inactive (Unwilling or Unable/Failed) Victim States|607
4|Barriers to Asset Recovery|608
4|Best National, Regional and International Asset Recovery Practices|609
3|Including Corruption’s Victims in the ‘Bargain’|610
4|Defining ‘Victims’|610
4|Settlements in Foreign Corruption Cases|611
3|UNCAC in Practice: The AO Man-Long Case|612
3|Challenges and Outlook|613
2|26: In Pursuit of the Proceeds of Transnational Corporate Bribery: The UK Experience to Date|622
3|Introduction|622
3|What Is Transnational Corporate Bribery?|624
3|The Proceeds of Transnational Corporate Bribery|632
3|Reappropriating the Proceeds of Corporate Bribery: International and Domestic Law|635
4|Confiscation Orders|638
4|Civil Recovery Orders|639
4|Disgorgement of Profits as Part of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs)|640
4|Victim Compensation|642
4|Destination of the Recovered Proceeds of Bribery|643
3|Conclusion: Key Issues in Recovering the Proceeds of Corporate Bribery|644
2|27: In Search of Transnational Financial Intelligence: Questioning Cooperation Between Financial Intelligence Units|650
3|Introduction|650
3|European and International Communication Channels|652
4|The Egmont Secure Web|654
5|FIU.NET|657
5|Other Recognised Cooperation Channels|660
5|Information Sharing in Numbers|661
3|Financial Intelligence Cooperation in Face of Tensions|665
4|On the Capacity to Respond to FIU Requests|666
4|On Spontaneous Dissemination and ‘Abusive’ Restrictions|670
3|Conclusion|671
2|28: Taxing Crime: A New Power to Control|677
3|Introduction|677
3|Conditions of Possibility|678
3|The Jurisprudence|679
4|Which Criminal Activities Might Be Susceptible to Tax?|679
4|Is Taxing the Proceeds of Crime Acceptable?|681
4|Allowable Expenses for Criminal Activities|685
4|Does Taxation Policy Affect Criminal Behaviour?|686
3|Catch 22: Taxing the Proceeds of Crime Imposes an Obligation to Disclose and Thereby Incriminates the Taxpayer|687
3|The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 Way of Knowing|688
3|‘Civil’ising Crime|690
4|Criminal Regulation|692
4|Governance|694
4|The Abiographical Wrongdoer|695
3|Conclusion|697
2|29: The Disposal of Confiscated Assets in the EU Member States: What Works, What Does Not Work and What Is Promising|705
3|Introduction|705
3|The Current State of Asset Disposal in the EU|706
4|Existing Studies|706
4|EU Developments|707
3|Disposal of Confiscated Assets in the EU: Mapping Legislation and Practices|708
4|Legislation and Institutional Building Arrangements|708
4|Practices: What Does Not Work (Key Problems)|710
4|Practices: What Works (Best Practices)|714
3|Focusing on Current Social Reuse Experiences in the EU|716
4|Key Social Reuse Experiences in the EU|717
5|Belgium|717
5|France|718
5|Hungary|719
5|Italy|719
5|Luxembourg|721
5|Scotland|721
5|Spain|723
4|Comparing Social Reuse Experiences in the EU|724
4|Social Reuse Practices: What Does Not Work (Key Problems)|724
4|Social Reuse Practices: What Works (Best Practices)|727
3|Conclusion: Is Social Reuse a Promising Disposal Option?|729
1|Part IV: Counter-Terrorism Financing|734
2|30: Counter-Terrorism Financing: An Overview|735
3|The Background|735
3|Chapter Outline|739
2|31: Counter-Terrorism Financing Assemblages After 9/11|752
3|Introduction|752
3|CTF After 9/11|754
3|CTF Regulation as Complex Assemblage|758
3|Banks in the Frontline|763
3|Inside Banking Practice|765
3|Conclusions|768
2|32: The Financial War on Terrorism: A Critical Review of the United Kingdom’s Counter-Terrorist Financing Strategies|777
3|Introduction|777
3|The Origins of the Financial War on Terrorism|778
3|Counter-Terrorist Financing Before 9/11|780
3|Counter-Terrorist Financing After 11 September 2001|782
3|Criminalisation|783
3|Asset Freezing|784
3|Confiscation/Forfeiture|786
3|The Sanctions Regime|788
3|Financial Intelligence|789
3|Conclusion|792
2|33: Legal and Regulatory Approaches to Counter-Terrorist Financing: The Case of Australia|803
3|Introduction|803
3|The Evolution of Australia’s Framework to Counter the Financing of Terrorism|805
3|The Legislative Framework for Criminalising the Financing of Terrorism|807
4|Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)|807
5|Financing Terrorism|807
5|Funding a Terrorist Organisation|809
4|The Domestic Application of the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Sanctions|810
4|The Restraint and Recovery of Criminal Assets|811
5|The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth)|811
5|State Legislation: The Example of New South Wales|812
5|Oversight and Reporting Mechanisms|813
5|Cash Dealers and the Obligation to Report Suspicious Transactions|814
5|Licensing Requirements for Money Value Transfer Service Providers|815
5|Reporting Obligations for Wire Transfers and International Fund Transfer Instructions|817
5|Reporting Obligations in Relation to the Transfer of Currency into or out of Australia|817
5|Non-Profit Organisations|819
3|Concluding Observations|820
2|34: Examining the Efficacy of Canada’s Anti-terrorist Financing Laws|830
3|Introduction|830
3|Anti-terrorist Financing Regime|832
3|Assessing Efficacy|834
3|Was the Air India Report a Turning Point?|837
3|Conclusion|841
2|35: EU Measures to Combat Terrorist Financing|850
3|Introduction|850
3|EU Measures to Combat Terrorist Finances|851
3|Meeting EU’s Official Goals in the Fight Against Terrorist Financing|856
4|Ratification and Implementation of UN Resolutions and FATF Recommendations|856
4|Drafting, Adoption and Implementation of EU’s Own Measures|860
3|Effectiveness of EU Measures for Counterterrorist Financing?|862
4|Amount of Frozen Terrorist Assets|863
4|Number of Suspicious Activity Reports and Other Criteria|865
3|Concluding Remarks|868
2|36: The United Nations Security Council Sanctions Regime Against the Financing of Terrorism|877
3|Two Regimes for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (SFT)|877
3|Listing: The 1267 Regime|878
3|Legislation|879
3|Implementation, Resistance and the Evolution of Listing|881
3|The Provision for Delisting and Its Procedure|881
3|Information Available to Listed Persons|882
3|Definitional Criteria for Listing|883
3|Control over Delisting|884
3|Independent Review|884
3|SCR 1373: Global and Domestic SFT Legislation|886
3|Concluding Remarks: Security Council Sanctions Within the SFT Behemoth|889
2|37: The Intersection of AML/SFT and Security Council Sanctions|901
3|The Rise of Measures to Suppress Terrorist Financing|901
3|The Development of Links with UN Sanctions|902
3|Evolution of Security Council Sanctions for Counter Terrorism|903
3|The Use of Targeted Sanctions|904
3|The Creation of a Counter Terrorism Sanctions Regime|905
3|The Fair Process Challenge|906
3|The Ombudsperson|909
3|The Ombudsperson: Sufficient Fairness|911
3|Other Challenges|913
3|Conclusion|915
2|38: Anti-terrorism Smart Sanctions and Armed Conflicts|921
3|Introduction|921
3|The Purported Existence of a Norm Conflict and the Role of the Principle of Lex Specialis|923
3|The Unilateral Application of Restrictive Measures in Light of the Principle of Non-intervention|925
3|Economic Sanctions and the Right to Self-Determination|929
3|Conclusions|932
2|39: Applying Social Network Analysis to Terrorist Financing|939
3|Introduction|939
3|Social Network Analysis: A Relational Approach|940
3|Al-Shabaab Case Study|943
3|Hezbollah Case Studies|944
3|Analysing Terrorist Financing Networks|948
3|Conclusion|953
2|40: Criminal Prosecutions for Terrorism Financing in the UK|961
3|Introduction|961
3|Details of CTF Provisions in the UK|963
4|Offences|963
4|Forfeiture|965
4|Seizure of Cash|966
3|Prosecutor’s Viewpoint47|967
4|Strategy|968
4|Apparatus|971
4|Offences|973
3|Defender’s Viewpoint90|974
3|Conclusion|978
2|41: The Failure to Prosecute ISIS’s Foreign Financiers Under the Material Support Statute|988
3|Introduction|988
3|The Scope of Criminal Liability Under the Material Support Statute|991
4|The Statutory Framework|991
4|Extraterritorial Jurisdiction|993
4|Inchoate Liability|995
3|Who Is Being Prosecuted Under the Material Support Statute?|996
4|Undercover Operations|999
4|Attempt Liability|1002
4|Conspiracy Liability|1004
4|Lack of Extraterritorial Application|1006
3|Who Should Be Prosecuted Under the Material Support Statute?|1006
3|Conclusion|1008
2|42: Counter Terrorism Finance, Precautionary Logic and the Regulation of Risk: The Regulation of Informal Value Transfer Systems Within the UK|1021
3|Introduction: Post 9/11 Crisis and the Prominence of Counter Terrorism Finance Strategy|1021
3|Precautionary Logic|1022
3|IVTS: Informal Cultural Networks—Risk and Suspicion|1025
3|Suspect Targets and Sanctions Listings: The Al Barakaat Case|1028
3|UK Perspective: The Regulation of Money Service Businesses|1029
3|Intelligence Gathering and Suspicions Activity Reporting|1035
3|Regulatory Consequence: De-risking and Financial Exclusion|1036
3|Conclusion|1037
2|43: Responding to Money Transfers by Foreign Terrorist Fighters|1053
3|Introduction|1053
4|What Is a Money Service Business?|1054
4|What Is a Money Transfer?|1054
4|Know Your Customer Requirements to Send a Money Transfer|1055
3|MSB Exposure to Foreign Terrorist Fighters Money Transfers|1056
4|Terrorism Is Cheap and Money Transfers are an Attractive Option|1057
3|MSB Compliance Programmes|1058
4|Balancing Risk with Humanitarian Need|1058
4|Different Regulations in Every Country|1059
4|The Role of Financial Intelligence Units|1059
4|Necessity of Strategic Intelligence|1059
4|Strategic Intelligence and Law Enforcement|1061
3|Building and Leveraging a Typology: A Strategic Intelligence Response to Foreign Terrorist Fighters|1061
4|Building a Typology|1062
4|Leveraging the Typology to Deploy Automated Transaction Rules|1064
4|Importance of Technology in Responding to FTF Money Transfers|1066
4|Strategic Response Is Effective at Controlling Risk but Inefficient at Identifying Individual FTFs|1066
4|Generating FTF Targets When No Consumers Stand Out|1067
3|Challenges|1068
4|The Problem of Limited Information|1068
4|Refugee Crises Overlapping with Foreign Terrorist Fighter Typology|1070
4|Continuing Evolution of the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Typology|1071
4|Challenge of Using International Law Enforcement Referral Information|1071
3|Conclusion|1072
2|44: Terrorism Financing and the Governance of Charities|1077
3|Introduction|1077
3|Legal and Other Governance Mechanisms to Curtail Charitable Financing of Terrorism in the United Kingdom|1081
4|Internal Governance|1082
4|External Governance|1084
3|Intended Consequences of Governance|1086
3|Unintended Consequences of Governance|1095
3|Conclusions and Future Governance|1097
2|45: Governing Non-profit Organisations Against Terrorist Financing: The Malaysian Legal and Regulatory Modalities|1108
3|Introduction|1108
3|What Are Non-profit Organisations?|1109
3|Terrorism Financing and Its International Governance|1110
3|The Vulnerabilities of NPOs to Terrorist Financing|1112
3|Criminalising Terrorism Financing in Malaysia|1113
4|NPOs and Terrorist Financing in Malaysia|1117
3|Governing the NPOs in Malaysia|1119
4|Governing Zakat in Malaysia|1121
4|The Best Practices Approach for NPOs in Malaysia|1121
3|Conclusion|1123
2|46: Kidnap and Terrorism Financing|1131
3|The Rise of Kidnapping for Ransom to Fund Terrorism|1133
3|Recent Efforts Towards a Universal Terrorist Ransom Ban|1135
3|The Legal Impact of the Measures Urging a Universal Terrorist Ransom Ban|1137
3|Norm Influence and the Recent Measures Urging a Universal Ransom Ban|1140
3|Considering the Alternative: Force Instead of Persuasion|1142
4|Practical and Ethical Obstacles to Enforcing a Legally Binding Terrorist Ransom Ban Directed at Governments|1142
4|Practical and Ethical Obstacles to Enforcing a Legally Binding Terrorist Ransom Ban Directed at Individuals|1144
3|The Way Forward: More Persuasion|1148
2|47: The Illicit Antiquities Trade and Terrorism Financing: From the Khmer Rouge to Daesh|1156
3|Militant and Terrorist Funding via the Illicit Antiquities Trade|1157
4|Brief History of the Antiquities Trade and Its Link to Violence|1157
4|Estimates on the Scope of ISIS’s Antiquities Trade|1158
4|Details of ISIS’s Antiquities Operation|1160
3|Legal Frameworks for Targeting the Blood Antiquities Problem|1162
4|International Conventions and UN Security Council Resolutions|1163
4|Domestic Law—US Example|1165
3|Conclusion and Recommendations|1170
1|Selected Bibliography|1181
1|Index|1202
1|List of Figures|11
1|List of Tables|13
1|Part I: Introductory Section|15
2|1: Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law: An Introduction|16
3|Background|16
3|Agendas|19
3|Our Research Inquiries|20
3|Book Plan|21
1|Part II: Anti-Money Laundering|26
2|2: Anti-Money Laundering: An Overview|27
2|3: The Global AML Regime and the EU AML Directives: Prevention and Control|44
3|Introduction|44
3|The Emergence and Development of the Global and Regional EU AML Regime|45
3|Regulations and Regulators|46
4|International Rules and European Regulations|46
4|The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)|46
4|The European Union|47
4|Private Actors|48
3|Major Changes After 2000|49
4|Financing of Terrorism|49
4|The Risk-Based Approach|50
3|Recent Developments at the EU Level|51
4|The Broader Regulatory Framework|51
4|The Current EU AML Framework|52
5|More Cooperation Between National Authorities|53
5|A More Targeted and Focused Risk-Based Approach|53
4|The Proposed Amendments|54
4|The Criminal Law Proposal|55
5|The Fourth AML Directive and Criminal Law|56
5|The Proposed EU AML Criminal Law Directive|57
3|Conclusions: Preventing and Controlling ML and Terrorism Financing?|59
2|4: Globalization, Money Laundering and the City of London|68
3|Introduction|68
3|Money Laundering in the City of London|72
3|The UK and Anti-Money Laundering Legislation|76
3|AMLR and the City of London|80
3|Conclusion|85
2|5: The Production of Suspicion in Retail Banking: An Examination of Unusual Transaction Reporting|91
3|Introduction|91
3|Risk, AML/CTF, and Suspicious Funds|93
3|Methodology|97
3|Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Risk Management|99
3|Financial Instruments and the Production of Risk|101
3|Sums of Money and the Production of Moral Risk|105
3|Discussion|110
3|Conclusion|112
2|6: Money Laundering, Anti-Money Laundering and the Legal Profession|118
3|Introduction|118
3|The Facilitation of Money Laundering by Professionals: A Significant Concern?|120
4|The Official Narrative|120
4|A Lack of Understanding|122
3|Lawyers as ‘Gatekeepers’: The Preventative Obligations of Regulated Professionals|124
3|Prosecution of Lawyers Involved in Money Laundering in the UK|127
4|Proceeds of Crime Act 2002: Sections 327, 328 and 329|127
5|Section 330: ‘Failure to Disclose: Regulated Sector’|130
5|Implications for Legal Professionals: Considering Cases of Convicted Solicitors|132
5|Conclusion|135
2|7: Cash, Crime and Anti-Money Laundering|143
3|Introduction|143
3|Measuring Cash: Paradoxes and Surprises|144
4|The Increasing Value of Banknotes in Circulation|144
4|Only Part of Circulating Cash Is Used for Transactions|146
4|Cash-Ratio: South-Eastern Europe on Top|147
4|How to Explain the Gap? The Illegal Economy|147
3|Cash-Generating Illicit Activities|149
3|Cash Smuggling|151
4|Smuggling or Laundering?|151
4|Cash Smuggling Methods|152
3|Cash-Intensive Businesses and Assets|153
4|Cash-Intensive Businesses|153
4|Cash-Intensive Assets|155
3|Reducing Cash Use|155
4|Limits on Cash Purchases|156
4|Limits on Cash Transfers|158
4|Limits on Banknote Denominations|158
4|The Anomaly of the 500 Euro Banknote|159
3|Seizing Cash|160
3|Policy and Research Implications|161
4|In Summary|161
4|Implications for Criminals|162
4|Implications for Policymakers|163
4|Implications for Researchers|164
2|8: Money Laundering in a Virtual World|172
3|Introduction|172
3|Virtual Worlds|173
3|Virtual Currencies and Money Laundering|176
3|Analysis of Money Laundering Cases in the Virtual World|179
4|Gold Farming|179
4|Virtual Money Inc.|181
4|Attorney Turned Launderer|181
3|Legal Perspective|182
3|Analysis and Reflection|185
2|9: A Bit(Coin) of a Problem for the EU AML Framework|190
3|Introduction|190
3|The Bitcoin Phenomena|192
3|Initial Regulation|194
3|Bitcoin and Crime|198
3|Policy as a Transitional Tool|200
3|Extending AML to Actors in the Bitcoin System|202
3|Policing in Shifting Regulatory Space|207
3|Conclusion|208
2|10: ‘Fake Passports’: What Is to Be Done About Trade-Based Money Laundering?|216
3|Introduction|216
3|What Is TBML?|217
3|The Size and Incidence of TBML|218
3|Current Responses to TBML|220
3|The Difficulties of Applying Financial Sector-Based Responses to International Trade|221
3|Implications of the ‘Do Nothing’ Response|222
3|The Impact of TBML on the Credibility of AML Efforts as a Whole|223
3|TBML and Terrorist Financing|224
3|TBML and the Law|225
3|Tackling TBML Through Compliance ‘Red Flags’|228
3|TBML and Prosecutions|229
3|TBML and Proving Criminality|231
3|New Tools to Tackle TBML: Alternative Methods of Combat|234
3|The UK Bribery Act: Transferable Lessons?|237
3|TBML: Redefining the Offence|238
3|TBML: A Difficult Problem Maybe, But It Won’t Go Away|239
2|11: De-risking: An Unintended Negative Consequence of AML/CFT Regulation|244
3|Introduction|244
3|The Great De-banking of Money Transfer Organizations|245
4|Evidence of Account Closures|245
4|Drivers of De-banking|248
5|Background Increase in Regulatory Pressure|248
5|MTOs as High-Risk Clients|251
4|Scale of De-banking and the Impact on Industry|253
4|Negative Impacts on Remittance Flows and Transparency|255
5|Lower Flows of Remittances to Developing Countries|257
5|Remittance Flows Become Less Transparent|258
3|Correspondent Banking and Other Cross-Border Transactions Under Threat|259
4|The Decline of Correspondent Banking Relationships and Trade Finance in Some Corridors|259
4|Drivers of the Reduction in Correspondent Accounts|261
4|Potential Consequences|264
3|Responses are Hamstrung by Poor Data Availability|265
4|Responses to Date|265
4|Towards Adequate Data|266
5|Data Generation|266
5|Data Sharing|267
3|Conclusion|268
2|12: Punishing Banks, Their Clients and Their Clients’ Clients|280
3|Introduction|280
3|Who Is Harmed by De-risking?|283
4|Bank Policies and Practices|284
4|Changes to Reduce the Counter-Productive Effects|286
4|Punishing the Banks and Individuals|288
4|Sentencing Council Guidelines for England and Wales|289
4|Regulatory Penalties in the UK|291
3|Conclusions|293
2|13: A Critical Analysis of the Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures with Reference to Australia|299
3|Objectives and Development of AML Systems|300
3|The FATF Standards, Peer Review System and the Concept of Effectiveness|303
3|Implementation of AML Systems in Australia|306
3|Supervisory Capacity and Effectiveness|307
3|Regulation of Designated Non-financial Businesses and the Professions|308
3|Reporting Obligations and Effectiveness|309
3|Financial Intelligence and Effectiveness|312
3|Money Laundering Prosecutions|314
3|International Co-operation|315
3|Conclusions|316
2|14: The Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Policy: A Cost-Benefit Perspective|323
3|Introduction|323
3|Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Policy|324
3|A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Anti-Money Laundering Policy|325
3|The Costs of AML Policy|327
4|Ongoing Policy Making|327
4|FIU|327
4|Supervision|328
4|Law Enforcement and Judiciary|330
4|Sanction Costs (Repressive)|332
4|Duties of the Private Sector|335
4|Reduction in Privacy|337
4|Efficiency Costs for Society and the Financial System|337
3|The Benefits of AML Policy|338
4|Fines (Repressive)|338
4|Confiscated Proceeds|339
4|Reduction in the Amount of Money Laundering and Terrorism|340
4|Effects of Money Laundering: Fewer Predicate Crimes, Reduced Damage Effect on Real Economy and Less Risk for the Financial Sector|341
3|Conclusion|344
2|15: A ‘Risky’ Risk Approach: Proportionality in ML/TF Regulation|351
3|Introduction: Risk, Protection and Proportionality|351
3|The Risk Approach/Concept of the FATF|352
3|Save the Nut, Restrain the Sledgehammer|354
4|The Crime-Money Risk: Faith, Facts and Recycling|354
4|Laundered and Unlaundered Money: More Than Semantics|356
4|The Rumbling Pot of Empirical Research|356
3|The Risk-Based Approach and Proportionality|359
3|The Fourth Round: Evidence from 13 Mutual Evaluation Reports|361
4|Country-Wise Evidence of Risks and Proportionality|366
4|National Risk Assessment and Strategy Evaluated|368
5|Fully Compliant|368
5|Largely Compliant|368
5|Partly Compliant|369
5|Non-compliant|370
3|Conclusion and Discussion|371
1|Part III: Asset Recovery|381
2|16: Asset Recovery: An Overview|382
2|17: Mutual Recognition and Confiscation of Assets: An EU Perspective|403
3|Introduction|403
3|Harmonisation of the Extended Confiscation: Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA|404
4|Directive 42/2014|405
3|Harmonisation: Non-conviction-Based Confiscation|410
3|Cooperation Through the 1990 Council of Europe Strasbourg Convention|411
3|Mutual Recognition of Confiscation: Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA|412
3|The Judgments of the ECHR: The Gogidtize Case and the Nature of Non-conviction-Based Confiscation|413
3|The Prospects for the Mutual Recognition of Confiscation Orders|418
2|18: Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States|430
3|Introduction|430
3|Why Make Forfeiture Part of the Criminal Process?|431
3|What Can Be Forfeited?|433
4|What Are ‘Proceeds’?|434
4|The Gross Versus Net Controversy|435
4|Facilitating Property|436
4|Money Laundering|437
3|Forfeiture Procedure|437
4|Administrative Forfeiture|437
4|Civil Judicial Forfeiture|439
5|Civil Forfeiture Procedure|441
4|Criminal Forfeiture|442
5|Obtaining a Criminal Forfeiture Order Step-by-Step|443
3|Conclusion|444
2|19: Post-conviction Confiscation in England and Wales|450
3|The Nature of ‘Confiscation Orders’ in England and Wales|451
3|Scope of the Enquiry into Benefit|452
4|Third-Party Rights|452
4|Family Law Matters|454
3|Considerations in Determining ‘Benefit’|454
4|Transient Nature of Holding or Possessing Property|455
4|Proportionality|456
4|Statutory Assumptions as to Benefit|457
3|The Amount to Be Repaid|459
3|Enforcing the Confiscation Order|461
4|Time to Pay|462
4|Default Sentences for Non-payment|463
4|Interest|463
4|Compliance Orders|464
3|Conclusion|464
2|20: Disproportionality in Asset Recovery: Recent Cases in the UK and Hong Kong|472
3|Introduction|472
3|Disproportionality in Asset Recovery|473
4|Disproportionate Restraint|475
4|Disproportionate Confiscation|476
3|Development of Proportionality in UK Confiscation Law|477
3|Recent Developments in Hong Kong|483
4|Indefinite Restraint|483
4|Confiscation and the Proceeds of Money Laundering|485
3|Conclusion|488
2|21: Confiscating Dirty Assets: The Italian Experience|493
3|Introduction|493
3|The Italian Traditional System of Criminal Confiscation|494
3|The Creation of Non-criminal Confiscation|497
3|The Extension of Criminal Confiscation|504
3|Concluding Remarks on the Italian Legislation on Asset Forfeiture|507
2|22: Civil Recovery in England and Wales: An Appraisal|517
3|Introduction|517
3|‘Recovery’? ‘Civil’?12|518
3|Rationales16|519
3|Matters Institutional|520
3|Human Rights Challenges to Civil Recovery68|526
3|Proof|530
3|Types of Evidence|532
4|Inference from Silence|532
4|Previous Behaviour|533
4|Illegally Obtained Evidence and Abuse of Process|533
4|Hearsay|534
4|Legal Advice|534
3|Results and Some Conclusions|535
2|23: An Empirical Glimpse of Civil Forfeiture Actions in Canada|545
3|Civil Forfeiture Regulation|546
3|A Controversial Approach|548
3|Manitoban Civil Forfeiture Law|552
3|A Glimpse of Context|554
4|The Findings|555
3|Observations on Contextual Study|558
3|Conclusion|560
2|24: The Difficulties of Belief Evidence and Anonymity in Practice: Challenges for Asset Recovery|566
3|Introduction|566
3|Methods|568
3|Belief Evidence: The Law|569
3|Belief Evidence in Practice|573
3|Anonymity: The Law|576
3|Anonymity in Practice|578
3|Conclusion|582
2|25: International Asset Recovery and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption|592
3|Introduction|592
3|Asset Recovery and the UNCAC in the Criminological and International Legal Context|595
4|UNCAC’s Broad Scope of Application|595
4|Applying the UNTOC to Grand Corruption|596
4|Practical Implications of Grand Corruption’s Transnational Organized Nature|596
4|The UNCAC as a Legal Basis for International Cooperation in Asset Recovery|598
3|Outline of UNCAC, Chapter V|599
3|Prevention of Laundering the Assets|599
4|Verification of Customer Identity|600
4|Identification of Beneficial Owners of High-Value Accounts|600
4|Enhanced Scrutiny over Accounts Held by Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs)|601
4|Record-Keeping|601
4|Preventing the Establishment of, and Correspondent Relationship with, Shell Banks|602
4|Financial Disclosure Systems for Public Officials|602
3|Detecting and Freezing the Assets|603
4|Determining the Proceeds of Corruption|603
4|Freezing the Assets of Corruption|603
3|Confiscating the Assets|604
3|Returning the Assets|605
3|Asset Recovery in Cases of Inactive (Unwilling or Unable/Failed) Victim States|607
4|Barriers to Asset Recovery|608
4|Best National, Regional and International Asset Recovery Practices|609
3|Including Corruption’s Victims in the ‘Bargain’|610
4|Defining ‘Victims’|610
4|Settlements in Foreign Corruption Cases|611
3|UNCAC in Practice: The AO Man-Long Case|612
3|Challenges and Outlook|613
2|26: In Pursuit of the Proceeds of Transnational Corporate Bribery: The UK Experience to Date|622
3|Introduction|622
3|What Is Transnational Corporate Bribery?|624
3|The Proceeds of Transnational Corporate Bribery|632
3|Reappropriating the Proceeds of Corporate Bribery: International and Domestic Law|635
4|Confiscation Orders|638
4|Civil Recovery Orders|639
4|Disgorgement of Profits as Part of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs)|640
4|Victim Compensation|642
4|Destination of the Recovered Proceeds of Bribery|643
3|Conclusion: Key Issues in Recovering the Proceeds of Corporate Bribery|644
2|27: In Search of Transnational Financial Intelligence: Questioning Cooperation Between Financial Intelligence Units|650
3|Introduction|650
3|European and International Communication Channels|652
4|The Egmont Secure Web|654
5|FIU.NET|657
5|Other Recognised Cooperation Channels|660
5|Information Sharing in Numbers|661
3|Financial Intelligence Cooperation in Face of Tensions|665
4|On the Capacity to Respond to FIU Requests|666
4|On Spontaneous Dissemination and ‘Abusive’ Restrictions|670
3|Conclusion|671
2|28: Taxing Crime: A New Power to Control|677
3|Introduction|677
3|Conditions of Possibility|678
3|The Jurisprudence|679
4|Which Criminal Activities Might Be Susceptible to Tax?|679
4|Is Taxing the Proceeds of Crime Acceptable?|681
4|Allowable Expenses for Criminal Activities|685
4|Does Taxation Policy Affect Criminal Behaviour?|686
3|Catch 22: Taxing the Proceeds of Crime Imposes an Obligation to Disclose and Thereby Incriminates the Taxpayer|687
3|The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 Way of Knowing|688
3|‘Civil’ising Crime|690
4|Criminal Regulation|692
4|Governance|694
4|The Abiographical Wrongdoer|695
3|Conclusion|697
2|29: The Disposal of Confiscated Assets in the EU Member States: What Works, What Does Not Work and What Is Promising|705
3|Introduction|705
3|The Current State of Asset Disposal in the EU|706
4|Existing Studies|706
4|EU Developments|707
3|Disposal of Confiscated Assets in the EU: Mapping Legislation and Practices|708
4|Legislation and Institutional Building Arrangements|708
4|Practices: What Does Not Work (Key Problems)|710
4|Practices: What Works (Best Practices)|714
3|Focusing on Current Social Reuse Experiences in the EU|716
4|Key Social Reuse Experiences in the EU|717
5|Belgium|717
5|France|718
5|Hungary|719
5|Italy|719
5|Luxembourg|721
5|Scotland|721
5|Spain|723
4|Comparing Social Reuse Experiences in the EU|724
4|Social Reuse Practices: What Does Not Work (Key Problems)|724
4|Social Reuse Practices: What Works (Best Practices)|727
3|Conclusion: Is Social Reuse a Promising Disposal Option?|729
1|Part IV: Counter-Terrorism Financing|734
2|30: Counter-Terrorism Financing: An Overview|735
3|The Background|735
3|Chapter Outline|739
2|31: Counter-Terrorism Financing Assemblages After 9/11|752
3|Introduction|752
3|CTF After 9/11|754
3|CTF Regulation as Complex Assemblage|758
3|Banks in the Frontline|763
3|Inside Banking Practice|765
3|Conclusions|768
2|32: The Financial War on Terrorism: A Critical Review of the United Kingdom’s Counter-Terrorist Financing Strategies|777
3|Introduction|777
3|The Origins of the Financial War on Terrorism|778
3|Counter-Terrorist Financing Before 9/11|780
3|Counter-Terrorist Financing After 11 September 2001|782
3|Criminalisation|783
3|Asset Freezing|784
3|Confiscation/Forfeiture|786
3|The Sanctions Regime|788
3|Financial Intelligence|789
3|Conclusion|792
2|33: Legal and Regulatory Approaches to Counter-Terrorist Financing: The Case of Australia|803
3|Introduction|803
3|The Evolution of Australia’s Framework to Counter the Financing of Terrorism|805
3|The Legislative Framework for Criminalising the Financing of Terrorism|807
4|Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)|807
5|Financing Terrorism|807
5|Funding a Terrorist Organisation|809
4|The Domestic Application of the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Sanctions|810
4|The Restraint and Recovery of Criminal Assets|811
5|The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth)|811
5|State Legislation: The Example of New South Wales|812
5|Oversight and Reporting Mechanisms|813
5|Cash Dealers and the Obligation to Report Suspicious Transactions|814
5|Licensing Requirements for Money Value Transfer Service Providers|815
5|Reporting Obligations for Wire Transfers and International Fund Transfer Instructions|817
5|Reporting Obligations in Relation to the Transfer of Currency into or out of Australia|817
5|Non-Profit Organisations|819
3|Concluding Observations|820
2|34: Examining the Efficacy of Canada’s Anti-terrorist Financing Laws|830
3|Introduction|830
3|Anti-terrorist Financing Regime|832
3|Assessing Efficacy|834
3|Was the Air India Report a Turning Point?|837
3|Conclusion|841
2|35: EU Measures to Combat Terrorist Financing|850
3|Introduction|850
3|EU Measures to Combat Terrorist Finances|851
3|Meeting EU’s Official Goals in the Fight Against Terrorist Financing|856
4|Ratification and Implementation of UN Resolutions and FATF Recommendations|856
4|Drafting, Adoption and Implementation of EU’s Own Measures|860
3|Effectiveness of EU Measures for Counterterrorist Financing?|862
4|Amount of Frozen Terrorist Assets|863
4|Number of Suspicious Activity Reports and Other Criteria|865
3|Concluding Remarks|868
2|36: The United Nations Security Council Sanctions Regime Against the Financing of Terrorism|877
3|Two Regimes for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (SFT)|877
3|Listing: The 1267 Regime|878
3|Legislation|879
3|Implementation, Resistance and the Evolution of Listing|881
3|The Provision for Delisting and Its Procedure|881
3|Information Available to Listed Persons|882
3|Definitional Criteria for Listing|883
3|Control over Delisting|884
3|Independent Review|884
3|SCR 1373: Global and Domestic SFT Legislation|886
3|Concluding Remarks: Security Council Sanctions Within the SFT Behemoth|889
2|37: The Intersection of AML/SFT and Security Council Sanctions|901
3|The Rise of Measures to Suppress Terrorist Financing|901
3|The Development of Links with UN Sanctions|902
3|Evolution of Security Council Sanctions for Counter Terrorism|903
3|The Use of Targeted Sanctions|904
3|The Creation of a Counter Terrorism Sanctions Regime|905
3|The Fair Process Challenge|906
3|The Ombudsperson|909
3|The Ombudsperson: Sufficient Fairness|911
3|Other Challenges|913
3|Conclusion|915
2|38: Anti-terrorism Smart Sanctions and Armed Conflicts|921
3|Introduction|921
3|The Purported Existence of a Norm Conflict and the Role of the Principle of Lex Specialis|923
3|The Unilateral Application of Restrictive Measures in Light of the Principle of Non-intervention|925
3|Economic Sanctions and the Right to Self-Determination|929
3|Conclusions|932
2|39: Applying Social Network Analysis to Terrorist Financing|939
3|Introduction|939
3|Social Network Analysis: A Relational Approach|940
3|Al-Shabaab Case Study|943
3|Hezbollah Case Studies|944
3|Analysing Terrorist Financing Networks|948
3|Conclusion|953
2|40: Criminal Prosecutions for Terrorism Financing in the UK|961
3|Introduction|961
3|Details of CTF Provisions in the UK|963
4|Offences|963
4|Forfeiture|965
4|Seizure of Cash|966
3|Prosecutor’s Viewpoint47|967
4|Strategy|968
4|Apparatus|971
4|Offences|973
3|Defender’s Viewpoint90|974
3|Conclusion|978
2|41: The Failure to Prosecute ISIS’s Foreign Financiers Under the Material Support Statute|988
3|Introduction|988
3|The Scope of Criminal Liability Under the Material Support Statute|991
4|The Statutory Framework|991
4|Extraterritorial Jurisdiction|993
4|Inchoate Liability|995
3|Who Is Being Prosecuted Under the Material Support Statute?|996
4|Undercover Operations|999
4|Attempt Liability|1002
4|Conspiracy Liability|1004
4|Lack of Extraterritorial Application|1006
3|Who Should Be Prosecuted Under the Material Support Statute?|1006
3|Conclusion|1008
2|42: Counter Terrorism Finance, Precautionary Logic and the Regulation of Risk: The Regulation of Informal Value Transfer Systems Within the UK|1021
3|Introduction: Post 9/11 Crisis and the Prominence of Counter Terrorism Finance Strategy|1021
3|Precautionary Logic|1022
3|IVTS: Informal Cultural Networks—Risk and Suspicion|1025
3|Suspect Targets and Sanctions Listings: The Al Barakaat Case|1028
3|UK Perspective: The Regulation of Money Service Businesses|1029
3|Intelligence Gathering and Suspicions Activity Reporting|1035
3|Regulatory Consequence: De-risking and Financial Exclusion|1036
3|Conclusion|1037
2|43: Responding to Money Transfers by Foreign Terrorist Fighters|1053
3|Introduction|1053
4|What Is a Money Service Business?|1054
4|What Is a Money Transfer?|1054
4|Know Your Customer Requirements to Send a Money Transfer|1055
3|MSB Exposure to Foreign Terrorist Fighters Money Transfers|1056
4|Terrorism Is Cheap and Money Transfers are an Attractive Option|1057
3|MSB Compliance Programmes|1058
4|Balancing Risk with Humanitarian Need|1058
4|Different Regulations in Every Country|1059
4|The Role of Financial Intelligence Units|1059
4|Necessity of Strategic Intelligence|1059
4|Strategic Intelligence and Law Enforcement|1061
3|Building and Leveraging a Typology: A Strategic Intelligence Response to Foreign Terrorist Fighters|1061
4|Building a Typology|1062
4|Leveraging the Typology to Deploy Automated Transaction Rules|1064
4|Importance of Technology in Responding to FTF Money Transfers|1066
4|Strategic Response Is Effective at Controlling Risk but Inefficient at Identifying Individual FTFs|1066
4|Generating FTF Targets When No Consumers Stand Out|1067
3|Challenges|1068
4|The Problem of Limited Information|1068
4|Refugee Crises Overlapping with Foreign Terrorist Fighter Typology|1070
4|Continuing Evolution of the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Typology|1071
4|Challenge of Using International Law Enforcement Referral Information|1071
3|Conclusion|1072
2|44: Terrorism Financing and the Governance of Charities|1077
3|Introduction|1077
3|Legal and Other Governance Mechanisms to Curtail Charitable Financing of Terrorism in the United Kingdom|1081
4|Internal Governance|1082
4|External Governance|1084
3|Intended Consequences of Governance|1086
3|Unintended Consequences of Governance|1095
3|Conclusions and Future Governance|1097
2|45: Governing Non-profit Organisations Against Terrorist Financing: The Malaysian Legal and Regulatory Modalities|1108
3|Introduction|1108
3|What Are Non-profit Organisations?|1109
3|Terrorism Financing and Its International Governance|1110
3|The Vulnerabilities of NPOs to Terrorist Financing|1112
3|Criminalising Terrorism Financing in Malaysia|1113
4|NPOs and Terrorist Financing in Malaysia|1117
3|Governing the NPOs in Malaysia|1119
4|Governing Zakat in Malaysia|1121
4|The Best Practices Approach for NPOs in Malaysia|1121
3|Conclusion|1123
2|46: Kidnap and Terrorism Financing|1131
3|The Rise of Kidnapping for Ransom to Fund Terrorism|1133
3|Recent Efforts Towards a Universal Terrorist Ransom Ban|1135
3|The Legal Impact of the Measures Urging a Universal Terrorist Ransom Ban|1137
3|Norm Influence and the Recent Measures Urging a Universal Ransom Ban|1140
3|Considering the Alternative: Force Instead of Persuasion|1142
4|Practical and Ethical Obstacles to Enforcing a Legally Binding Terrorist Ransom Ban Directed at Governments|1142
4|Practical and Ethical Obstacles to Enforcing a Legally Binding Terrorist Ransom Ban Directed at Individuals|1144
3|The Way Forward: More Persuasion|1148
2|47: The Illicit Antiquities Trade and Terrorism Financing: From the Khmer Rouge to Daesh|1156
3|Militant and Terrorist Funding via the Illicit Antiquities Trade|1157
4|Brief History of the Antiquities Trade and Its Link to Violence|1157
4|Estimates on the Scope of ISIS’s Antiquities Trade|1158
4|Details of ISIS’s Antiquities Operation|1160
3|Legal Frameworks for Targeting the Blood Antiquities Problem|1162
4|International Conventions and UN Security Council Resolutions|1163
4|Domestic Law—US Example|1165
3|Conclusion and Recommendations|1170
1|Selected Bibliography|1181
1|Index|1202